sexta-feira, 12 de julho de 2013

Asiana Flight 214 - Reconstruction


Jack Suchocki, who flew 727s and other aircraft, made this animation to demonstrate his company’s work, and because he believes “this was a very unique crash that will be influential in evaluating pilot training and qualifications.”
 
Jack Suchocki, que voou Boeing 727 e outras aeronaves, fez esta animação para demonstrar o trabalho da empresa dele, e porque ele acredita  que “este foi o único acidente que estará influenciando em avaliação de qualificações e treinamento de piloto”.
 
Suchocki started Eyewitness Animations in Pompano Beach, Fla., after his career as a captain with Eastern Airlines. His company uses computer-aided design modeling from San Rafael-based Autodesk to re-create air crashes for investigations and litigation.
Suchocki iniciou a empresa Eyewitness Animation em Pompano Beach, Flórida, após a carreira dele como um comendante da Eastern Linhas Aéreas. A empresa dele usa modelagem de desenho auxiliada por computador do Autodesk baseado em San Rafael para recriar  acidentes aéreos para investigações e litígio.
The animation begins when the plane is below 500 feet in elevation, and transpires in real time. Speed was a major issue in the crash, and the ghost plane in the video showing how the plane should have landed would have immediately left the frame of the video if depicted realistically. For that reason, Suchocki had the two planes travel together.
 
A animação começa quando o avião está abaixo de 500 pés de altura, e transcorre em tempo real. A velocidade era um assunto principal no acidente e o avião fantasma [azul claro) no video mostrando como o avião devia ter pousado, teria imediatamente deixado o quadro do video se retratado realisticamente. Por essa razão, Suchocki teve dois aviões viajando juntos.
 

segunda-feira, 8 de julho de 2013

Asiana Flight 214 - Detailed Descent Speed Before Impact



Asiana Flight 214 - Detailed the descent speed by Deborah Hersman, NTSB chairwoman

 

Asiana Flight 214 – Velocidade de descida detalhada pela presidente da NTSB, Deborah Hersman

 

Deborah Hersman detailed the descent speed of the plane in the moments before the crash.
Deborah Hersman detalhou a velocidade de descida do avião nos momentos antes do acidente.
At 1,600 feet and 82 seconds prior to impact, autopilot was disengaged.
 
A 1600 pés e 82 segundos antes do impacto, o Piloto Automático foi desligado.
At 500 feet and 34 seconds before impact, the plane dipped below target landing speed of 137 knots to 134 knots.
A 500 pés e 34 segundos antes do impacto, o avião mergulhou abaixo da velocidade alvo de pouso de 137 Knots [253 Km/h] para 134 Knots [248 Km/h].
Speed continued to decrease as the plane continued its decent. At three seconds prior to impact, the flight data recorder "recorded its lowest speed, of 103 knots," Hersman said. Engines at the time were at about 50% power and engine power was increasing. At impact, air speed was 106 knots, she said, meaning it was speeding up. 
 
A velocidade continuou a diminuir enquanto o avião continuava sua descida. A três segundos antes do impacto, o gravador de dados de voo [FDR] “registrou sua mais baixa velocidade, de 103 Knots” [190 Km]/h], disse Hersman. Os motores na hora estavam cerca de 50% da potência e a potência estava aumentando.  No impacto, a velocidade era de 106 Knots, ela disse, significando que ela estava acelerando.
"We're looking at what [the crew was] doing and why they were doing it," Hersman said. "We want to know what they understood."
“Nós estamos olhando o que [o tripulante estava] fazendo e por que eles estavam fazendo isso”, disse Hersman. “Nós queremos saber o que eles entenderam”.
Pilots were asked to increase the speed of the aircraft about seven seconds before impact
 
Os pilotos foram solicitados para aumentar a velocidade da aeronave cerca de sete segundos antes do impacto.
Four seconds before impact, an instrument that warns pilots of an impending stall began to vibrate loudly and rapidly. About 1.5 seconds before the crash, the crew gave the order to abort the landing, turn around and try again.
 
Quatro segundos antes do impacto, um instrumento que alerta pilotos de um iminente estol [perda de sustentação] começou a vibrar alto e rapidamente [stick shaker]. Cerca de 1.5 segundos antes do acidente, a tripulação deu a ordem para abortar o pouso, circular e tentar novamente.
Flight 214 had been cleared by Northern California TRACON for a 17-mile, straight visual approach to the airport, officials said. Communication was passed to SFO air-traffic control tower operators, who heard no distress calls or any other indication that something had gone wrong. Controllers help aircraft avoid each other in the air and on the runway, officials said, but successfully landing the plane is the responsibility of the pilot.
 
O  voo 214 tinha sido autorizado pelo Controle de Tráfego Aéreo Norte da Califórnia para uma aproximação direta visual a 17 milhas [náuticas] (30 Km)  do aeroporto, autoridades disseram. As comunicações pelo rádio foram passadas para os operadores da torre de controle de tráfego aéreo de São Francisco, que não ouviram  chamadas com aflição  ou qualquer outra indicação de que algo tinha dado errado. Os controladores ajudam aeronave a evitar cada outra no ar e na pista, autoridades disseram, mas pousar bem sucedidamente o avião é responsabilidade do piloto.
Investigators are combing through all aspects of the crash, including the crash site. The lower portion of the plane's tail cone is on the rocks at the sea wall, officials said, and a "significant piece" of the tail is in the water. More pieces of the airplane are visible in the water when the tide goes out.
 
Investigadores estão passando pente fino através de todos aspectos do acidente, incluindo o sítio do acidente. A porção mais baixa do cone de cauda do avião está nas pedras no dique, oficiais disseram, e um “significante pedaço” da cauda está na água. Mais pedaços do avião estão visíveis na água quando a maré baixa.
On the beginning of the tarmac, investigators found the horizontal stabilizer, the vertical stabilizer and the upper portion of the tail cone. Farther down Runway 28L, investigators have documented pieces of the landing gear and fractured pieces of the aft fuselage, as well as sea wall debris several hundred feet away from the wall.
 
No começo do Tarmac, investigadores encontraram o estabilizador horizontal, o estabilizador vertical e a porção superior do cone de cauda. Mais adiante na pista 28  Esquerda, os investigadores documentaram pedaços do trem de pouso e pedaços fraturados da fuselagem traseira, tanto quanto destroços do dique centenas de pés longe da parede.

Asiana Flight 214 - Much Slower Than Target Speed for Approach and Landing


UPDATE JULY 8, 2013 18:45 (UTC) 15:45 Brazilian Time

 
 
 
 
SAN FRANCISCO/SEOUL, South Korea  — The pilot of the crashed Asiana plane at San Francisco airport was still "in training" for the Boeing 777 when he attempted to land the aircraft under supervision, the South Korean airline said Monday.
 
São Francisco/Seul, Coreia do Sul – O piloto do avião da Asiana acidentado no aeroporto de  São Francisco estava ainda “em treinamento” para o Boeing 777 quando ele tentava pousar a aeronave sob supervisão, a empresa aérea South Korea disse nesta Segunda-feira (08 JUL).
Lee Kang-kook, the second most junior pilot of four on board the Asiana Airlines aircraft, had 43 hours of experience flying the long-range jet when it crashed Saturday, Asiana said.
 
Le Kang-kook, o segundo piloto mais junior dos quatro a bordo da aeronave da Asiana Linhas Aéreas, tinha 43 horas de experiência voando o jato de longo alcance quando ele acidendou no Sábado (06 JUL), disse a Asiana.
It was his first attempt to land a 777 at San Francisco, though he had flown there 29 times previously on different types of aircraft, said South Korean transport ministry official Choi Seung-youn.
Era a primeira tentativa de pousar um [Boeing 777] em São Francisco, apesar que ele tinha voado para lá 29 vezes perviamente em diferentes tipos de aeronave, disse o ministro dos transportes da Coreia do Sul, Choi Seung-youn.
Earlier, the ministry said Lee Kang-kook had accumulated a total of 9,793 flying hours, including his 43 at the controls of the 777.
Anteriormente, o ministro disse que Lee Kang-kook tinha acumulado um total de 9793 horas, incluindo 43 delas nos controles do [Boeing] 777.
 

Investigação: pilotos tentaram abortar o pouso logo antes do jato acidentar

by Jaxon Van Derbeken and Demian Bulwa
Updated 20:40, Sunday, July 7, 2013


Click on the link below to watch the first preliminary NTSB's report about Asiana Flight 214



Human Translation
by George Rock


(07-07) 20:33 PDT SAN FRANCISCO -- The doomed Asiana Airlines jetliner had its throttles set to idle and was moving so slowly that it nearly stalled before it smashed into  seawall bordering a San Francisco International Airport runway, federal investigators said Sunday.

(07 JUL) 20:23 O jato condenado da Asiana teve suas alavancas de potência ajustadas para Marcha Lenta e estava voando  tão lentamente que ele quase estolou (perdeu sustentação em voo) antes dele colidir contra um dique em volta da pista do aeroporto internacional de San Francisco, investigadores federais disseram Domingo (07).

The crew tried to abort the landing and avert the disaster, which killed two teenagers on board and injured dozens more, but it was too late, according to a preliminary review of flight data and cockpit communications by the National Transportation Safety Board.

 

A tripulação tentou abortar o pouso e evitar o desastre, o qual matou duas adolescentes a bordo e feriu dúzias a mais, mas era muito tarde, de acordo com  uma revisão preliminar pela NTSB sobre os dados do voo e comunicações no cockpit.

 

The crew sought to accelerate 7 1/2 seconds before impact, investigators said. Three seconds later, a vibrating "shaker stick" in the cockpit signaled an impending stall - a condition in which the wings lose lift and a plane can't be controlled.

A tripulação buscou acelerar 7.5 segundos antes do impacto, disseram investigadores. Três segundos depois, uma vibração do “stick shaker”(coluna do manche vibra]  no cockpit sinalizou  um estol iminente – uma condição na qual as asas perdem sustentação e um avião não pode ser controlado. [em baixíssima altitude].

And with 1 1/2 seconds left, someone on board alerted an air traffic controller that the Boeing 777 jetliner would try to pull up and circle around. It could not, and at 11:27 a.m. it bounced and skidded across the ground, losing its tail before it came to rest on the side of Runway 28L.

E com 1.5 segundos restante, alguém a bordo alertou um controlador de tráfego aéreo que o jato Boeing 777 tentaria arremeter e circular em volta. Ele não pôde, e às 11:27 A. M. Ele quicou e deslizou no solo, perdendo sua cauda antes dele parar na lateral da pista 28 da Esquerda.

National Transportation Safety Board Chairwoman Deborah Hersman said at a media briefing Sunday that it was too early to say what caused the crash of Asiana Flight 214, which was completing an 11-hour trip from Seoul with 307 people aboard.

A presidente da NTSB Deborah Hersman disse numa entrevista com a midia nesse Domingo que era muito cedo para dizer o que causou o acidente do Asiana Voo 214, o qual estava completando um viagem de 11 horas de Seul com 307 pessoas a bordo.

"Everything is on the table right now," she said

“ Tudo está na mesa neste momento”, ela disse.

Much slower than target.

Muito mais lento do que o alvo

However, Hersman focused her comments on the speed of the plane, which she said was "significantly below" the target speed of 137 knots, or 158 mph. "We're not talking about a few knots here or there," she said.

Todavia, Hersman focou os comentários dela na velocidade do avião, a qual ela disse estar “significante abaixo”da velocidade alvo de 137 Knots, ou 253 Km/h. “Nós não estamos falando de [defasagem] de poucos Knots aqui ou ali”,  ela disse.

"The approach proceeds normally as they descend. There is no discussion of any aircraft anomalies or concerns with the approach," Hersman said. When the throttles were finally advanced seconds before impact, she said, "the engines appear to respond normally."

 

“A aproximação prosseguia normalmente enquanto eles desciam. Não há discussão de qualquer anomalia na aeronave ou preocupações com a aproximação”,  disse Hersman. Quando as alavancas de potência foram finalmente avançadas segundos antes do impacto, ela disse, “os motores pareceram responder normalmente”.

At that point, though, the crew may have been powerless to regain altitude, said aviation experts. They were surprised that the jetliner's throttles were apparently idling at such a low altitude, which would have caused a lag time when they were finally pushed.

 

Nesse ponto, apesar desse fato, a tripulação pode ter estado sem potência para reganhar altitude, disse um especialista em aviação. Eles foram surpreendidos de que as alavancas de potência do jato estavam aparentemente na posição Marcha-Lenta em tal altitude baixa, o que teria causado um  intervalo de tempo  quando elas foram finalmente empurradas. [aceleradas].

"If you do that prior to impact, you're not going to have enough time to advance the throttles," said Barry Schiff, a former pilot for TWA who has written extensively about aviation safety. "You should always make an approach with power, and they didn't do that."

 

“Se você faz isso antes do impacto, você não está indo ter tempo suficiente para avançar as alavancas de potência”, disse Barry Schiff, um ex-piloto da TWA que tem escrito extensivamente acerca de segurança de aviação. “Você devia sempre fazer um aproximação com  potência, e eles não fizeram  isso”.

He added, "These pilots have a lot of explaining to do."

Ele acrescentou, “Estes pilotos têm uma porção de explicação a fazer”.

Jim Tilmon, a former commercial pilot and aviation consultant in Arizona, said the plane appeared to be "behind the power curve" - meaning that when the crew tried to throttle up the Pratt & Whitney engines, they may not have had enough altitude to arrest their descent.

 

Jim Tilmon, um ex-piloto comercial e um consultor de aviação no Arizona, disse que o avião pareceu estar  “atrás da curva de potência” – significando que quando a tripulação tentou acelerar os motores Pratt & Whitney, eles não puderam ter tido altitude suficiente para interromper a descida.

"It sounds like, too low, too slow, too late," Tilmon said.

“Isso soa como, muito baixo, muito baixo muito tarde”,  disse Tilmon

Hersman said one part of the investigation would look at whether the crew of the jetliner was affected by the loss of a key piece of airport equipment, known as a glide slope indicator, that had not been operating since June 1 because of a runway expansion project.

Hersman disse que uma parte da investigação olharia se a tripulação do jato foi afetada pela perda de uma peça chave do equipamento do aeroporto, conhecida como um indicador de rampa de planeio, que não tinha estado operando desde o dia 01 Junho por causa de um projeto de expansão da pista.

The system - designed for weather conditions that decrease visibility - gives pilots a 3-degree descent path to the runway. A needle on the instrument panel moves up and down and tells the pilot whether the plane is coming in too high or too low.

 

O sistema – planejado para condições meteorológicas que diminuem a visibiidade – dá aos pilotos uma trajetória de descida com 3 graus de ângulo para a pista. Uma agulha no painel de instrumentos move-se para cima e para baixo e diz ao piloto se o avião está voando muito acima da rampa de planeio ou muito abaixo.

Good visibility

Boa visibilidade

Hersman warned against drawing any conclusions about the loss of the indicator. Other systems were available to guide the plane, she said, including color-coded lights that show red when planes approach too low. It was a clear day with good visibility, she said, and the pilots were cleared for a visual approach.

 

Hersman alertou contra esboçar quaisquer conclusões acerca do indicador. Outros sistemas estavam disponíveis para guiar o avião, ela disse, incluindo luzes de cores codificadas que se mostram vermelhas quando aviões aproximam-se muito baixo. Estava um dia limpo com boa visibilidade, ela disse, e os pilotos estavam autorizados para uma aproximação visual.

Aviation experts said the loss of the glide slope system should not have been a problem. However, they added that, if it was working, it might have warned the Asiana Airlines crew of the impending danger.

Especialistas em aviação disseram que a falta do sistema da Rampa de Planeio não devia ter sido um problema. Todavia, eles acrescentaram quem se ele estivesse funcionando, ele poderia ter avisado à tripulação da Asiana Linhas Aéreas do perigo iminente.

"Let's face it, pilots were making approaches to that runway all day long," Schiff said. "You don't need to have that when conditions are clear. You can see the runway ahead of you."

 

“Vamos encarar isso, pilotos estavam fazendo aproximações para aquela pista durante todo o dia”,  disse Schiff. “Você não precisa ter isso quando as condições [meteorológicas] são boas. Você pode ver a pista em frente de você”.

Data collected by FlightAware, which tracks navigation broadcasts for sale to the aviation industry, showed the plane was dropping fast. When the plane was 600 feet over the bay, the company said, its descent was nearly twice as fast as normal.

 

Dados coletados pela Flight Aware, a qual rastrea navegação e transmite comercialmente para a indústria de aviação, mostrou que o avião estava descendo rápido. Quando o avião estava a 600 pés sobre a baia, a empresa disse, sua descida estava perto de duas vezes tão rápida quanto a normal.

The investigation, which will take months, will be aided not only by the recovery of the flight data recorder, but also by the survival of the pilots, said Kevin Hiatt, a former chief pilot for Delta Airlines who heads the Flight Safety Foundation in Alexandria, Va.

A investigação, a qual levará meses, será auxiliada não somente para recuperação do gravador de dados de voo, mas também  pela sobrevivência dos pilotos, disse Kevin Hiatt, um ex-piloto chefe da Delta Airlines que chefia a Flight Safety Foundation em Alexandria, Virginia.

"Investigators are going to be able to talk to them about whether there were any other factors that got them into that situation," Hiatt said.

“Investigadores vão ser capazes de conversar com eles acerca se houve quaisquer outros fatores que os fizeram entrar nessa situação”,  disse Hiatt.
 

domingo, 7 de julho de 2013

The Dark Side of the Visual Landing


 
The Dark Side of the Visual Landing

 The visual approach, intended to benefit everyone, frequently results in pilots experiencing exactly the opposite effect. Visual approach incidents reported to the ASRS frequently cite confusion, with resultant stress on the flight crews. There are a variety of performance errors revealed in ASRS reports.

 How do Visual Illusions Affect the Pilot's Perception?

Visual illusions result from the absence of or the alteration of visual references that modifies the pilot perception of his / her position relative to the runway threshold.

Visual illusions affect perception of heights, distances and/or intercept angles.
 
Visual illusions are most critical when transitioning from IMC and instrument references to VMC and visual references.

Visual illusions (such as the black-hole effect) affect the flight crew vertical and horizontal situational awareness, particularly during the base leg and when turning final (as applicable) and during the final approach.

Visual illusions usually induce crew inputs (corrections) that cause the aircraft to deviate from the original and intended vertical or lateral flight path.

 “Black hole” along the final approach flight path:

In case of approach over water or with an unlighted area on the approach path, the absence of visible ground features reduces the crew ability to perceive the aircraft lateral and vertical position relative to the intended flight path.

 

Low intensity lights create the impression of being farther away (hence on a shallower glide path).

 Decrease in Speed (Well Below Vapp) Before the Flare

Flight at too low a speed results in a high Angle-of-Attack and a high pitch attitude, and therefore, reduced ground clearance. When the aircraft reaches the flare height, the flight crew must significantly increase the pitch to reduce the sink rate. This will further reduce the ground clearance.

 Sink Rate Too High Just Prior to Reaching the Flare Height

If the sink rate is too high when the aircraft is close to the ground, the flight crew may attempt to avoid a firm touchdown by commanding a high pitch rate. This action will significantly increase the pitch attitude. However, if the resulting lift increase is not sufficient to significantly reduce the sink rate, a firm touchdown may occur. In addition, the high pitch rate may be difficult to control after touchdown, particularly in the case of a bounce.

 


Bounce at Touchdown

In the case of a bounce at touchdown, the flight crew may decide to increase the pitch attitude, to ensure a smooth second touchdown. If the bounce results from a firm touchdown associated with a high pitch rate, it is important for the flight crew to control the pitch, so that it does not continue to increase.

Crosswinds Not Handled Correctly

When the aircraft is close to the ground, the wind velocity tends to decrease, and the wind direction tends to turn (direction in degrees decreasing in northern latitudes). The flight crew must be aware that during the approach phase, and especially during the flare, a crosswind effect could suddenly increase the pitch of the aircraft, and result in tailstrike.

 HGST - Head-UP Guidance System Technology

 Most importantly, HGST provides real-time display of the aircraft Flight Path Vector and acceleration conformal with the real world scene and allows the pilot access to other critical information such as airspeed, altitude, etc. while viewing the outside scene.

 

Seventeen distinct safety properties of the HGST were defined

 The study concludes that in modern jet aircraft (glass cockpit) the HGST might have prevented or positively influenced 38% of the accidents overall.

 Of these accidents where the pilot was directly involved, such as takeoff and landing and loss-of-control accidents, the likehood of accident prevention due to HGST safety properties becomes much greater, 69% and 57%, respectively.

HGS SAFETY PROPERTIES

1. Flight Path Vector

The Flight Path Vector is inertially derived and provides instantaneous indication of where the aircraft is going relatively to the outside world on a conformal display.

2. Flight Path Acceleration

The acceleration (or deceleration) of the aircraft along the flight path is indicated by the Flight Path Acceleration symbol. The flight path acceleration is made up of the total acceleration forces acting on the aircraft, including acceleration generated by both the aircraft in the form of thrust and acceleration generated by the air mass the aircraft is moving through. To avoid confusion in the control of aircraft thrust, the Flight Path Acceleration symbol is removed from the display when the HGS detects a low-level decreasing performance windshear.

3. Guidance Cue

The guidance cue provides lateral/vertical guidance from the Flight Control Computers (FCC) and provides lateral/vertical guidance to touchdown through rollout from the HGS computer. It also provides takeoff guidance from the HGST computer for lower-than-standard takeoff minimums.

 4. Speed Error Tape

The speed error tape provides a positive or a negative presentation of airspeed difference between actual and selected airspeed with an intuitive tape presentation. It also provides the pilot very precise control of speed in conjunction with the inertia caret.

 5. Runway Remaining

The Runway Remaining symbology provides a digital readout in 500 feet increments during the takeoff ground roll and Category III Mode Rollout. The symbol simulates the runway markings such that the display will show a decrement by 500 feet as each marker is passed.

 6. Deceleration Rate Index

The deceleration rate index presented using the inertia caret indicates deceleration with respect to the airplane autobrake algorithms or other deceleration references familiar to the crew. The inertia caret algorithms run independently in the HGS computer and present an inertially derived deceleration indexed on the combiner. The index on the combiner is presented with indices that represent their values that correlate to the airplane autobrake settings or other deceleration performance references useful to the crew.
 

7. Unusual Attitude Display

During unusual attitudes, the HGS display automatically switches to a format designed for recognition of and recovery from the conditions. When the airplane attitude is restored to a stable condition, the display format is returned to the selected operating mode.

The HGS Unusual Attitude mode main display feature is a large attitude sphere in the center of the display with a distinct sky/ground indication. The basic airspeed and altitude scales from the Primary mode are also displayed, and the rest of the display is de-cluttered for concentration on the basic flight information. The Unusual Attitude mode is automatically entered and exited, overriding the currently selected normal operational mode on the display.

 8. Autonomous Flare Guidance

The Flight Path Canards will appear attached to the sides of the Flight Path. They appear at approximately 105 feet altitude AGL. The serve as reference points that position them in line with the Autonomous Flare Cue when the flare maneuver is being correctly executed.

 The Autonomous Flare Cue provides flare symbology in PRI, IMC AND VMC modes. The symbol is both a flare anticipation and flare symbology cue. To distinguish between these two functions the dashed lines will become solid lines when the symbol is to be used as a flare symbology cue.

The No Flare Annunciation provides an indication that Autonomous Flare symbology cannot be provided. The symbol displayed in the upper left area of the display.

 9. Tailstrike Limit and Tailstrike Advisory

On takeoff the HGS provides a Tailstrike Limit symbol that is displayed when the pitch attitude indicates that the airplane is rotating at a rate or to an extent that will cause a tailstrike. The symbol looks like a bar bell: O----O.  In order to avoid a tailstrike, the pilot must not allow the boresight symbol to pass through the Tailstrike Limit symbol.

 On landing, a Tailstrike Advisory is displayed in text on the combiner when the airplane is in an attitude or flares et a rate that would cause the airplane to strike the tail. This is caused by improper configuration, significant negative speed deviation or pilot induced oscillation from over-rotating during the flare.

10. TCAS Guidance

When a Resolution Advisory 9RA) is received from the TCAS Computer, a TCAS Resolution Advisory Symbol is displayed on the HGS display. TCAS Resolution Advisories are either corrective or preventive. Corrective advisories are issued when the aircraft vertical flight path must be altered to avoid collision, while preventive advisories are as issued when an intruder is within range, but the current vertical flight path of the aircraft is safe and the pilot only needs to monitor vertical speed.

When a Corrective Up or Corrective Down TCAS Resolution Advisory is received by the HGS, the Corrective Resolution Advisory symbol is displayed indicating  the "fly" region for the Flight Path symbol to avoid a collision with the other traffic.

11. Windshear Avoidance/Recovery Guidance/Performance Margin Awareness

Early recognition of wind shear is identified by observing the erratic wind direction and wind velocity on the direction symbol and velocity symbol. The HGS/HUD will provide an intuitive and immediate identification of performance margin available to the pilot during a wind shear recovery by displaying the AoA limit symbol. The pilot maintains the flight path vector over the solid guidance cue and between the zero degree pitch line and the AoA limit symbol. The pilot is able to monitor the energy of the airplane via the inertia caret, which combined with the Speed Error Tape, can also provide indications of windshear conditions. To avoid confusion in the control of aircraft thrust, the Flight Path Acceleration symbol is removed from the display when the HGS detects a low-level decreasing performance windshear.

 12. Improved Pilot Performance during Engine Failure on Takeoff Operations

The following symbols provide the pilot with a more intuitive method to quickly ascertain airplane plate, stability, performance and performance margin.

Flight path vector

Inertia caret

Speed error tape

Slip skid

Zero degree pitch line

Angle of Attack Limit (AoA)

 This set of symbols allows the pilot to quickly and intuitively determine the inputs required to stabilize the airplane for engine-inoperative flight. The flight path displays the airplane's path referenced to the zero degree pitch line to establish a positive rate of climb, The AoA limit symbol provides the pilot a  visual reference establishing the maximum ascent capability. The area displayed between the glideslope reference line and the AoA limit determines the performance margin available. The flight path also presents lateral position and when referenced to the slip/skid indicator intuitively provides guidance to the pilot to apply the appropriate rudder forces to stabilize the airplane laterally. The speed error tape presents precise speed control to maintain the designated speed or the engine-out condition. Since the speed the pilot must maintain can vary with when the engine failure occurred during the profile, the speed error tape can be a significant benefit to the pilot in establishing and maintains the desired speed.

13. Surface Movement Guidance

Surface Movement Guidance is a  system that will help pilots navigate better on airport taxiways and runways. The Surface Guidance System (SGS) uses an airport database to identify the centerline and edges of the current runway or taxiway the aircraft is operating on, and display virtual centerline, edges lines, signs and other symbols that overlay the actual airport taxiways, runways and signage will be able to maneuver on the ground with confidence and minimize runway incursions. This capability will utilize multiple technologies to provide accurate position information to ATC and other aircraft.

 14. Weather Avoidance

The zero degree pitch line can be used to determine whether the airplane has the ability to safely fly over low-level thunderstorm in the airplane's path, or the flight path vector can be used to determine a safe and efficient route to circumnavigating thunderstorms.

 15. Selectable Descent Path - Glideslope Reference Line

The reference setting for glideslope is indicated by the position of the Glideslope Reference Line relative to the Horizon Line. The Reference Glideslope value is also displayed digitally at both ends of the Glideslope Reference Line. The Glideslope Reference Line is a conformal display representing the glideslope value selected on the HCP or MCDU or received from the FMC, meaning that the Glideslope Reference Line overlaying a pointy on the ground indicates that the airplane position is at an angle equal to the glideslope reference point.

Maneuvering the aircraft so that the Flight Path symbol overlies any point along the symbol's dashed line results in a descent angle equal to the glideslope value selected. Initiating a descent when the Glideslope Reference Line overlays the runway touchdown zone allows a constant descent angle approach to be flown with pure visual information.

 16. Energy Management during RTO

The inertia caret and deceleration index are used to monitor the Rejected Takeoff (RTO) function. The inertia caret and deceleration index presentation display to the pilot the stopping efficiency and capability of the airplane. The pilot knows the stopping value associated with indexed points of the display and the inertia caret represents the level of braking effect the system is experiencing.

17. Angle of Attack (AoA)

The Angle of Attack Scale and Indicator is displayed in the upper right of the display. It consists of a round dial with pointer and a digital readout that indicate the aircraft's current angle of attack.

 The angle of attack approach reference band is displayed on the Angle of Attack Scale. It indicates the normal approach angles of attack when the flaps are in a landing position.

The angle of attack stick shaker trip point is displayed to provide a visual indication of the aircraft's stick shaker angle of attack.

 Approach

A stabilized approach (i.e. pitch, thrust, flight path, VAPP) is essential for achieving a successful landing.

Auto thrust and the Flight Path Vector (FPV), if available, are effective flight crew aids.

For the approach phase, the flight crew should:

 • Not chase the glide slope close to the ground: Progressively and carefully monitor the pitch attitude and sink rate.

• Avoid high sink rate when close to the ground.

PNF callouts during the final approach are essential to alert the PF of any excessive deviation of flight parameters, and/or excessive pitch attitude at landing. Following a PNF flight parameter exceedance callout, the suitable PF response will be to:

 • Acknowledge the PNF callout, for proper crew coordination purposes

• Take immediate corrective action to control the exceeded parameter back into the defined stabilized conditions

• Assess whether stabilized conditions will be recovered early enough prior to landing, otherwise initiate a go-around.

 Landing

The flight crew should avoid “holding off the aircraft” in an attempt to make an excessively smooth landing.

Immediately after main landing gear touchdown, the PF should release the back pressure on the sidestick (or control column, as applicable) and fly the nose wheel smoothly, but without delay, on to the runway.

The PNF should continue to monitor the attitude.

“PITCH, PITCH” auto callout (synthetic voice, if installed) triggers when pitch becomes excessive during flare and landing.

The Pitch Limit Indication on the PFD (if installed) can also help flight crew awareness, because it indicates the pitch limit before a tailstrike.

Bouncing at Touchdown

In case of a light bounce, the flight crew can apply the following typical recovery technique:

• Maintain a normal landing pitch attitude:

- Do not increase pitch attitude, as this could cause a tailstrike

- Do not allow the pitch attitude to increase, particularly following a firm touchdown with a high pitch rate.

Note: Spoiler extension may induce a pitch-up effect.

 • Continue the landing

• Keep thrust at idle

• Be aware of the increased landing distance.

In case of a more severe bounce, the flight crew should not attempt to land, because the remaining runway length might not be sufficient to stop the aircraft.

For more information, refer to the Flight Operations Briefing Note Bounce Recovery – Rejected Landing.