Jack Suchocki, who flew 727s and other aircraft,
made this animation to demonstrate his company’s work, and because he believes
“this was a very unique crash that will be influential in evaluating pilot
training and qualifications.”
|
Jack Suchocki, que voou Boeing 727 e outras aeronaves, fez
esta animação para demonstrar o trabalho da empresa dele, e porque ele
acredita que “este foi o único
acidente que estará influenciando em avaliação de qualificações e treinamento
de piloto”.
|
Suchocki started Eyewitness Animations in Pompano
Beach, Fla., after his career as a captain with Eastern Airlines. His company
uses computer-aided design modeling from San Rafael-based Autodesk to
re-create air crashes for investigations and litigation.
|
Suchocki iniciou a empresa Eyewitness Animation em Pompano
Beach, Flórida, após a carreira dele como um comendante da Eastern Linhas
Aéreas. A empresa dele usa modelagem de desenho auxiliada por computador do
Autodesk baseado em San Rafael para recriar
acidentes aéreos para investigações e litígio.
|
The animation begins when the plane is below 500
feet in elevation, and transpires in real time. Speed was a major issue in
the crash, and the ghost plane in the video showing how the plane should have
landed would have immediately left the frame of the video if depicted
realistically. For that reason, Suchocki had the two planes travel together.
|
A animação começa quando o avião está abaixo de 500 pés de
altura, e transcorre em tempo real. A velocidade era um assunto principal no
acidente e o avião fantasma [azul claro) no video mostrando como o avião
devia ter pousado, teria imediatamente deixado o quadro do video se retratado
realisticamente. Por essa razão, Suchocki teve dois aviões viajando juntos.
|
sexta-feira, 12 de julho de 2013
Asiana Flight 214 - Reconstruction
segunda-feira, 8 de julho de 2013
Asiana Flight 214 - Detailed Descent Speed Before Impact
Asiana Flight 214 - Detailed the descent speed by Deborah Hersman, NTSB chairwoman
Asiana Flight
214 – Velocidade de descida detalhada pela presidente da NTSB, Deborah Hersman
Deborah Hersman detailed
the descent speed of the plane in the moments before the crash.
|
Deborah Hersman detalhou a velocidade de
descida do avião nos momentos antes do acidente.
|
At 1,600 feet and
82 seconds prior to impact, autopilot was disengaged.
|
A 1600 pés e 82 segundos antes do
impacto, o Piloto Automático foi desligado.
|
At 500 feet and 34
seconds before impact, the plane dipped below target landing speed of 137
knots to 134 knots.
|
A 500 pés e 34 segundos antes do
impacto, o avião mergulhou abaixo da velocidade alvo de pouso de 137 Knots [253
Km/h] para 134 Knots [248 Km/h].
|
Speed continued to
decrease as the plane continued its decent. At three seconds prior to impact,
the flight data recorder "recorded its lowest speed, of 103 knots,"
Hersman said. Engines at the time were at about 50% power and engine power
was increasing. At impact, air speed was 106 knots, she said, meaning it was
speeding up.
|
A velocidade continuou a diminuir
enquanto o avião continuava sua descida. A três segundos antes do impacto, o
gravador de dados de voo [FDR] “registrou sua mais baixa velocidade, de 103
Knots” [190 Km]/h], disse Hersman. Os motores na hora estavam cerca de 50% da
potência e a potência estava aumentando.
No impacto, a velocidade era de 106 Knots, ela disse, significando que
ela estava acelerando.
|
"We're looking
at what [the crew was] doing and why they were doing it," Hersman said.
"We want to know what they understood."
|
“Nós estamos olhando o que [o tripulante
estava] fazendo e por que eles estavam fazendo isso”, disse Hersman. “Nós
queremos saber o que eles entenderam”.
|
Pilots were asked
to increase the speed of the aircraft about seven seconds before impact
|
Os pilotos foram solicitados para
aumentar a velocidade da aeronave cerca de sete segundos antes do impacto.
|
Four seconds before
impact, an instrument that warns pilots of an impending stall began to
vibrate loudly and rapidly. About 1.5 seconds before the crash, the crew gave
the order to abort the landing, turn around and try again.
|
Quatro segundos antes do impacto, um instrumento
que alerta pilotos de um iminente estol [perda de sustentação] começou a
vibrar alto e rapidamente [stick shaker]. Cerca de 1.5 segundos antes do acidente, a
tripulação deu a ordem para abortar o pouso, circular e tentar novamente.
|
Flight 214 had been
cleared by Northern California TRACON for a 17-mile, straight visual approach
to the airport, officials said. Communication was passed to SFO air-traffic
control tower operators, who heard no distress calls or any other indication
that something had gone wrong. Controllers help aircraft avoid each other in
the air and on the runway, officials said, but successfully landing the plane
is the responsibility of the pilot.
|
O
voo 214 tinha sido autorizado pelo Controle de Tráfego Aéreo Norte da
Califórnia para uma aproximação direta visual a 17 milhas [náuticas] (30 Km) do aeroporto, autoridades disseram. As
comunicações pelo rádio foram passadas para os operadores da torre de
controle de tráfego aéreo de São Francisco, que não ouviram chamadas com aflição ou qualquer outra indicação de que algo
tinha dado errado. Os controladores ajudam aeronave a evitar cada outra no ar
e na pista, autoridades disseram, mas pousar bem sucedidamente o avião é
responsabilidade do piloto.
|
Investigators are
combing through all aspects of the crash, including the crash site. The lower
portion of the plane's tail cone is on the rocks at the sea wall, officials
said, and a "significant piece" of the tail is in the water. More
pieces of the airplane are visible in the water when the tide goes out.
|
Investigadores estão passando pente fino
através de todos aspectos do acidente, incluindo o sítio do acidente. A
porção mais baixa do cone de cauda do avião está nas pedras no dique,
oficiais disseram, e um “significante pedaço” da cauda está na água. Mais pedaços
do avião estão visíveis na água quando a maré baixa.
|
On the beginning of
the tarmac, investigators found the horizontal stabilizer, the vertical
stabilizer and the upper portion of the tail cone. Farther down Runway 28L,
investigators have documented pieces of the landing gear and fractured pieces
of the aft fuselage, as well as sea wall debris several hundred feet away
from the wall.
|
No começo do Tarmac, investigadores
encontraram o estabilizador horizontal, o estabilizador vertical e a porção
superior do cone de cauda. Mais adiante na pista 28 Esquerda, os investigadores documentaram
pedaços do trem de pouso e pedaços fraturados da fuselagem traseira, tanto
quanto destroços do dique centenas de pés longe da parede.
|
Asiana Flight 214 - Much Slower Than Target Speed for Approach and Landing
UPDATE JULY 8, 2013 18:45 (UTC) 15:45 Brazilian Time
SAN FRANCISCO/SEOUL, South
Korea — The pilot of the crashed Asiana plane at San Francisco airport
was still "in training" for the Boeing 777 when he attempted to
land the aircraft under supervision, the South Korean airline said Monday.
|
São Francisco/Seul, Coreia do Sul –
O piloto do avião da Asiana acidentado no aeroporto de São Francisco estava ainda “em treinamento” para
o Boeing 777 quando ele tentava pousar a aeronave sob supervisão, a empresa
aérea South Korea disse nesta Segunda-feira (08 JUL).
|
Lee Kang-kook, the second
most junior pilot of four on board the Asiana Airlines aircraft, had 43 hours
of experience flying the long-range jet when it crashed Saturday, Asiana
said.
|
Le Kang-kook, o segundo piloto mais
junior dos quatro a bordo da aeronave da Asiana Linhas Aéreas, tinha 43 horas
de experiência voando o jato de longo alcance quando ele acidendou no Sábado
(06 JUL), disse a Asiana.
|
It was his first attempt to
land a 777 at San Francisco, though he had flown there 29 times previously on
different types of aircraft, said South Korean transport ministry official
Choi Seung-youn.
|
Era a primeira tentativa de pousar
um [Boeing 777] em São Francisco, apesar que ele tinha voado para lá 29 vezes
perviamente em diferentes tipos de aeronave, disse o ministro dos transportes
da Coreia do Sul, Choi Seung-youn.
|
Earlier, the ministry said
Lee Kang-kook had accumulated a total of 9,793 flying hours, including his 43
at the controls of the 777.
|
Anteriormente, o ministro disse que
Lee Kang-kook tinha acumulado um total de 9793 horas, incluindo 43 delas nos
controles do [Boeing] 777.
|
Investigação: pilotos tentaram abortar o pouso logo
antes do jato acidentar
by Jaxon Van Derbeken and
Demian Bulwa
Updated 20:40, Sunday, July 7, 2013 Click on the link below to watch the first preliminary NTSB's report about Asiana Flight 214
Human Translation
by George Rock
(07-07) 20:33 PDT SAN FRANCISCO -- The doomed Asiana
Airlines jetliner had its throttles set to idle and was moving so slowly that
it nearly stalled before it smashed into seawall bordering a San Francisco
International Airport runway, federal investigators
said Sunday.
|
(07 JUL) 20:23 O
jato condenado da Asiana teve suas alavancas de potência ajustadas para
Marcha Lenta e estava voando tão lentamente que ele quase estolou
(perdeu sustentação em voo) antes dele colidir contra um dique em volta da
pista do aeroporto internacional de San Francisco, investigadores federais
disseram Domingo (07).
|
The crew tried to abort the
landing and avert the disaster, which killed two teenagers on board and
injured dozens more, but it was too late, according to a preliminary review
of flight data and cockpit communications by the National
Transportation Safety Board.
|
A tripulação tentou abortar o pouso e evitar o
desastre, o qual matou duas adolescentes a bordo e feriu dúzias a mais, mas
era muito tarde, de acordo com uma
revisão preliminar pela NTSB sobre os dados do voo e comunicações no cockpit.
|
The crew sought to
accelerate 7 1/2 seconds before impact, investigators said. Three seconds
later, a vibrating "shaker stick" in the cockpit signaled an
impending stall - a condition in which the wings lose lift and a plane can't
be controlled.
|
A tripulação buscou acelerar 7.5 segundos antes
do impacto, disseram investigadores. Três segundos depois, uma vibração do “stick
shaker”(coluna do manche vibra] no cockpit sinalizou um estol
iminente – uma condição na qual as asas perdem sustentação e um avião não
pode ser controlado. [em baixíssima altitude].
|
And with 1 1/2 seconds left,
someone on board alerted an air traffic controller that the Boeing 777
jetliner would try to pull up and circle around. It could not, and at 11:27
a.m. it bounced and skidded across the ground, losing its tail before it came
to rest on the side of Runway 28L.
|
E com 1.5 segundos restante, alguém a bordo
alertou um controlador de tráfego aéreo que o jato Boeing 777 tentaria
arremeter e circular em volta. Ele não pôde, e às 11:27 A. M. Ele quicou e
deslizou no solo, perdendo sua cauda antes dele parar na lateral da pista 28 da
Esquerda.
|
National Transportation
Safety Board Chairwoman Deborah Hersman said at a media briefing Sunday that
it was too early to say what caused the crash of Asiana Flight
214, which was completing an 11-hour trip from Seoul with 307
people aboard.
|
A presidente da NTSB Deborah Hersman disse numa
entrevista com a midia nesse Domingo que era muito cedo para dizer o que
causou o acidente do Asiana Voo 214, o qual estava completando um viagem de
11 horas de Seul com 307 pessoas a bordo.
|
"Everything is on the
table right now," she said
|
“ Tudo está na mesa neste momento”, ela disse.
|
Much slower than target.
|
Muito mais lento do que o alvo
|
However, Hersman focused her
comments on the speed of the plane, which she said was "significantly
below" the target speed of 137 knots, or 158 mph. "We're not
talking about a few knots here or there," she said.
|
Todavia, Hersman focou os comentários dela na
velocidade do avião, a qual ela disse estar “significante abaixo”da velocidade
alvo de 137 Knots, ou 253 Km/h. “Nós não estamos falando de [defasagem] de
poucos Knots aqui ou ali”, ela disse.
|
"The approach proceeds
normally as they descend. There is no discussion of any aircraft anomalies or
concerns with the approach," Hersman said. When the throttles were
finally advanced seconds before impact, she said, "the engines appear to
respond normally."
|
“A aproximação prosseguia normalmente enquanto
eles desciam. Não há discussão de qualquer anomalia na aeronave ou
preocupações com a aproximação”, disse
Hersman. Quando as alavancas de potência foram finalmente avançadas segundos
antes do impacto, ela disse, “os motores pareceram responder normalmente”.
|
At that point, though, the
crew may have been powerless to regain altitude, said aviation experts. They
were surprised that the jetliner's throttles were apparently idling at such a
low altitude, which would have caused a lag time when they were
finally pushed.
|
Nesse ponto, apesar desse fato, a tripulação pode
ter estado sem potência para reganhar altitude, disse um especialista em
aviação. Eles foram surpreendidos de que as alavancas de potência do jato
estavam aparentemente na posição Marcha-Lenta em tal altitude baixa, o que
teria causado um intervalo de
tempo quando elas foram finalmente
empurradas. [aceleradas].
|
"If you do that prior
to impact, you're not going to have enough time to advance the
throttles," said Barry Schiff,
a former pilot for TWA who has written extensively about aviation safety.
"You should always make an approach with power, and they didn't
do that."
|
“Se você faz isso antes do impacto, você não está
indo ter tempo suficiente para avançar as alavancas de potência”, disse Barry
Schiff, um ex-piloto da TWA que tem escrito extensivamente acerca de
segurança de aviação. “Você devia sempre fazer um aproximação com potência, e eles não fizeram isso”.
|
He added, "These pilots
have a lot of explaining to do."
|
Ele acrescentou, “Estes pilotos têm uma porção de
explicação a fazer”.
|
Jim Tilmon,
a former commercial pilot and aviation consultant in Arizona, said the plane
appeared to be "behind the power curve" - meaning that when the
crew tried to throttle up the Pratt &
Whitney engines, they may not have had enough altitude to arrest
their descent.
|
Jim Tilmon, um ex-piloto comercial e um consultor
de aviação no Arizona, disse que o avião pareceu estar “atrás da curva de potência” – significando
que quando a tripulação tentou acelerar os motores Pratt & Whitney, eles
não puderam ter tido altitude suficiente para interromper a descida.
|
"It sounds like, too
low, too slow, too late," Tilmon said.
|
“Isso soa como, muito baixo, muito baixo muito
tarde”, disse Tilmon
|
Hersman said one part of the
investigation would look at whether the crew of the jetliner was affected by
the loss of a key piece of airport equipment, known as a glide slope
indicator, that had not been operating since June 1 because of a runway
expansion project.
|
Hersman disse que uma parte da investigação
olharia se a tripulação do jato foi afetada pela perda de uma peça chave do
equipamento do aeroporto, conhecida como um indicador de rampa de planeio,
que não tinha estado operando desde o dia 01 Junho por causa de um projeto de
expansão da pista.
|
The system - designed for weather conditions
that decrease visibility - gives pilots a 3-degree descent path to the
runway. A needle on the instrument panel moves up and down and tells the
pilot whether the plane is coming in too high or too low.
|
O sistema – planejado para condições
meteorológicas que diminuem a visibiidade – dá aos pilotos uma trajetória de
descida com 3 graus de ângulo para a pista. Uma agulha no painel de
instrumentos move-se para cima e para baixo e diz ao piloto se o avião está voando
muito acima da rampa de planeio ou muito abaixo.
|
Good visibility
|
Boa visibilidade
|
Hersman warned against
drawing any conclusions about the loss of the indicator. Other systems were
available to guide the plane, she said, including color-coded lights that
show red when planes approach too low. It was a clear day with good
visibility, she said, and the pilots were cleared for a visual approach.
|
Hersman alertou contra esboçar quaisquer conclusões
acerca do indicador. Outros sistemas estavam disponíveis para guiar o avião,
ela disse, incluindo luzes de cores codificadas que se mostram vermelhas
quando aviões aproximam-se muito baixo. Estava um dia limpo com boa
visibilidade, ela disse, e os pilotos estavam autorizados para uma
aproximação visual.
|
Aviation experts said the
loss of the glide slope system should not have been a problem. However, they
added that, if it was working, it might have warned the Asiana Airlines crew
of the impending danger.
|
Especialistas em aviação disseram que a falta do
sistema da Rampa de Planeio não devia ter sido um problema. Todavia, eles
acrescentaram quem se ele estivesse funcionando, ele poderia ter avisado à
tripulação da Asiana Linhas Aéreas do perigo iminente.
|
"Let's face it, pilots
were making approaches to that runway all day long," Schiff said.
"You don't need to have that when conditions are clear. You can see the
runway ahead of you."
|
“Vamos encarar isso, pilotos estavam fazendo
aproximações para aquela pista durante todo o dia”, disse Schiff. “Você não precisa ter isso
quando as condições [meteorológicas] são boas. Você pode ver a pista em
frente de você”.
|
Data collected by
FlightAware, which tracks navigation broadcasts for sale to the aviation
industry, showed the plane was dropping fast. When the plane was 600 feet
over the bay, the company said, its descent was nearly twice as fast as normal.
|
Dados coletados pela Flight Aware, a qual rastrea
navegação e transmite comercialmente para a indústria de aviação, mostrou que
o avião estava descendo rápido. Quando o avião estava a 600 pés sobre a baia,
a empresa disse, sua descida estava perto de duas vezes tão rápida quanto a
normal.
|
The investigation, which
will take months, will be aided not only by the recovery of the flight data
recorder, but also by the survival of the pilots, said Kevin Hiatt,
a former chief pilot for Delta Airlines
who heads the Flight Safety
Foundation in Alexandria, Va.
|
A investigação, a qual levará meses, será
auxiliada não somente para recuperação do gravador de dados de voo, mas também pela sobrevivência dos pilotos, disse Kevin
Hiatt, um ex-piloto chefe da Delta Airlines que chefia a Flight Safety
Foundation em Alexandria, Virginia.
|
"Investigators are
going to be able to talk to them about whether there were any other factors
that got them into that situation," Hiatt said.
|
“Investigadores vão ser capazes de conversar com
eles acerca se houve quaisquer outros fatores que os fizeram entrar nessa
situação”, disse Hiatt.
|
domingo, 7 de julho de 2013
The Dark Side of the Visual Landing
The Dark Side of the Visual Landing
Visual illusions result from the
absence of or the alteration of visual references that modifies the pilot perception
of his / her position relative to the runway threshold.
Visual illusions affect perception
of heights, distances and/or intercept angles.
Visual illusions are most critical
when transitioning from IMC and instrument references to VMC and visual references.
Visual illusions (such as the
black-hole effect) affect the flight crew vertical and horizontal situational
awareness, particularly during the base leg and when turning final (as
applicable) and during the final approach.
Visual illusions usually induce crew
inputs (corrections) that cause the aircraft to deviate from the original and
intended vertical or lateral flight path.
In case of approach over water or
with an unlighted area on the approach path, the absence of visible ground
features reduces the crew ability to perceive the aircraft lateral and vertical
position relative to the intended flight path.
Low intensity lights create the
impression of being farther away (hence on a shallower glide path).
Flight at too low a speed results in
a high Angle-of-Attack and a high pitch attitude, and therefore, reduced ground
clearance. When the aircraft reaches the flare height, the flight crew must significantly
increase the pitch to reduce the sink rate. This will further reduce the ground
clearance.
If the sink rate is too high when
the aircraft is close to the ground, the flight crew may attempt to avoid a
firm touchdown by commanding a high pitch rate. This action will significantly
increase the pitch attitude. However, if the resulting lift increase is not
sufficient to significantly reduce the sink rate, a firm touchdown may occur.
In addition, the high pitch rate may be difficult to control after touchdown,
particularly in the case of a bounce.
Bounce at Touchdown
In the case of a bounce at
touchdown, the flight crew may decide to increase the pitch attitude, to ensure
a smooth second touchdown. If the bounce results from a firm touchdown
associated with a high pitch rate, it is important for the flight crew to
control the pitch, so that it does not continue to increase.
Crosswinds Not Handled Correctly
When the aircraft is close to the ground,
the wind velocity tends to decrease, and the wind direction tends to turn
(direction in degrees decreasing in northern latitudes). The flight crew must
be aware that during the approach phase, and especially during the flare, a
crosswind effect could suddenly increase the pitch of the aircraft, and result
in tailstrike.
Seventeen distinct safety properties
of the HGST were defined
Of these accidents where the pilot was
directly involved, such as takeoff and landing and loss-of-control accidents,
the likehood of accident prevention due to HGST safety properties becomes much
greater, 69% and 57%, respectively.
HGS SAFETY PROPERTIES
1. Flight Path Vector
The Flight Path Vector is inertially
derived and provides instantaneous indication of where the aircraft is going relatively
to the outside world on a conformal display.
2. Flight Path Acceleration
The acceleration (or deceleration)
of the aircraft along the flight path is indicated by the Flight Path
Acceleration symbol. The flight path acceleration is made up of the total
acceleration forces acting on the aircraft, including acceleration generated by
both the aircraft in the form of thrust and acceleration generated by the air
mass the aircraft is moving through. To avoid confusion in the control of
aircraft thrust, the Flight Path Acceleration symbol is removed from the
display when the HGS detects a low-level decreasing performance windshear.
3. Guidance Cue
The guidance cue provides
lateral/vertical guidance from the Flight Control Computers (FCC) and provides
lateral/vertical guidance to touchdown through rollout from the HGS computer.
It also provides takeoff guidance from the HGST computer for
lower-than-standard takeoff minimums.
The speed error tape provides a
positive or a negative presentation of airspeed difference between actual and selected
airspeed with an intuitive tape presentation. It also provides the pilot very
precise control of speed in conjunction with the inertia caret.
The Runway Remaining symbology
provides a digital readout in 500 feet increments during the takeoff ground
roll and Category III Mode Rollout. The symbol simulates the runway markings
such that the display will show a decrement by 500 feet as each marker is
passed.
The deceleration rate index presented
using the inertia caret indicates deceleration with respect to the airplane
autobrake algorithms or other deceleration references familiar to the crew. The
inertia caret algorithms run independently in the HGS computer and present an
inertially derived deceleration indexed on the combiner. The index on the
combiner is presented with indices that represent their values that correlate
to the airplane autobrake settings or other deceleration performance references
useful to the crew.
7. Unusual Attitude Display
During unusual attitudes, the HGS
display automatically switches to a format designed for recognition of and
recovery from the conditions. When the airplane attitude is restored to a
stable condition, the display format is returned to the selected operating
mode.
The HGS Unusual Attitude mode main
display feature is a large attitude sphere in the center of the display with a
distinct sky/ground indication. The basic airspeed and altitude scales from the
Primary mode are also displayed, and the rest of the display is de-cluttered
for concentration on the basic flight information. The Unusual Attitude mode is
automatically entered and exited, overriding the currently selected normal
operational mode on the display.
The Flight Path Canards will appear
attached to the sides of the Flight Path. They appear at approximately 105 feet
altitude AGL. The serve as reference points that position them in line with the
Autonomous Flare Cue when the flare maneuver is being correctly executed.
The No Flare Annunciation provides
an indication that Autonomous Flare symbology cannot be provided. The symbol
displayed in the upper left area of the display.
On takeoff the HGS provides a
Tailstrike Limit symbol that is displayed when the pitch attitude indicates
that the airplane is rotating at a rate or to an extent that will cause a
tailstrike. The symbol looks like a bar bell: O----O. In order to avoid a
tailstrike, the pilot must not allow the boresight symbol to pass through the
Tailstrike Limit symbol.
10. TCAS Guidance
When a Resolution Advisory 9RA) is
received from the TCAS Computer, a TCAS Resolution Advisory Symbol is displayed
on the HGS display. TCAS Resolution Advisories are either corrective or preventive.
Corrective advisories are issued when the aircraft vertical flight path must be
altered to avoid collision, while preventive advisories are as issued when an
intruder is within range, but the current vertical flight path of the aircraft
is safe and the pilot only needs to monitor vertical speed.
When a Corrective Up or Corrective
Down TCAS Resolution Advisory is received by the HGS, the Corrective Resolution
Advisory symbol is displayed indicating
the "fly" region for the Flight Path symbol to avoid a
collision with the other traffic.
11. Windshear Avoidance/Recovery Guidance/Performance Margin Awareness
Early recognition of wind shear is identified
by observing the erratic wind direction and wind velocity on the direction
symbol and velocity symbol. The HGS/HUD will provide an intuitive and immediate
identification of performance margin available to the pilot during a wind shear
recovery by displaying the AoA limit symbol. The pilot maintains the flight
path vector over the solid guidance cue and between the zero degree pitch line
and the AoA limit symbol. The pilot is able to monitor the energy of the
airplane via the inertia caret, which combined with the Speed Error Tape, can
also provide indications of windshear conditions. To avoid confusion in the
control of aircraft thrust, the Flight Path Acceleration symbol is removed from
the display when the HGS detects a low-level decreasing performance windshear.
The following symbols provide the
pilot with a more intuitive method to quickly ascertain airplane plate,
stability, performance and performance margin.
Flight path vector
Inertia caret
Speed error tape
Slip skid
Zero degree pitch line
Angle of Attack Limit (AoA)
13. Surface Movement Guidance
Surface Movement Guidance is a system that will help pilots navigate better
on airport taxiways and runways. The Surface Guidance System (SGS) uses an
airport database to identify the centerline and edges of the current runway or
taxiway the aircraft is operating on, and display virtual centerline, edges
lines, signs and other symbols that overlay the actual airport taxiways,
runways and signage will be able to maneuver on the ground with confidence and
minimize runway incursions. This capability will utilize multiple technologies
to provide accurate position information to ATC and other aircraft.
The zero degree pitch line can be
used to determine whether the airplane has the ability to safely fly over
low-level thunderstorm in the airplane's path, or the flight path vector can be
used to determine a safe and efficient route to circumnavigating thunderstorms.
The reference setting for glideslope
is indicated by the position of the Glideslope Reference Line relative to the
Horizon Line. The Reference Glideslope value is also displayed digitally at
both ends of the Glideslope Reference Line. The Glideslope Reference Line is a
conformal display representing the glideslope value selected on the HCP or MCDU
or received from the FMC, meaning that the Glideslope Reference Line overlaying
a pointy on the ground indicates that the airplane position is at an angle
equal to the glideslope reference point.
Maneuvering the aircraft so that the
Flight Path symbol overlies any point along the symbol's dashed line results in
a descent angle equal to the glideslope value selected. Initiating a descent
when the Glideslope Reference Line overlays the runway touchdown zone allows a constant
descent angle approach to be flown with pure visual information.
The inertia caret and deceleration
index are used to monitor the Rejected Takeoff (RTO) function. The inertia
caret and deceleration index presentation display to the pilot the stopping
efficiency and capability of the airplane. The pilot knows the stopping value
associated with indexed points of the display and the inertia caret represents
the level of braking effect the system is experiencing.
17. Angle of Attack (AoA)
The Angle of Attack Scale and
Indicator is displayed in the upper right of the display. It consists of a
round dial with pointer and a digital readout that indicate the aircraft's
current angle of attack.
The angle of attack stick shaker
trip point is displayed to provide a visual indication of the aircraft's stick
shaker angle of attack.
A stabilized approach (i.e. pitch,
thrust, flight path, VAPP) is essential for achieving a successful landing.
Auto thrust and the Flight Path
Vector (FPV), if available, are effective flight crew aids.
For the approach phase, the flight
crew should:
• Avoid high sink rate when close to
the ground.
PNF callouts during the final
approach are essential to alert the PF of any excessive deviation of flight
parameters, and/or excessive pitch attitude at landing. Following a PNF flight
parameter exceedance callout, the suitable PF response will be to:
• Take immediate corrective action
to control the exceeded parameter back into the defined stabilized conditions
• Assess whether stabilized
conditions will be recovered early enough prior to landing, otherwise initiate
a go-around.
The flight crew should avoid
“holding off the aircraft” in an attempt to make an excessively smooth landing.
Immediately after main landing gear
touchdown, the PF should release the back pressure on the sidestick (or control
column, as applicable) and fly the nose wheel smoothly, but without delay, on
to the runway.
The PNF should continue to monitor
the attitude.
“PITCH, PITCH” auto callout
(synthetic voice, if installed) triggers when pitch becomes excessive during
flare and landing.
The Pitch Limit Indication on the
PFD (if installed) can also help flight crew awareness, because it indicates
the pitch limit before a tailstrike.
Bouncing at Touchdown
In case of a light bounce, the
flight crew can apply the following typical recovery technique:
• Maintain a normal landing pitch
attitude:
- Do not increase pitch attitude, as
this could cause a tailstrike
- Do not allow the pitch attitude to
increase, particularly following a firm touchdown with a high pitch rate.
Note: Spoiler extension may induce a pitch-up
effect.
• Keep thrust at idle
• Be aware of the increased landing
distance.
In case of a more severe bounce, the
flight crew should not attempt to land, because the remaining runway length
might not be sufficient to stop the aircraft.
For more information, refer to the Flight Operations Briefing Note Bounce
Recovery – Rejected Landing.
Assinar:
Postagens (Atom)