SOFTWARE Glitches - UPDATE for Boeing 737-800 MAX on AOA - On PFD AOA Indicator & Message Alert

http://www.boeing.com/commercial/737max/737-max-software-updates.page

Overview

The Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) flight control law was designed and certified for the 737 MAX to enhance the pitch stability of the airplane – so that it feels and flies like other 737s.

MCAS is designed to activate in manual flight, with the airplane’s flaps up, at an elevated Angle of Attack (AOA).

Boeing has developed an MCAS software update to provide additional layers of protection if the AOA sensors provide erroneous data. The software was put through hundreds of hours of analysis, laboratory testing, verification in a simulator and two test flights, including an in-flight certification test with Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) representatives on board as observers.

The additional layers of protection include:

·         Flight control system will now compare inputs from both AOA sensors. If the sensors disagree by 5.5 degrees or more with the flaps retracted, MCAS will not activate. An indicator on the flight deck display will alert the pilots.

·         If MCAS is activated in non-normal conditions, it will only provide one input for each elevated AOA event. There are no known or envisioned failure conditions where MCAS will provide multiple inputs.

·         MCAS can never command more stabilizer input than can be counteracted by the flight crew pulling back on the column. The pilots will continue to always have the ability to override MCAS and manually control the airplane.

These updates reduce the crew’s workload in non-normal flight situations and prevent erroneous data from causing MCAS activation.

We continue to work with the FAA and other regulatory agencies on the certification of the software update.

Training

To earn a Boeing 737 type rating, pilots must complete 21 or more days of instructor-led academics and simulator training. Differences training between the NG and MAX includes computer-based training (CBT) and manual review.

Boeing has created updated CBT to accompany the software update. Once approved, it will be accessible to all 737 MAX pilots. This course is designed to provide 737 type-rated pilots with an enhanced understanding of the 737 MAX Speed Trim System, including the MCAS function, associated existing crew procedures and related software changes.

Pilots will also be required to review:

·         Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin

·         Updated Speed Trim Fail Non-Normal Checklist

·         Revised Quick Reference Handbook

Key Definitions

Maneuvering Characteristics Augmentation System (MCAS) – flight control law implemented on the 737 MAX to improve aircraft handling characteristics and decrease pitch-up tendency at elevated angles of attack.

Angle of Attack (AOA) – the difference between the pitch angle (nose direction) of the airplane and the angle of the oncoming wind.

Angle of Attack Sensor / Vane – hardware on the outside of the airline that measures and provides angle of attack information to onboard computers; also referred to as an AOA vane.

Angle of Attack Disagree – a software-based information feature that alerts flight crews when data from left and right angle of attack sensors disagree. This can provide pilots insight into air data disagreements and prompts a maintenance logbook entry.

Angle of Attack Indicator – a software-based information feature that provides angle of attack data to the flight crew through the primary flight displays. It is an option that can be selected by customers.

Control law – a set of software that performs flight control function or task

FCOM (Flight Crew Operations Manual Bulletin) – supplementary operations information

FOTB (Flight Operations Technical Bulletin) – supplementary technical information

Speed trim system – a system that uses multiple components to provide additional speed or pitch stability when needed

Stick Shaker & AOA System Anomalies - RECOGNITION AND RECOVERY TECHNIQUES

Stick shaker. An artificial stall warning system is required for airplane certification if the natural prestall buffet characteristics of the airplane are insufficient to warn the flight crew of an impending stall. This warning must be in a form other than visual to be effective, even if the flight crew is not looking at the instrument panel. Beginning with early commercial jetliners, standard practice has been to equip these airplanes with a stick shaker as a means of stall warning. Some airplanes also have employed stick nudgers or stick pushers to improve stall avoidance and stall characteristics. All these indications have been driven by an AOA threshold, which is usually a function of flap configuration, landing gear configuration, or both.

Because of the effect of Mach number on stall AOA, the stall warning AOA typically was set at a conservative level to accommodate gross weight and altitude variations expected in the terminal area.

It should be noted that the stall warning schedule does not follow the buffet boundary at very high Mach numbers. The buffet here is caused by Mach buffet, or too high a speed. Setting the stall warning system to activate at this point may lead the flight crew to believe the airplane is near stall and increase, rather than decrease, speed.

The early stall warning system thresholds were not set to be effective at cruise altitudes and speeds because they did not correct for Mach number. This kept the system simple. The stick shaker was set at an AOA effective for low altitudes but at too high a value for cruise. Natural stall buffet was found to give satisfactory warning at higher Mach numbers.

Later stall warning systems used Mach number from the pitot or static air data system to adjust the stall warning AOA threshold down as Mach number increased. This provided the flight crew with a stall warning related to the actual available performance. However, it also made the stall warning system dependent on good pitot and static data, a factor that will be considered in the next section on the dedicated AOA indicator.

SYSTEM ANOMALY RECOGNITION AND RECOVERY TECHNIQUES

Regardless of the nature of erroneous flight instrument indications, some basic actions are key to survival. The longer erroneous flight instruments are allowed to cause a deviation from the intended flight path, the more difficult recovery will be. Some normal procedures are designed, in part, to detect potential problems with erroneous flight instruments to avoid airplane upsets. Examples are the 80-kn call on takeoff and callouts for bank angle exceedances. In some cases the flight crew may need to recover the airplane from an upset condition: unintentional pitch greater than 25 deg nose high or 10 deg nose low, bank angle in excess of 45 deg, or flying at airspeed inappropriate for conditions. As the condition deteriorates, it becomes more dynamic and stressful. This stress increases the difficulty flight crews experience in determining, believing, and adjusting to using the correct instruments and ignoring the faulty instruments. Regardless of the situation, good communication between crewmembers is essential, and several basic actions are paramount:

Recognizing an unusual or suspect indication.

Keeping control of the airplane with basic pitch and power skills.

Taking inventory of reliable information.

Finding or maintaining favorable flying conditions.

Getting assistance from others.

Using checklists

ACCIDENT AND INCIDENT CASE STUDIES

Erroneous flight information such as the many and varied symptoms of pitot-static anomalies can confuse an unprepared flight crew. Because of the confusion caused by multiple and sometimes conflicting alerts and warnings, the flight crew may not recognize an air data error and may fail to respond appropriately. The following accidents and incidents show what can happen when a crew is confronted with unreliable or erroneous flight information.

In December 1974, a Boeing 727 crashed 12 min after takeoff while on a positioning flight from Buffalo, New York, in the United States. Three crewmembers were killed and the airplane was destroyed. The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) determined that the probable cause of the accident was flight crew failure to recognize and correct the airplane's high angle of attack and low speed stall. The stall was precipitated by the crew's reaction to erroneous airspeed indications caused by atmospheric icing blockage of the pitot probe. The pitot heat switch had not been turned to the ON position.

 In April 1991, the crew on a large corporate jet survived the following incident. On the previous leg, the captain's airspeed/Mach indicator and the standby airspeed/Mach indicator were erratic. The ground crew was unable to duplicate the problem. The next leg was at night in visual conditions. It was uneventful until the crew observed the first officer's airspeed/Mach indicator begin an uncommanded increase as the airplane climbed through FL310. Passing FL330, the captain's airspeed remained steady, but the first officer's airspeed pointer exceeded "barber pole," and the high-speed aural clacker activated. The autothrottles were disconnected, and at that point the captain's airspeed indicator began to show a decrease in airspeed that coincided with the standby airspeed/Mach indicator. Because of problems reported on the previous leg, the crew assumed that the captain's instruments were faulty. As the first officer's airspeed/Mach indicator kept increasing, the crew pulled the power back to silence the clacker, but the first officer's airspeed continued to increase and the captain's airspeed indicator continued to decrease. The airplane began to shake, which the crew assumed was high-speed Mach tuck. At FL340, the pitch was increased and stick shaker activated. The crew suddenly realized that they were entering a stall. While performing stall recovery procedures, they experienced severe vertigo, spatial disorientation, and confusion over determining the actual airspeed. Though the clacker was still sounding, fuel flow, attitude, and N1 were calculated for descent. Appropriate checklists were run and the circuit breakers were pulled to silence the clacker. Using calculated attitude and power settings, a descent, instrument landing system approach, and uneventful landing were accomplished. Maintenance later confirmed that the first officer's central air data computer had failed.

 In February 1996, a Boeing 757 crashed after takeoff from the International Airport of Puerto Plata, Dominican Republic. After climbing through 7,300 ft, the airplane descended until it crashed into the Atlantic Ocean about 5 mi off the coast of the Dominican Republic. All 189 people on board were killed, and the airplane was destroyed. Data from the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) and flight data recorder (FDR) indicate that the airspeeds displayed to the captain during the takeoff roll were incorrect and that the captain was aware of this during the takeoff roll. Nevertheless, the captain decided to continue the takeoff, and the first officer notified the captain when the airplane reached V1 and Vr. Shortly after takeoff, the captain commented that his airspeed indicator had begun to operate, even though it indicated unrealistic airspeeds. A normal climbout ensued, and the captain engaged the center autopilot. During the climb, at an altitude of 4,700 ft, RUDDER RATIO and MACH/SPD TRIM advisory messages appeared on the engine indication and crew alerting system display unit. For the next several minutes, the crewmembers discussed the significance of these advisory messages and expressed confusion about the airspeed. At an altitude of about 7,000 ft, the captain's airspeed indicator showed 350 knots, and an overspeed warning occurred, immediately followed by activation of the stall warning system stick shaker. Flight crew confusion about appropriate airspeed, thrust setting, and proper pitch attitude was evident as the airplane stalled, descended, and then crashed. The erroneous readings from the captain's airspeed indicator are consistent with a blocked pitot tube. Comments by the first officer recorded on the CVR suggest that his pitot probe was not obstructed, and he was seeing correct airspeed indications on his display.

 In October 1996, a Boeing 757 crashed into the Pacific Ocean about 30 mi off the coast of Lima, Peru. The flight crew declared an emergency immediately after takeoff because of erroneous airspeed and altitude indications and was attempting to return to Lima when the accident occurred. Data from the CVR and FDR revealed that the airspeed and altitude readings were normal during the takeoff roll. However, as the airplane began to climb, the flight crew noticed that the airspeed indications were too low and the altitude indications were increasing too slowly. Shortly after takeoff, the windshear warning activated, despite calm wind conditions and no significant weather activity. The flight crew declared an emergency and expressed confusion about the airplane's airspeed and altitude displays. Analysis of FDR data indicates that the airplane subsequently climbed to a maximum altitude of approximately 13,000 ft. When the airplane descended, the captain's altitude and airspeed displays were still erroneous, but at that point they indicated higher-than-actual conditions. During descent, the first officer's displayed airspeed slowed to the point of stall warning stick shaker activation. Meanwhile, the captain's airspeed read over 350 knots, and the overspeed warning was sounding. Flight crew confusion about airspeed and altitude was evident as the airplane continued its final descent. At impact into the Pacific Ocean, the captain's flight instruments were reading approximately 9,500 ft and 450 kn. The erroneous indications recorded by the FDR are consistent with a partial blockage of the captain's static ports.

 Three valuable lessons emerged from the investigations of these events. First, the effects of flight instrument anomalies appear during or immediately after takeoff. Second, flight crews must overcome the startle factor associated with rare anomalous events and immediately begin to implement specific corrective procedures and techniques. Finally, flight crews should acquire enough system knowledge to be able to determine the difference between valid and faulty display information.

AOA – Angle of Attack probe has been used as a primary performance parameter for years on some military aircraft, particularly on fighters. There are many good reasons for this.

In general, fighters operate more often at the extremes of the envelope, often flying at maximum lift for minimum radius turns. For other applications, AOA minimizes the pilot (usually single-place) workload by giving a simple target to fly. AOA is accurate enough for these applications. In addition, the higher sweep and lower aspect ratio of the wing reduce the sensitivity to AOA errors.

AOA has proved particularly useful for approach to aircraft carriers, where it is important to maintain a consistent approach attitude for each landing. In this case, 'backside' approach techniques are used, where glide path is controlled primarily by changes in thrust while the aircraft is held at a fixed AOA. Use of this technique during approach on commercial jet airplanes would be contrary to the pitch commands provided by the flight director bars, and to the speed hold mode of the autothrottle, which is often used during approach.

Citation XLS+ PR-AFA - Holding Pattern Entry Is NOT Mandatory

SCROLL DOWN FOR ENGLISH TEXT

AVIAÇÃO NO SÉCULO XXI

Os recursos instalados nas modernas aeronaves estão lá no cockpit como complemento para a segurança da NAVEGAÇÃO AÉREA. Esta minha afirmação é por demais, verdadeira, pois está escrito em TODOS os manuais de operação de todas as aeronaves neste planeta, que “no evento de falha dos instrumentos “SOFISTICADOS”, o piloto somente DEVE confiar nos simplíssimos instrumentos BÁSICOS”:

1.    Bússola

2.    Velocímetro

3.    Altímetro

A aeronave mais moderna do planeta possui OBRIGATORIAMENTE esses instrumentos acima no seu painel sofisticado, e isso para ser usado no evento de falha total na sofisticação.

Teoricamente um piloto detentor de certificações em determinada aeronave, está apto para conduzir uma aeronave de grande porte que eventualmente tenha ficado com apenas os 3 (três) instrumentos acima funcionando,  a pousar em um aeroporto nas proximidades do evento da emergência.

É mera especulação dos investigadores do CENIPA, órgão da Força Aérea Brasileira, encarregado de executar as investigações de acidentes aéreos. As conclusões são medíocres. As alusões são insidiosas. Muita falácia militar.

A avaliação dos investigadores beira a IRRACIONALIDADE quando aventam que a voz do piloto comandante da aeronave no voo produziu indícios de ESTAFA.

Ora, qualquer piloto não emitirá um timbre de voz de CONTENTAMENTO ao iniciar um Procedimento de Arremetida. A sensação é recalcitrante, é de desperdício de tempo, combustível e insatisfação pelo objetivo não cumprido.

O traçado dos perfis de procedimento de aproximação de voo para pouso por instrumentos é MANDATÓRIO para aquelas aeronaves e tripulação que estão limitadas aos parâmetros aquém da era contemporânea de auxílios à navegação aérea.

O “atalho” tão condenado pelos investigadores do CENIPA é um recurso LEGAL e LÓGICO, além de sua utilização por tripulação INTELIGENTE.

Para o familiar de vítima de acidente aéreo quando um investigador PLANTA a notícia de que houve um ATALHO, esse familiar LEIGO em aviação pensará de imediato que foi feito algo ILÍCITO, quando na realidade foi executada uma manobra LÓGICA e fundamentada nos recursos instrumentais de altíssima performance no auxílio para os pilotos assegurarem o pouso com máxima segurança.

Pilotos de aeronave,  tais como do avião Cessna Citation XLS+ 560-6066, matrícula PR-AFA, não devem ficar restritos à utilização BÁSICA dos instrumentos. Esse instrumental sofisticado é para ser DOMINADO pelo tripulante em todas as fases do voo.  

O que se depreende da ALUSÃO dos investigadores para a decisão do Pilot-Flying (PIC) é que todo o esforço dos engenheiros de Software para navegação aérea, tal ‘coletânea de recursos moderníssimos e precisos’ de navegação horizontal e vertical, seja abandonada e os pilotos fiquem escravizados pelas sugestões dos NÃO FAMILIARIZADOS investigadores de acidentes aéreos com a prática, os quais estão apenas deduzindo a partir dos manuais.

Os investigadores do CENIPA querem a todo custo incutir na mente de brasileiros LEIGOS em aviação, um estado mental de brasileiros CULPAREM os pilotos por terem sido extremamente LÓGICOS e usarem o recurso adequadamente, e por que não dizer, brilhantemente. Esses mesmos investigadores portam-se com total incoerência, pois afirmam que o objetivo da investigação NÃO é apontar culpados e responsabilidades, mas intrinsicamente eles APONTAM com todas as letras e INSÍDIA, que o procedimento do piloto em eliminar algumas fases do procedimento de aproximação por instrumentos, chamado vulgarmente de ‘atalho’, seria uma falta de cumprimento de normas. E até mesmo o Procurador da República, Thiago Lacerda Nobre, aventa de que houve violação de regras de tráfego aéreo.

JAMAIS, tão alusão tem valor jurídico ou técnico operacional, quer partindo dos investigadores quer do Procurador ou Promotor Público. Não existe na regulamentação qualquer alusão de que um piloto de aeronave possuidora de recursos de última geração para navegação aérea NÃO poderá eliminar certas etapas do Procedimento de Aproximação para Pouso por Instrumentos.

Afirmo ainda que cientificamente, as etapas do voo desde o instante do desvio para a esquerda, descendo sobre o mar até a altitude de 2200 pés e voando depois no prolongamento do eixo da pista até o instante da declaração do piloto acerca de efetivar a arremetida, tenha prejudicado a lógica do voo ou sua segurança. Muito pelo contrário, pois as várias curvas que foram evitadas ao eliminar certas etapas, elas sim, tinham o potencial de desorientar espacialmente os tripulantes.

O acidente em nada se relaciona à fase chamada INSIDIOSAMENTE de ‘atalho’, pois a aeronave foi conduzida até o ponto da arremetida sem aparentes problemas. O que ocorreu causando fatalidade, está física e temporalmente associado ao percurso após a arremetida, e muito mais precisamente, após o anúncio verbalizado do comandante da aeronave de que ele estava iniciando uma ARREMETIDA.

Não existe uma única razão para esses investigadores aventarem que o tão propalado ‘atalho’ esteve relacionado com a falta de controle aerodinâmico da aeronave.

ENGLISH

XXI CENTURY AVIATION


The high-tech instruments installed on modern aircraft are there on the ‘flight deck’  in addition to the safety of air navigation. This statement is entirely true, since it is written in all flight crew operation manuals on this planet, that "in the event of all sophisticated instruments failure”, the pilot only must rely on the simplest basic instruments" listed below:

1.         Compass

2.         Aerodynamic Speed Indicator

3.         Altimeter

The most modern aircraft on the planet COMPULSORILY has installed these instruments listed above in its sophisticated panel, and that to be used in the event of total failure on high-tech instrumental.

Theoretically, a pilot holding his/her certifications for given aircraft, he/she is fit to pilot a large aircraft that eventually got only those above three working instruments, and he/she is capable of landing at an airport in vicinity of emergency point.

It is mere speculation of CENIPA’s officials, which is a military unit of the Brazilian Air Force, responsible for carrying out the investigations of air accidents. Mediocre investigation conclusions. Insidious concepts to the pilots. Military fallacy as own marketing.

The assessment of investigators edges irrationality as they presume the co-pilot voice radio transmitted during that flight had produced evidence of fatigue. That is very funny if it weren’t so tragic.

Let’s think seriously, any pilot on this planet will not emit a happy voice tone just after he/she has started a Go-Around Procedure. The feeling is recalcitrant, for waste of time and waste of fuel, and dissatisfaction by unmet goal.

The drawing of the instruments landing approach flight procedure profiles is COMPULSORY for better understanding by  the flight crew but  that strokes are limited to short of the modern era of air navigation aid.

The "shortcut" as doomed by CENIPA’s investigators is a LEGAL and LOGICAL procedure, in addition to its use by smart flight crew.

As a relative of an aircraft accident fatal victim hears some news from an investigator that there was a flight “shortcut”, that relative, which is a LAYMAN in aviation immediately will imagine something illicit has been done by the pilots, when in reality, it was performed a LEGAL maneuver within flight LOGIC based on high-tech instrumental resources on board further helping to ensure pilots landing with maximum safety.

Pilots of aircraft such as Cessna Citation XLS+ 560-6066, registration PR-AFA, should not be restricted to the basic use of the standard instruments. That sophisticated instrumental, highly precise, is to be DOMINATED and put it in good practice by the crew in all phases of flight.

What we can see from the investigators reference to the Pilot-Flying (PIC) decision on eliminate some phases depicted on the Instruments Approach Landing Chart is that all endeavors by Software engineers in navigation, such as  ' high-end resource software routines for accurate horizontal and vertical air navigation should be given up and the pilots stood enslaved by the mind of the air accident investigator guesser. As a general rule, a person not familiar with the operation of those flight high-tech instruments.

CENIPA’s investigators want at all costs to instill in Brazilian LAYMEN mind a feeling state that all Brazilians must BLAME the pilots. The Brazilian air crash investigators NEVER point their fingers to the manufacturer, even though there is a roll of evidence of manufacturer failure.

The Flight Crew Operation Manual for this plane brings some remarks to the pilots about the plane misbehavior after go-around procedure or even during a take-off as the plane speeds up to 215 (± 10) KIAS and the Flaps lever is out of ZERO position. A speed sensor for stabilizer signals to a logic circuitry to freeze the stabilizer on NOSE DOWN position till the speed to be decreased below 200 Knots. The flaps must NOT be retracted during this speed of 215 (± 10) KIAS.

The issue is the alert for calling flight crew attention but it only occurs very later. When the current alerts come on the MFDU, the Stabilizer is AUTOMATICALLY already frozen  on NOSE DOWN pitch setting. The aircraft nose instantaneously and abruptly, in milliseconds, falls down without any chance for the flight crew to raise the aircraft nose as in very low altitude, mainly on the MDA altitude. Unfortunately, the aircraft will get into the terrain almost vertically in vicinity upon very high speed.

In my opinion, the aircraft manufacturer MUST install another alert (aural) like those on EGPWS, to alert the flight crew as soon as the speed reaches  215 (± 10) KIAS, and the flaps lever is out of retracted position (0° FLAPS), and the landing gears aren’t fully retracted (INTRANSIT light ON).

The aural alert I supposed it could be like that:

SPEED …STABILIZER…SPEED…STABILIZER…SPEED …STABILIZER

That will alert the flight crew to immediately decrease the airplane speed to 200 Knots.

The pilot in command was extremely logical and he used the resource on board properly, and why not say, brilliant.

These same CENIPA’s investigators behave in complete incoherence, since they claim that the purpose of their investigation is not pointing fingers to anyone or announce responsibilities, but intrinsically they point out with all the Final Report letters and their WILL, that pilot procedure in eliminating some stages of the instrument approach procedure, said by them a 'shortcut', would be a lack of compliance to the air traffic rules. And even the State Prosecutor, Thiago Lacerda Nobre, suggested to the Press there was violation of air traffic rules. He doesn’t know Air Traffic Rules so deeply to state that. All of them in this case are guessers.

NEVER such allusion will have legal or technical value, neither CENIPA’s investigators nor the Prosecutor or District Attorney are well-founded to state that. There is no mention of flight rules forbidding a pilot flying with next-generation capabilities for air navigation to eliminate certain steps of the Flight Approach profile, providing that he/she keeps restraining the plane above minimum altitudes as flying over sea. That is not intended for flight over obstacles.

Scientifically, the flight stages from the moment of the detour to the left, going down over the sea up to the altitude of 2200 feet and after flying along the extension of the runway centerline till the moment Pilot-Flying’s  announcement  for go-around, there was no any  undermined logic or encroach to the air traffic rules. On the contrary, various turns avoided by eliminating certain stages (for those turns had potential to disorient spatially the crewmembers), the plane flew without issues till the go-around beginning.

LOGICAL CONCLUSION.

The accident in nothing relates to the phase called INSIDIOUSLY of ' shortcut ', because the aircraft was flown to the go-around point (MAPt) without apparent issues. What have occurred causing fatality, is physically and temporally associated with the route flown just after the go-around, and more precisely, following the Pilot announcement verbalizing he is starting the go-around. The investigation only should  have concerns after the pilot has stated “I will wait for better weather”, that meaning he would fly the plane ascending to 4000 feet heading 375 NDB SAT, and keep flying on holding pattern, nothing more than that.

A seguir está um exemplo do que ocorreu comigo:

A atitude de um piloto decidir por eliminar a entrada em órbita e até mesmo eliminar a fase de afastamento, optando por voar direto para um ponto de interceptação na reta final da pista de pouso em uso é LÓGICO e perfeitamente aceitável e não estará o piloto infringindo a regulamentação.

E para provar a eficiência desse recurso utilizando os computadores de bordo, eu executei tal procedimento com total sucesso em Saint Croix, Ilhas Virgens Americanas, no Caribe.

Decolei de Fort Lauderdale à noite e ao chegar em Saint Croix o mundo estava desabando com chuva.

Desde a minha descida do nível de cruzeiro programei o FMS para interceptar a reta final sobre o mar caribenho, criando o ponto de interceptação (PBD) adiante da órbita, assim eliminei todas as curvas desnecessárias do procedimento de entrada em órbita. Prossegui na aproximação final e quando percebi que não havia iluminação de pista, não hesitei, continuei para o pouso e pousei suavemente. Taxiei para o pátio de estacionamento e tivemos que ficar dentro da aeronave por mais de 90 minutos devido à forte chuva.

É para isso que servem os recursos de bordo.

IPSIS LITTERIS

(FLYING TRAINING, Instrument Flying, USAF, by colonel E. J. BAKER)

g. Restrictions. The procedure turn will not be flown in the following instances:

(1) When issued an ATC clearance for a "straight-in" approach.

(2) When the initial approach is via a no procedure turn required (NoPT) course.

(3) When ATC radar vectors the aircraft to final approach course.

(4) When established in a published or assigned holding pattern, subsequently cleared for approaching and the following two conditions are met:

(a)    The holding course and procedure turn course are the same.

(b)   The aircraft is on the maneuvering side of the procedure turn.

(5) When conducting "timed approaches" from a holding fix. Timed approaches are in progress when you are established in a holding pattern and given a time to depart the FAF inbound.

NOTE: In any of the situations in g above, proceed over the FAF at the published altitude and continue inbound on the final approach course without making a procedure turn, holding pattern, or any other aligning maneuver before the FAF unless otherwise cleared by ATC. When cleared for the approach in any of the above situations, if the pilot desires to fly the procedure turn or to make additional circuits in a published or assigned holding pattern to lose excessive altitude or to become better established on course before departing the FAP, it is his or her responsibility to request such maneuvering from ATC.

No caso em estudo Cessna Ciatation XLS+ 560-6066 (PR-AFA), em virtude da não existência de Controle de Tráfego Aéreo para pouso na pista da Base Aérea de Santos, o piloto em comando apenas deveria declarar a intenção de interceptar a reta da aproximação final, informando a distância em milhas náuticas e a altitude deste ponto de interceptação (mesma altitude do final da curva de afastamento) até a cabeceira da pista.

 Exemplo:

“Rádio Santos, PAPA, ROMEU, ALPHA, FOXTROT, ALPHA, chamará estabilizado no curso da aproximação final, 10 NM, 2200 pés, por NAVEGAÇÃO PRÓPRIA”.

Esta declaração por si, já significa que tanto o bloqueio, entrada em órbita (holding) quanto o afastamento estão eliminados.

Citation XLS - Stabilizer System Caution -

Cessna Citation XLS

Horizontal Stabilizer  Description	Descrição do Estabilizador Horizontal
The two-position horizontal stabilizer system automatically repositions the aircraft’s horizontal stabilizer to improve flight characteristics.	O sistema de estabilizador horizontal de duas posições reposiciona o estabilizador horizontal da aeronave para melhorar as características do voo.
The horizontal stabilizer positions to one of two positions: a +1 degree (cruise) or –2 degree (takeoff). The angle of incidence position depends on the flap handle position and airspeed by moving the entire horizontal stabilizer. When airspeed is greater than 215 knots ±10, the airspeed switch disables the arming valve preventing stabilizer movement to the –2° position.	As posições do estabilizador horizontal para uma das duas posições: uma de +1 grau (cruzeiro) ou -2 graus (decolagem). A posição do ângulo de incidência [ponpensação] depende da posição da alavanca dos flaps e da velocidade aerodinâmica ao movimentar o estabiizador horizontal inteiro. Quando a velocidade estiver maior do que 215 Knots  ± 10, o interruptor de velocidade incapacita a válvula de armar  impedindo o movimento do estabilizador para a posição -2°.

Airspeed Switch

Interruptor de Velocidade Aerodinâmica

The airspeed switch senses airspeed from the standby pitot static system and enables or disables the horizontal tail from downward movement towards the takeoff and approach position or upward movement towards the cruise position— based upon the airspeed sensed. The horizontal tail is enabled if airspeed is less than 215 ±10 knots; or disabled it if airspeed is greater than 215 ±10 knots. It is behind the copilot side panel, above the armrest.

O interruptor de velocidade aerodinamica detecta a velocidade do sistema de pitot estático auxiliar e habilita ou desabilita a cauda horizontal [estabilizador] do movimento para baixo na direção da posição decolagem e aproximação ou do movimento para cima na direção da posição cruzeiro — baseado na velocidade aerodinamica sentida. A cauda horizontal é habilitada se a velocidade estiver menor que  215 ± 10 knots; ou desabilitada, se a velocidade estiver  maior que 215 ± 10 knots. Ele [interruptor] está atrás do painel lateral do co-piloto, acima do apoio de braço.

The STAB MIS COMP light illuminates to indicate the horizontal stab position does not agree with the flap handle position after 30 seconds of travel. (Unless the Landing Gear is also selected, then the delay is 40 seconds).

A luz STAB MIS COMP ilumina-se para indicar que a posição do estabilizador horizontal não corresponde com a posição da alavanca de flaps após 30 segundos de movimentação dos flaps. (A menos que o Trem de Pouso esteja também selecionado, então o atraso é 40 segundos).



Stabilizer Monitoring System	Sistema de Monitoramento do Estabilizador
The two-position horizontal stabilizer control system is controlled by a flap-handle position and airspeed. With the flap-handle in the FLAPS UP detent position the horizontal stabilizer has an incidence of +1°. With the flap handle in any position other than the FLAPS UP detent and the airspeed no greater than 215 ± 10kts, the horizontal stabilizer has an incidence of –2°.	O sistema de controle do estabilizador horizontal com duas posições é controlado por uma alavanca de posição dos flaps e a velocidade aerodinâmica. Com a alavanca de flaps na posição do batente FLAPS UP [flaps recolhidos], o estabilizador horizontal tem uma incidência [desvio de compensação] de + 1°. Com alavancaa  de flaps em qualquer posição diferente  do batente  FLAPS UP e a velocidade não superior a 215 ± 10 knots  [398 Km/h ± 18 Km/h, uma margem entre 379 e 416 Km/h], o estabilizador horizontal tem uma incidência [desvio de compensação] de – 2°.
The horizontal stabilizer cannot move down to an incidence of –2° if the airspeed is greater than 215 ± 10 kts. It is prevented from moving in either direction if the landing gear is in motion. The two-position tailprinted circuit board (N2017) monitors the horizontal stabilizer position. The circuit board flashes the amber STAB MIS COMP annunciator and illuminates the MASTER CAUTION RESET switchlight under the following conditions:	O estabilizador horizontal não pode mover para baixo com uma incidência de –2° [menos 2°], se a velocidade for superior a 215 ± 10 knots. Ele [estabilizador]  é impedido de se mover em qualquer direção, se o trem de pouso estiver em movimento [recolhendo ou baixando) . A Placa de circuito impresso de duas posições (N2017) monitora a posição do estabilizador horizontal. A placa do circuito faz piscar a luz âmbar de anúncio STAB MIS COMP e ilumina a luz MASTER CAUTION RESET  sob as seguintes condições:
• Anytime the flap handle is not in the “FLAPS UP” detent position and the stabilizer has not reached the incidence of –2° within the predetermined time limit of 30 seconds.	• A qualquer momento que a alavanca dos  flaps não estiver na posição do batente "FLAPS UP" e o estabilizador não tiver atingido a incidência de –2° dentro do limite de tempo pré-determinado de 30 segundos.
• Anytime the flap handle is in the “FLAPS UP” detent position and the stabilizer has not reached the incidence of +1 within the predetermined time limit of 30 seconds.	• A qualquer momento que a alavanca de flaps estiver  na posição do batente  "FLAPS UP" e o estabilizador não tiver chegado a incidência de + °1 dentro do limite de tempo pré-determinado de 30 segundos.
• Anytime the PCB senses flap handle selected up and flap-handle is selected down concurrently.	• Sempre que a Placa de Circuito Impresso sente o manuseio de flaps selecionado para cima e a alavanca  de flaps  estiver selecionada para baixo simultaneamente.