Fuel-saving Wake Surfing - Airbus And Boeing

Boeing’s test in 2018 with its 777F ecoDemonstrator flying behind another FedEx 777F and Airbus’ Fello’fly demonstration.

Avionics required to enable automated wake surfing, particularly automatic dependent surveillance-broadcast (ADS-B).

ADS-B is now mandatory in the U.S.
Now planes have the avionics to make this possible.
The regulations say don’t do it. So the next step is getting the regulations changed.

We will do it first with cargo aircraft, and we are working with Airbus on the regulatory aspects.

Agreeing on the procedures between aircraft, operators and air traffic control (ATC) that will enable wake surfing.

There are two things wake surfing is not. The first is a drag reduction technique. Instead, to maintain steady, level flight within the updraft from the wake vortex, the aircraft must pitch nose-down so it is descending relative to the upward moving air. The lift vector, normally vertical, is tilted slightly forward. This counters some of the drag, requiring less thrust to maintain horizontal flight. This reduces fuel consumption.

The second is traditional formation flying. Military aircraft fly in close formation, a few wingspans apart. Commercial aircraft would fly in extended formation, up to 1 nm apart, on what the industry prefers to call “cooperative trajectories.” This greater distance—10 or more wingspans for commercial aircraft—reduces the fuel-saving benefit but eases the workload on the pilots.

For Boeing’s 777F ecoDemonstrator flight test, Aviation Communication & Surveillance Systems modified its traffic collision alert system (TCAS) to perform airborne interrogation of the lead aircraft for EHS data. The system sent ADS-B and EHS data to a flight-test laptop that hosted the wake prediction algorithm on the trail aircraft. The laptop then sent a command to the autopilot’s localizer control law, which was used to keep the aircraft on station relative to the wake. “ADS-B plus TCAS may work.

Impact of GNSS signal loss on aircraft operations - Be Prepared

The power of the GPS signal “is comparable to the power emitted by a 60-watt light bulb located more than 20,000 km [12,000 mi.] away from the surface of the earth; this means the signal could easily be disturbed by any ground source located near an aircraft and emitting in the GPS L1 frequency,” Airbus experts in operations, navigation and security say in a company publication focusing on safety.

Interference can cause the loss of GNSS position and timing. In that instance, the Flight Management System (FMS) will revert to the onboard inertial reference system (IRS) and ground-based navigation aids, such as DME and VOR (distance measuring equipment and VHF omnidirectional range). “A loss of GNSS inputs does not lead to a map shift or an erroneous position computation by the FMS. In the case of a loss of GPS signal, the FMS switches from the mixed GPS/IRS position to an IRS-DME/DME position or IRS-VOR/DME or pure IRS, in order of priority,” the experts explain.

How to handle these events in the daily aircraft operations

When GNSS signals from satellite constellation are lost or degraded by interferences, depending on the duration, aircraft capabilities can be maintained, limited or lost during the flight. 

Cockpit effects that can be observed by the flight crew during total loss of GNSS signal.

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Maintenance recommendations to be considered during post-flight analysis after GNSS loss event.

 A320, A330, A340, A380 and A350 aircrafts

 GPS output sent to the IRS which sends a “hybridized” position to the FMS).

These aircraft are fitted with two MMRs, three ADIRUs and two (A320/A330/A340/A380) or three (A350) FMS to compute the aircraft position. 

In case GPS data is lost due to GNSS RFI affecting both MMRs, the aircraft position source will switch to pure IRS and will enter into the so called coasting mode. If the integrity of GPIRS data is degraded enough then the position source will switch to other radio navigation based solution (from FMS) according to the availability of DME and VOR. If Navaids are not available, the aircraft position solution will switch to IRS only.

CAE Hurry Up Production of Boeing 737 Max Flight Simulators

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Long a manufacturer of full-flight simulators, CAE also runs the world’s largest training network for civil aviation pilots, with about 300 devices deployed at company-run facilities in cities such as Abu Dhabi, Kuala Lumpur and London. CAE says its 2,000 instructors train more than 135,000 pilots every year.

Airlines that bought the MAX have had to cancel flights while the global fleet remains grounded.

If only computer-based training were required for renewed 737 MAX commercial flying, Boeing’s largest customer Southwest Airlines Co had said it would take one to two months to prepare its more than 9,500 pilots on the updates.

Southwest had not been part of Boeing’s recent discussions on pilot training recommendations and could not provide additional cost or timing estimates before there was specific guidance, spokeswoman Brandy King said.

Southwest has three MAX simulators in various stages of FAA certification and expects three more later this year.

American Airlines Group Inc and United Airlines each have one MAX simulator.

Not many MAX simulators exist and it was unclear if training could be performed on the 737 NG simulator that 737 pilots have used until now. As of December, Toronto-based manufacturer CAE Inc had delivered 23 MAX full-flight simulators, a spokeswoman said.

The FAA said on Tuesday it will consider Boeing’s recommendations during training evaluations of U.S. and international flight crew alongside regulators from Canada, Europe and Brazil.

Canada’s Transport Minister Marc Garneau, who has leaned toward mandatory simulator training for Canadian 737 MAX operators, said in a statement that Boeing’s signaling the importance of such training was “encouraging.”

Boeing 737-800 MAX training on Tablet before Accidents Criticized

Boeing’s proposal to skip flight simulator training for pilots when its grounded fleet of 737 Maxes is cleared to resume service is not an innocent one. Much of the criticism the company has faced is that the original training for the Max 8 for pilots who had flown previous versions of the 737 aircraft was an hour-long course on a tablet. This was part of a scheme by the company to reduce the cost of the new plane for airlines and minimize the time needed to get it into the air. Corners were cut in order to beat back a challenge from Boeing’s European-based rival Airbus, whose new short- and mid-range commercial jet was threatening to capture lucrative markets long dominated by the US giant as well as the rapidly growing Asian market.

PORTUGUÊS

A proposta da BOEING de pular o treinamento de simulador de voo para pilotos quando sua frota  de 737 Maxes no solo for liberada para retomar o serviço não é inocente. Grande parte das críticas que a empresa tem enferentado é que o treinamento original para o Max 8 para pilotos que haviam voado versões anteriores da aeronave 737 era um curso de uma hora em um tablet. Isso fazia parte de um esquema da empresa para reduzir o custo do novo avião para as companhias aéreas e minimizar o tempo necessário para obtê-lo no ar. As arestas foram aparadas para vencer um desafio da rival europeia AIRBUS, cuja nova aeronave comercial de curto e médio alcance ameaçava capturar mercados lucrativos há muito dominados pelo gigante dos EUA, bem como pelo mercado asiático em rápido crescimento.

MCAS No Longer Repeats After 5 sec. If electronic Trim Inputs Are Made - B737-8 MAX

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MCAS no longer repeats after 5 sec. if electronic trim inputs are made

Pilots always retain pitch control authority over MCAS input to stabilizer


Boeing emphasizes that the MCAS is not an anti-stall or stall-prevention system, as it often has been portrayed in news reports.
MCAS has three new layers of protection:

Compares inputs of both AOA sensors

Pilots always retain pitch control authority over MCAS input to stabilizer

MCAS no longer repeats after 5 sec. if electronic trim inputs are made

The new software load [P12.1] has triple-redundant filters that prevent one or both angle-of-attack (AOA) systems from sending erroneous data to the FCCs that could falsely trigger the MCAS. It also has design protections that prevent runaway horizontal stabilizer trim from ever overpowering the elevators. Boeing showed pilots that they can always retain positive pitch control with the elevators, even if they don’t use the left and right manual trim wheels on the sides of the center console to trim out control pressures after turning off the trim cut-out switches.

Most important, the MCAS now uses both left and right AOA sensors for redundancy, instead of relying on just one. The FCC P12.1’s triple AOA validity checks include an average value reasonability filter, a catastrophic failure low-to-high transition filter and a left versus right AOA deviation filter. If any of these abnormal conditions are detected, the MCAS is inhibited.
Three secondary protections are built into the new software load. First, the MCAS cannot trim the stabilizer so that it overpowers elevator pitch control authority. The MCAS nose-down stab trim is limited so that the elevator always can provide at least 1.2g of nose-up pitch authority to enable the flight crew to recover from a nose-low attitude. Second, if the pilots make electric pitch trim inputs to counter the MCAS, it won’t reset after 5 sec. and repeat subsequent nose-down stab trim commands. And third, if the MCAS nose-down stab trim input exceeds limits programmed into the new FCC software, it triggers a maintenance message in the onboard diagnostics system.

Pilots during their sim training they had never been exposed to extreme and continuous AOA indication errors, they’ve not experienced AOA induced airspeed and altitude deviations on PFDs and have not had to deal with continuous stall-warning stickshaker distractions. 

They also note that they have never been required to fly the aircraft from the point at which a runaway stab trim incident occurred all the way to landing using only the manual trim wheels. “We’re just checking boxes for the FAA".

ETHIOPIAN FLIGHT ET302 CRASH - PRELIMINARY REPORT - AOA & STAB PITCH TRIM

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FACTUAL INFORMATION
HISTORY OF FLIGHT
On March 10, 2019, at about 05:44 UTC1, Ethiopian Airlines flight 302, a Boeing 737-8 (MAX), Ethiopian registration ET-AVJ, crashed near Ejere, Ethiopia, shortly after takeoff from Addis Ababa Bole International Airport (HAAB), Ethiopia.  The flight was a regularly scheduled international passenger flight from Addis Ababa to Jomo Kenyatta International Airport (HKJK), Nairobi, Kenya.  There were 157 passengers and crew on board. All were fatally injured, and the Aircraft was destroyed.
The following is based on the preliminary analysis of the DFDR, CVR and ATC communications.  As the investigation continues, revisions and changes may occur before the final report is published.
At 05:37:34, ATC issued take off clearance to ET-302 and to contact radar on 119.7 MHz.
Takeoff roll began from runway 07R at a field elevation of 2333.5 m at approximately 05:38, with a flap setting of 5 degrees and a stabilizer setting of 5.6 units. The takeoff roll appeared normal, including normal values of left and right angle-of-attack (AOA). During takeoff roll, the engines stabilized at about 94% N1, which matched the N1 Reference recorded on the DFDR. From this point for most of the flight, the N1 Reference remained about 94% and the throttles did not move. The N1 target indicated non data pattern 220 seconds before the end of recording. According to the CVR data and the control column forces recorded in DFDR, captain was the pilot flying.
At 05:38:44, shortly after liftoff, the left and right recorded AOA values deviated. Left AOA decreased to 11.1° then increased to 35.7° while value of right AOA indicated 14.94°. Then after, the left AOA value reached 74.5° in ¾ seconds while the right AOA reached a maximum value of 15.3°. At this time, the left stick shaker activated and remained active until near the end of the recording. Also, the airspeed, altitude and flight director pitch bar values from the left side noted deviating from the corresponding right side values. The left side values were lower than the right side values until near the end of the recording.
At 05:38:43 and about 50 ft radio altitude, the flight director roll mode changed to LNAV.
At 05:38:46 and about 200 ft radio altitude, the Master Caution parameter changed state. The First Officer called out Master Caution Anti-Ice on CVR.  Four seconds later, the recorded Left AOA Heat parameter changed state. 
At 05:38:58 and about 400 ft radio altitude, the flight director pitch mode changed to VNAV SPEED and Captain called out “Command” (standard call out for autopilot engagement) and an autopilot warning is recorded.
At 05:39:00, Captain called out “Command”.
At 05:39:01 and about 630 ft radio altitude, a second autopilot warning is recorded.
At 05:39:06, the Captain advised the First-Officer to contact radar and First Officer reported SHALA 2A departure crossing 8400 ft and climbing FL 320.
Between liftoff and 1000 ft above ground level (AGL), the pitch trim position moved between 4.9 and 5.9 units in response to manual electric trim inputs.  At 1000 ft AGL, the pitch trim position was at 5.6 units.
At 05:39:22 and about 1,000 feet the left autopilot (AP) was engaged (it disengaged about 33 seconds later), the flaps were retracted and the pitch trim position decreased to 4.6 units.
Six seconds after the autopilot engagement, there were small amplitude roll oscillations accompanied by lateral acceleration, rudder oscillations and slight heading changes.  These oscillations continued also after the autopilot was disengaged.
At 05:39:29, radar controller identified ET-302 and instructed to climb FL 340 and when able right turns direct to RUDOL and the First-Officer acknowledged.
At 05:39:42, Level Change mode was engaged.  The selected altitude was 32000 ft.  Shortly after the mode change, the selected airspeed was set to 238 kt.
At 05:39:45, Captain requested flaps up and First-Officer acknowledged. One second later, flap handle moved from 5 to 0 degrees and flaps retraction began. 
At 05:39:50, the selected heading started to change from 072 to 197 degrees and at the same time the Captain asked the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading.
At 05:39:55, Autopilot disengaged,
At 05:39:57, the Captain advised again the First-Officer to request to maintain runway heading and that they are having flight control problems. 
At 05:40:00 shortly after the autopilot disengaged, the FDR recorded an automatic aircraft nose down (AND) activated for 9.0 seconds and pitch trim moved from 4.60 to 2.1 units. The climb was arrested and the aircraft descended slightly. 
At 05:40:03 Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) “DON’T SINK” alerts occurred.
At 05:40:05, the First-Officer reported to ATC that they were unable to maintain SHALA 1A and requested runway heading which was approved by ATC.
At 05:40:06, left and right flap position reached a recorded value of 0.019 degrees which remained until the end of the recording.
The column moved aft and a positive climb was re-established during the automatic AND motion. 
At 05:40:12, approximately three seconds after AND stabilizer motion ends, electric trim (from pilot activated switches on the yoke) in the Aircraft nose up (ANU) direction is recorded on the DFDR and the stabilizer moved in the ANU direction to 2.4 units.  The Aircraft pitch attitude remained about the same as the back pressure on the column increased.
At 05:40:20, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a second instance of automatic AND stabilizer trim occurred and the stabilizer moved down and reached 0.4 units.
From 05:40:23 to 05:40:31, three Ground Proximity Warning System (GPWS) “DON’T SINK” alerts occurred.
At 05:40:27, the Captain advised the First-Officer to trim up with him. 
At 05:40:28 Manual electric trim in the ANU direction was recorded and the stabilizer reversed moving in the ANU direction and then the trim reached 2.3 units.   
At 05:40:35, the First-Officer called out “stab trim cut-out” two times. Captain agreed and FirstOfficer confirmed stab trim cut-out.
At 05:40:41, approximately five seconds after the end of the ANU stabilizer motion, a third instance of AND automatic trim command occurred without any corresponding motion of the stabilizer, which is consistent with the stabilizer trim cutout switches were in the ‘’cutout’’ position
At 05:40:44, the Captain called out three times “Pull-up” and the First-Officer acknowledged.
At 05:40:50, the Captain instructed the First Officer to advise ATC that they would like to maintain 14,000 ft and they have flight control problem. 
At 05:40:56, the First-Officer requested ATC to maintain 14,000 ft and reported that they are having flight control problem. ATC approved.
From 05:40:42 to 05:43:11 (about two and a half minutes), the stabilizer position gradually moved in the AND direction from 2.3 units to 2.1 units. During this time, aft force was applied to the control columns which remained aft of neutral position.  The left indicated airspeed increased from approximately 305 kt to approximately 340 kt (VMO). The right indicated airspeed was approximately 20-25 kt higher than the left. 
The data indicates that aft force was applied to both columns simultaneously several times throughout the remainder of the recording.
At 05:41:20, the right overspeed clacker was recorded on CVR. It remained active until the end of the recording.
At 05:41:21, the selected altitude was changed from 32000 ft to 14000 ft.
At 05:41:30, the Captain requested the First-Officer to pitch up with him and the First-Officer acknowledged.
At 05:41:32, the left overspeed warning activated and was active intermittently until the end of the recording.
At 05:41:46, the Captain asked the First-Officer if the trim is functional. The First-Officer has replied that the trim was not working and asked if he could try it manually. The Captain told him to try. At 05:41:54, the First-Officer replied that it is not working.
At 05:42:10, the Captain asked and the First-Officer requested radar control a vector to return and ATC approved.
At 05:42:30, ATC instructed ET-302 to turn right heading 260 degrees and the First-Officer acknowledged.
At 05:42:43, the selected heading was changed to 262 degrees.
At 05:42:51, the First-Officer mentioned Master Caution Anti-Ice. The Master Caution is recorded on DFDR.
At 05:42:54, both pilots called out “left alpha vane”.
At 05:43:04, the Captain asked the First Officer to pitch up together and said that pitch is not enough.
At 05:43:11, about 32 seconds before the end of the recording, at approximately 13,4002 ft, two momentary manual electric trim inputs are recorded in the ANU direction.  The stabilizer moved in the ANU direction from 2.1 units to 2.3 units.
At 05:43:20, approximately five seconds after the last manual electric trim input, an AND automatic trim command occurred and the stabilizer moved in the AND direction from 2.3 to 1.0 unit in approximately 5 seconds.  The aircraft began pitching nose down. Additional simultaneous aft column force was applied, but the nose down pitch continues, eventually reaching 40° nose down.  The stabilizer position varied between 1.1 and 0.8 units for the remainder of the recording.
The left Indicated Airspeed increased, eventually reaching approximately 458 kts and the right Indicated Airspeed reached 500 kts at the end of the recording.  The last recorded pressure altitude was 5,419 ft on the left and 8,399 ft on the right.