JEJU AIR 7C2216 CVR and FDR LAST 4 MINUTES RECORDINGS OUT - POSSIBLE EVENT - CROSS BUS TIE RELAY NOT OPENED

 

On the very moment the GLIDE SLOPE is intercepted the CROSS BUS TIE RELAY automatically opens.

 The CROSS BUS TIE RELAY opens to isolate the navigation receivers and Flight Control Computers. The RELAY opening prevents all approach phase data be removed from FDR because of only one electrical failure.

The CROSS BUS TIE RELAY also opens when the BUS TRANSFER switch is moved to OFF.

 If NORMAL power sources to DC BUS fail, the emergency source of DC power is the batteries.

 If both generators come disconnected from the BUS TRANSFER BUS, the AUTOPILOT disengages and it can't be ENGAGED up to the generators are available. The plane must be piloted MANUALLY. It will be hard work.

With no electrical source available, the batteries can supply electrical power up to minimum of 60 minutes.

UPDATED UPON PRELIMINARY REPORT Jan 27, 2025

Cockpit Voice Recorder

The cockpit voice recorder uses four independent channels to record flight deck audio for 30 minutes or 120 minutes. Recordings older than 30 or 120 minutes are automatically erased. One channel records flight deck area conversation using the area microphone. The other channels record individual ACP output (headset) audio and transmissions for the pilots and observer. (Aircraft fit dependent) The RIPS (Recorder Independent Power Supply) provides power to the cockpit voice recorder for 10 minutes after aircraft power is interrupted either by normal shutdown or by any other loss of power. Normal power supply 115V TRANSFER BUS 2 and 28 V from DC BUS 2.

VOICE RECORDER Switch (when fitted):

AUTO - powers the cockpit voice recorder from first engine start until 5 minutes after last engine shutdown

ON - powers the cockpit voice recorder until the first engine start, then trips the switch to AUTO. On aircraft with no switch the voice recorder is active anytime 115V AC is applied to airplane.

As soon as the aircraft has intercepted the LOCALIZER course, following that the pilot attention will be on GLIDE SLOPE interception.

BATTERY POWER

Emergency source for:

- Static Inverter/AC Standby Bus

- DC Standby Bus

- Battery Bus

- Hot Battery Bus

- Switched Hot Battery Bus

The Static Inverter changes 24 DC power to 115 AC power for the AC STANDBY BUS.

The HOT BATTERY BUS is always connected to the battery, and all its components operate as long as the battery voltage is above a minimum value.

The pilot must move the BUS TRANSFER switch to OFF position and turn off the HIDRAULICS ELECTRIC PUMPS.

After trying to restore the generators, if both GEN OFF BUS (L & R) lights stay ON, the pilot must land the plane ASAP.

The CVR is a customer option, popular choices are the L-3 FA2100 and Honeywell 980-6020/980-6022. Both manufacturers offer these with a crash survivable memory unit (CSMU) for protection of the solid state voice recording memory. The capacity of the CSMU is a customer option, legally the state of registration may only need 30 minutes. The CSMU retains the most recent 30 or 120 minutes of audio, digital, and timing information. Unless you know the part number of the CVR installed, you will not know if it is a 30 minute or 120 minutes capacity, they look identical.

Another customer option is the overhead "Voice Recorder" switch, with ON and AUTO positions. If it has that switch it should shut down 5 minutes after the engines are shut down (based upon oil pressure), if it does not have that optional auto switch it can record whenever 115V is supplied.

JEJU AIR 2216 CRASH - LOCALIZER ANTENNAS INTALATION - CONCRETE STRUCTURE BERM NOT RECOMMENDED INSIDE RESA AREA

 

제주항공 사고기 블랙박스 2종, 사고 4분 전부터 기록 멈춰

Jeju Air Accident Plane 2 Types of Black Boxes, Recording Stopped 4 Minutes Before Accident

Pilot Go-Around (PGA) Vs. Pilot Not Go-Around (PnGA) - Psychology

Psychology of the Decision Making Under Time Pressure

SOURCE: Wright State University

International Symposium on Aviation Psychology

Haslbeck, A., Eichinger, A., & Bengler, K. (2013). Pilot Decision Making: Modeling Choices in Go-Around

Situations. 17th International Symposium on Aviation Psychology, 548-553.

https://corescholar.libraries.wright.edu/isap_2013/23

Part of the Other Psychiatry and Psychology Commons

 

SOURCE: FLIGHT SAFETY FOUNDATION - GO-AROUND DECISION-MAKING AND EXECUTION PROJECT

One important aspect of good airmanship is pilots’ decision making (FAA, 2004; DeMaria, 2006).

Long-term experience is needed to build up comprehensive knowledge for an aviator to find appropriate decisions in a certain situation.

One potentially hazardous situation is the approach phase, representing more than one-third of all fatal accidents (IATA, 2011; Boeing, 2012).

CREW FAILED TO GO-AROUND

Two typical accident categories defined by the International Air Transport Association are runway excursions (23% of IATA listed aircraft accidents in 2010) and hard landing (5%). In-depth analysis has shown, that in 35% of the runway excursions in 2010, meteorology has been a contributing factor. To complement this information, in one-fourth of all cases, the flight crew has failed to go-around after an unstabilized approach (IATA, 2011).

Go-around can be a safe decision to master the high-risk situation of a hazardous approach.

For types 1 and 2, the time intervals between different wind checks can be calculated. If a pilot is aware of a wind potentially differing from the ATC information, he should early perform a first wind check (t1) in the final approach (below 1,000 ft above ground level) and should repeat this check continuously until a final decision to (not) go around is made. The final wind check before the go-around is also measured (t2). If only one wind check is performed first and last check time coincide (t1=t2).

What are the driving forces for pilots to consider relevant information sources, i.e. important data displays?

Rasmussen’s classification of action identifying skill-based, rule-based, and knowledge-based behavior can help to localize relevant mechanisms (Rasmussen, 1983).

According to O’Hare (2003), “it will be easier to continue with an existing course of action than to change to a new one” (p. 223). So, pilots will sometimes tend to stick to unsuitable skill- or rule-based behavior, where analytical knowledge-based strategies would be appropriate (O’Hare, 2003).

Research Hypothesis 1: Pilots with a high level of experience will come to "better" decisions based upon good airmanship.

Research Hypothesis 2: Pilotos not intending to go around (PnGA) perceive relevant information too late or not at all.

The first wind check is later for PnGA than for PGA.

Research Hypothesis 3: Pilots intending to land (PnGA) stick to a default option up to the point of deciding to choose the default of landing.

The first wind check is not differing between PnGA and PGA.

Took part in this research Pilots with different practices and training.

Twenty-six long-haul captains (CPTs) flying Airbus A330/340 types participated in the experiment in a full flight simulator (JAR-STD 1A Level D) with A340-600 configuration and twenty-seven firs officers (FOs) scheduled on the A 320 short-haul fleet participated in an equivalent A320-200 full-flight simulator.

Scenario

An uneventful flight from the east to Munich Airport in the early morning hours. The PF came back from his last rest about 25 minutes prior to the landing to perform the approach and landing. In the first phase of the approach, using the autopilot, foreign air traffic control (ATC) communication (‘party line’) between other approaching aircraft and the airport could be heard. Pilots’ tasks were to plan, monitor, and communicate. When approaching the instrument landing system, it was the PF’s decision when to change from autopilot to manual control.

To provoke a hazardous situation, at 1.000 ft. above ground level (AGL), a gentle wind turned into an illegitimate strong tailwind (16 knots) by a scripted event. The wind information given b ATC was constantly good over the whole scenario. For pilots, this information given by ATC is binding. Only the non-binding wind indicator located at the pilot’s navigation display has shown the real wind strength and direction.

Such a hazardous situation can occur when the wind turns because the wind information given by ATC is averaged over several minutes. So, the situation was inexplicit and uncertain for the participants to make the trade-off between a fuel-saving and economic landing with a noticeable higher risk or the abort of the approach for a safe second try (Haslbeck et al., 2012). The chance to go around was given to all participants until 70 ft. AGL. At this height, the PM was structured to callout ‘go-around’ and abort the approach due to a strong tailwind.

THE RESULTS

The long-haul captains with a lower level of practice and training but a high level of operational experience show significantly more willingness to land in a risky situation with strong tailwind than short-haul first officers do.

Interestingly only a small number of pilots (26 %) would have landed without the PM being instructed to trigger the go-around in any case. Instructor pilots normally report a higher tendency to go-around when being in the flight simulator in comparison to real flights.

Visual Approach - Do NOT Abandon the Visual Path Angle

San Francisco CA [KSFO]:
June NOTAM #5: Navigation ILS runway 28L glide path out of service effective from June 01st, 2013 at 06:00 AM PST (1306011400) - August 22nd, 2013 at 03:59 PM PST (1308222359)

06/005 (A1056/13) - NAV ILS RWY 28L GP U/S. 01 JUN 14:00 2013 UNTIL 22 AUG 23:59 2013. CREATED: 01 JUN 13:40 2013

Significa que o Ângulo de Planeio Eletrônico (Rampa) do sistema de Pouso por Instrumentos (ILS)  está fora de serviço desde 01 JUN 2013 até 22 AGO 2013. Por esta razão,  os pilotos devem efetuar a aproximação em condições VISUAIS.

That means the Glide Slope, which is a component for Instrument Landing System - ILS is out of service since June 01, 2013 to August 22, 2013. Therefore, pilots MUST fly visual approach and landing for Ruanway 28 Left at San Francisco airport - KSFO.

In picture below you can see the point where the

Boeing 777 Asiana's landing gear struck the seawall

  Visual Approach illustration to Runway 28 Left from the cockpit

          Visual Approach for both runways at San Francisco airport as illustrated below

         On Visual Approach pilots have no Glide Slope, but he/she must overfly the runway threshold not below 50 feet

                                                                    Runway 28 L Threshold

 

Embankment height above sea level: 4 meters

                                 Runway 28 Left view

Runway 28 Left - KSFO

 

You can watch a successful Visual Aproach to runway 28 Right at San Francisco airport on the clip below

 

Complete video footage about 14 minutes is here