GLIDE FLIGHT – HOW TO - Azerbaijan Airlines EMB-190AR Flight J28243 and Air Transat Flight 236 A330-243

 

Captain struggling to not let the plane plunge into the sea

How far can a commercial aircraft fly with total engine failure?

Sources:

Airplane Flying Handbook FAA-H-8083-3C

Les Glatt, Ph.D, ATP/CFI-AI, AGI/IGI

Brown & Brown Insurance Brokers (UK) Limited

Accident Investigation Final Report

All Engines-out Landing Due to Fuel Exhaustion

Air Transat

Airbus A330-243 marks C-GITS

Lajes, Azores, Portugal

24 August 2001

FlightRadar24

Azerbaijan Airlines Airbus 330-243 almost plunged into the Caspian Sea before the accident in Kazakhstan

The gray color graphic line [Vertical rate (feet per minute)] shows the plane climbing up and down and the captain struggling to not let it plunge into the sea, as illustrated on the image below.

Captain struggling to hold the flight level

How far can a commercial aircraft fly with total engine failure?

The furthest flown by a passenger jet without engines was in 2001. An Air Transat Flight 236 was a transatlantic flight bound for Lisbon, Portugal, from Toronto, Canada. The plane carrying 293 passengers and 13 crews lost all engine power because of fuel leak, so it ran out of fuel caused by improper maintenance while flying over the Atlantic Ocean on August 24, 2001, as unbeknownst to anyone it had been leaking fuel ever since leaving Toronto six hours prior. Without any power, Captain Robert Piche and First officer Dirk DeJager glided the Airbus A330 for 19 minutes, covering 75 miles before landing safely at Lajes Air Base.

 It is necessary that they be performed more subconsciously than other maneuvers because most of the time during their execution, the pilot will be giving full attention to details other than the mechanics of performing the maneuver.

A glide is a basic maneuver in which the airplane loses altitude in a controlled descent with little or no engine power.

Forward motion is maintained by gravity pulling the airplane along an inclined path, and the descent rate is controlled by the pilot balancing the forces of gravity and lift.

FLIGHT INSTRUCTORS MUST FORGE ON STUDENT-PILOT’S MIND THAT TWO IDENTICAL AIRCRAFT AFTER INCURING IN TOTAL ENGINES FAILURE, BOTH PLANES WITH DIFFERENT WEIGHTS, THEY WILL REACH THE SAME DISTANCE FLYING ON GLIDE PATH ANGLE

Pitch angle = FPA + AOA

Pitch Angle = Flight Path Angle + Angle-of-Attack

(below the horizontal) + (chordline is above the velocity vector)

Glides are directly related to the practice of power-off accuracy landings.

They have a specific operational purpose in normal landing approaches and forced landings after engine failure.

The glide ratio of an airplane is the distance the airplane travels in relation to the altitude it loses. For example, if an airplane travels 10,000 feet forward while descending 1,000 feet, its glide ratio is 10 to 1.

The best glide airspeed is used to maximize the distance flown.

This airspeed is important when a pilot is attempting to fly during an engine failure.

When gliding at airspeed above or below the best glide airspeed, drag increases.

The best airspeed for gliding is one at which the airplane travels the greatest forward distance for a given loss of altitude in still air.

Source: Les Glatt, Ph.D, ATP/CFI-AI, AGI/IGI

(1) When the engine fails, the first step is to establish the aircraft at the airspeed

for best glide.

(2) This best glide airspeed allows the aircraft to fly at its maximum L/D ratio,

which allows the aircraft to glide the farthest horizontal distance for the least

loss in altitude.

(3) The best glide airspeed is given in the POH in the section entitled

“Emergency Procedures”.

(4) The airspeed that is shown is for the aircraft being loaded to gross weight.

(5) A rule of thumb to obtain the best glide speed at any aircraft weight is to

reduce the best glide airspeed at gross weight by one-half the percent

reduction in gross weight. Thus, if the aircraft is loaded to 10% below gross

weight, you should reduce the best glide speed at gross weight by 5%.

This relationship is the most fundamental relationship for gliding flight.

It gives us the flight path angle as a function of the lift to drag ratio.

The L/D can also be obtained from the POH by viewing the “Maximum Glide” chart in the “Emergency Procedures” section. Figure 3 shows a “Maximum Glide” chart” for a C-172. Note that this chart corresponds to a C-172 at gross weight, 65KIAS, propeller windmilling, flaps up and zero wind.

The L/D ratio can be obtained by dividing the 18 nautical mile distance in feet by the height above the terrain at 18 nautical miles, which is 12000 feet. This ratio is determined to be 9.09. If one substitutes the value of L/D of 9.09 into the glide path equation (5), the flight path angle is determined to be 6.3 degrees below the horizon.

This glide path angle is independent of the aircraft altitude or weight of the aircraft.

In the case of a C-172, the flight path angle was shown to be 6.3 degrees below the horizontal. The maximum L/D for a C-172 occurs somewhere between 6- and 9-degrees angle-of-attack. Using the expression in equation (1), the pitch angle would be somewhere between 0 and 3 degrees above the horizon. Thus, basic aerodynamics tells us that the same pitch attitude should be flown, independent of the weight of the aircraft or the altitude. The exact pitch attitude can be determined either by a plot similar to Figure 4 for a C-172, or one can load the aircraft to gross weight, reduce the power to idle and trim the aircraft to 65KIAS. The pitch attitude for the best glide speed should be noted and that pitch attitude should be used for simulated emergencies, no matter what the weight of the aircraft.

Flight instructors should teach student pilots to establish a given pitch attitude

when simulating engine failures, rather than to chase the airspeed, which is going to be dependent on the weight of the aircraft. By establishing the proper pitch attitude at different aircraft weights, the student can observe the resultant airspeeds for the same pitch attitude and thus correlate that with the statement that “the best glide

 speed is reduced by half the percent reduction in gross weight”. We try to teach our students to maintain visual cues outside the aircraft and setting up a specific pitch attitude for engine-out emergency simulations allows the student to do just that, keep his head out of the cockpit.

A stabilized, power-off descent at the best glide speed is often referred to as a normal glide. The beginning pilot should memorize the airplane’s attitude and speed with reference to the natural horizon and note the sounds made by the air passing over the airplane’s structure, forces on the flight controls, and the feel of the airplane.

 Example

Consider an executive jet that has a weight of 10,000 lbs, a wing area of 200 ft², and a parabolic drag polar*

We would like to calculate the glide range and L endurance from 20,000 ft. We would like to compare the range and endurance for a max range flight condition with that for a max endurance flight condition.

* Parabolic Drag Polar, it shows the aerodynamic efficiency of a given aircraft - that is, it represents the lift-to-drag ratio.

 An Exact Solution for Glide Endurance

 It turns out that we can get an exact solution for the glide time if we assume a standard atmosphere. The equation we developed for sink rate is:

05:45	The crew initiated a diversion from the flight-planned route for a landing at the Lajes (LPLA).
05:48	The crew advised Santa Maria Oceanic Control that the flight was diverting due to a fuel shortage.
06:13	The crew notified air traffic control that the right engine (Rolls-Royce RB211 Trent 772B) had flamed out.
06:26	When the aircraft was about 65 nautical miles from the Lajes airport and at an altitude of about FL 345 [34,500 feet], the crew reported that the left engine had also flamed out and that a ditching at sea was possible.
06:45	The aircraft landed on runway 33 at the Lajes airport.

MUAN INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT IN SOUTH KOREA - JEJU B738 NO LANDING GEAR - OVERRUN - RUNWAY THRESHOLD SLOPE

 UPDATED 01032025 at 00:45 UTC

These pages were found at the crash site by soldiers. They are about LANDING GEAR EXTENSION.

The images below are about the LANDING GEAR EXTENSION on QRH.

An ALS SYSTEM correctly installed at the runway threshold Safety Area without CONCRETE BASE above ground level (Chicago O'Hare International Airport) 

When the captain opts for landing from the higher runway threshold height [RWY 19, in case 15.5 meters] to the lower runway threshold height [RWY 01, in the case 9.9 meters] at Muan International airport in South Korea.

Below an image showing a similar crash at the Halifax airport in Canada caused by a Localizer concrete base inside the berm talude.

We can compare the same issue to the Boeing 747-244SF 9G-MKJ accident at the Halifax International Airport in New Scotia, Canada.

The landing gear collided with the berm top of the LOCALIZER concrete embankment.

Boeing 737 Airplanes with Collins Aerospace SVO-730 Rudder Rollout Guidance Actuators - NTSB URGENT

 

The National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) is providing the following information to urge The Boeing Company and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to take immediate action on the safety recommendations in this report concerning the potential for a jammed or restricted rudder control system on certain Boeing 737 airplanes. We identified these issues during our ongoing investigation of the rudder pedal anomaly involving a Boeing 737-8, N47280, while landing at Newark Liberty International Airport (EWR), Newark, New Jersey, on February 6, 2024.

 Federal Aviation Administration:

  Determine whether Collins Aerospace SVO-730 rudder rollout guidance actuators with incorrectly assembled bearings should be removed from Boeing 737NG and 737MAX airplanes and, if so, direct US operators to remove the actuators until acceptable replacement actuators become available for installation. (A-24-29) (Urgent)

If you determine the Collins Aerospace SVO-730 rudder rollout guidance actuators with incorrectly assembled bearings should be removed, notify international regulators that oversee operators of Boeing 737 airplanes about the safety issues involving the SVO-730 rudder rollout guidance actuator and encourage them to require the removal of actuators with incorrectly assembled bearings from 737NG and 737MAX airplanes until an acceptable replacement actuator becomes available for installation. (A-24-30) (Urgent)

 September 26, 2024

Aviation Investigation Report AIR-24-06

 Background and Analysis

On February 6, 2024, about 1555 eastern standard time, the flight crew of United Airlines flight 1539, a Boeing 737-8, N47280, experienced a rudder pedal.

 anomaly while landing at EWR.1 In a postincident statement, the captain reported that, during the landing rollout, the rudder pedals were “stuck” in their neutral position and did not move in response to the “normal” application of foot pressure to maintain alignment with the runway centerline.2 The flight was operating under the provisions of Title 14 Code of Federal Regulations Part 121 as a scheduled international passenger flight from Lynden Pindling International Airport, Nassau, Bahamas, to EWR.3

According to data derived from the flight data recorder, the flight crew applied approximately 32 pounds of force to the rudder pedals before touchdown which yielded no discernible effect on the rudder position or heading.4 The flight crew attempted to clear the jammed rudder controls immediately after touchdown, applying approximately 75 pounds of force to the rudder pedals when the airspeed was about 120 knots, again with no effect on the rudder position or heading.

With the airplane’s airspeed continuing to decrease during rollout, the flight crew applied approximately 42 pounds of force to the pedals, but the jam persisted. The captain elected instead to use the nosewheel steering tiller as the airplane slowed to a safe taxi speed. The captain stated that, after the airplane entered the assigned taxiway, he asked the first officer to check the rudder pedals on his side of the flight deck, and the first officer indicated that the same anomaly was occurring.

Data derived from the flight data recorder indicate that shortly after, with the airplane traveling at a groundspeed of less than 20 knots, the flight crew applied approximately 59 pounds of force on the rudder pedals, and the rudder pedals and rudder surface began to operate normally. The airplane taxied to the gate without further incident, and all airplane occupants (2 flight crewmembers, 4 cabin crewmembers, and 155 passengers) deplaned without any injuries or damage to the airplane.

United Airlines received the incident airplane from Boeing on February 20, 2023. The airplane was equipped with a Collins Aerospace SVO-730 rudder rollout guidance actuator, which was electrically disabled based on the operator’s delivery requirements for the autoflight system.5 Although the actuator was disabled, it remained mechanically connected to the upper portion of the airplane’s aft rudder input torque tube by the actuator’s output crank arm and a pushrod, as shown in figure 1.

 The Collins SVO-730 rudder rollout guidance actuator is installed only on Boeing 737NG and 737MAX airplanes equipped for category IIIB operations. (The incident 737-8 was a MAX variant.) United Airlines does not require category IIIB capability for its Boeing 737 fleet. According to FAA Advisory Circular 120-28D, category IIIB operations involve a precision instrument approach and landing with no decision height and a runway visual range less than 700 ft but not less than 150 ft.

6 Pilot control of the Boeing 737-8 rudder is transmitted in a closed-loop system from the pilots’ rudder pedals in the cockpit, through a single cable system, an aft rudder quadrant, and a pedal force transducer, to the aft rudder input torque tube in the vertical stabilizer. Rotation of the torque tube provides the command inputs to the main and standby rudder power control units to move the rudder surface.

VOEPASS 2283 [PASSAREDO CALLSIGN] PRELIMINARY REPORT - LOSS OF CONTROL IN-FLIGHT (LOC-I)

 

You can set this video for full screen and resolution 720p

SOURCE: CENIPA

LOC-I LOSS OF CONTROL IN-FLIGHT

Date: 9 August 2024

(UTC): 9 August 2024

Time: 16:22

City: VINHEDO - SÄO PAULO - BRASIL

Aerodrome: OUTSIDE THE AERODROME

Local: RESIDENTIAL AREA OF THE CITY

Damage to third

parties: YES

Injuries Function on Board Quantity

FATAL CREW 4

FATAL PASSENGERS 58

 

History

 

At 14:58 UTC, the aircraft took off from SBCA (Coronel Adalberto Mendes da Silva Airport, Cascavel, State of Paraná), bound for SBGR (Guarulhos - Governador André Franco Montoro - Airport, Guarulhos, State Of SOO Paulo) on a public regular passenger transport flight with 04 crew and 58 passengers on board. With the aircraft flying along the route, and after encountering icing conditions, control Of the aircraft was lost and it crashed into the ground.

 

Aircraft Involved

Registration marks: PSVPB

Location of latest takeoff: SBCA - ADALBERTO MENDES DA SILVA

Location of intended landing: SBGR - GOVERNADOR ANDRÉ FRANCO MONTORO

Type of operation: REGULAR

Phase of flight: CRUISE

Aircraft damage: DESTROYED

 

Sequence of events

Based on the information collected at the initial field Investigation, as well as recordings from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the Investigation Committee identified the sequence of events preceding the aircraft's collision with the ground. The time reference utilized is UTC (Universal Time Coordinated).

• 14:58:05 - the aircraft initiated takeoff from the runway 15 of SBCA, with 58 passengers and 04 crew on board;

• - the PROPELLER ANTI-ICING 1 and 2 were turned on;

• 15:14:56 - the Electronic Ice Detector connected to the Centralized Crew Alert System (CCAS) emitted an alert signal upon passing FL130;

• - the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on;

• 15:15:42 - a single chime was heard in the cockpit. Subsequently, the crew commented on the occurrence of an AIRFRAME DE-ICING Fault, and that they would turn it Off;

• 151549 - the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned off,

- the Electronic Ice Detector ceased emitting the alert signal.

• 1516125

• 1517:08

- the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal.

- the Electronic Ice Detector stopped emitting the alert signal;

- the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal;

- the Electronic Ice Detector stopped emitting the alert signal.

- the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal;

- the Electronic Ice Detector stopped emitting the alert signal;

- the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal;

- the SIC (pilot Second in Command) made radio contact with the airline's operational dispatcher at

Guarulhos airport, for coordination of the aircraft arrival;

• - At the same time of the SIC's coordination with the operational dispatcher, a flight attendant called

over the intercom. The SIC asked her to hold on moment and continued speaking with the dispatcher,

• - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped emitting the alert signal. At this time, the SIC was asking the

flight attendant for information that would be passed to the operational dispatcher;

• 16:17:32 - the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal; at this time, the PIC was informing the passengers about the SBGR local conditions and estimated time of landing,

• 16:17:41- the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on;

• 16:18:41 - at a speed of 191 kt., the CRUISE SPEED LOW alert was triggered. Concomitantly, the SIC was about to finish relaying some information to the operational dispatcher;

• 16:18:47 - the PIC started the briefing relative to the approach for landing in SBGR. Concomitantly, APP-SP made a radio call, and instructed him to change to frequency 123.25MHz;

• 16:18:55 — a single chime was heard in the cockpit. At this time, the communication with APP-SP was taking place;

• - the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned off;

• 16:19:16 - the crew made a call to APP-SP (Sao Paulo Approach Control) on the frequency 123.25 MHz;

• 16:19:19 - APP-SP requested the PS-VPB aircraft to maintain FL170 due to traffic;

• 16:19:23 - the crew replied to APP-SP that they would maintain flight level and that they were at the ideal point of descent, waiting for clearance;

• 16:19:28 - at a speed of 184 kt., the DEGRADED PERFORMANCE alert was triggered, together with a single chime. The alert was triggered concomitantly with the exchange of messages between APP-SP and the Crew;

• - APP-SP acknowledged the message and requested the aircraft to wait for clearance;

• 16:19:31 - Passaredo 2283 aircraft reported receipt of the message and thanked ATC;

• - the PIC resumed delivering the approach briefing;

• - the Second in Command (SIC) commented, "a lot of icing";

• - the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on for the third time;

• - APP-SP cleared the aircraft to fly direct to SANPA position, maintaining FL170, and informed that the descent would be authorized in two minutes;

• 16:20:39 - the crew acknowledged the flight instruction received (last communication performed by the flight crew);

• - the aircraft started a right turn in order to fly to SANPA position.

• 16:20:57 — during the turn, at a speed of 169 the INCREASE SPEED alert was triggered, in conjunction with a single chime. Immediately afterwards, vibration noise was heard in the aircraft, simultaneously with the activation of the stall alert;

• 16:21:09 - control of the aircraft was lost, and it entered an abnormal flight attitude until colliding with the ground. The aircraft rolled to the left to a bank-angle of 52 degrees, and then rolled to the right to a bank- angle of 94 degrees, performing a 180-degree turn in a clockwise direction. Subsequently, the turn was reversed to an anticlockwise direction, with the aircraft completing five full rotations in a flat spin before crashing into the ground.

Click on image to see it isolated

The ICING light would blink with the detection of an Icing condition and the Anti-Icing and/or De-lcing  (AIFRAME) were not selected to ON, followed by single chime. The light would remain illuminated in a continuous fashion with the systems turned on.

 

Anti-Icing and De-Icing Systems

 

The Anti-lcing functions were energized electrically, whereas the De-icing ones were provided by means of pneumatic pressure.

 

The APM system needed to be checked by the crew on a daily basis, and in case of a failure, an amber-colored FAULT message would illuminate on the APM panel.

If the aircraft's drag increased due to ice accumulation and performance was degraded, resulting in loss of cruise speed, alerts in three levels were triggered and presented to the pilots on both alert panels Of the APM, as follows:

• 1st Level - CRUISE SPEED LOW

The blue-colored message would indicate performance degradation Of around 10%, with reduction Of the Indicated Air Speed (IAS) during the cruise phase by at least 10 kt. below the speed computed by the APM.

This alert would be triggered only during the cruise phase.

• 2nd Level - DEGRADED PERFORMANCE

The amber-colored message would be followed by a single chime and a master caution alert, indicating a significant performance degradation in the range between 22% and 28%, induced by a significant increase in aerodynamic drag, causing a drop in cruise IAS of around 15 to 20 knots below the speed computed by the APM. This alert could be triggered during climb, cruise, Or descent.

• 3rd Level - INCREASE SPEED.

The amber-colored message would appear flashing, followed by a single chime and a master caution alert, indicating that the degraded performance condition had worsened , reaching an IAS value below the ICING BUG + 10 kt. This alert could be triggered during climb, cruise, or descent.

 

The pilot has set the ICING BUG SPEED for SEVERE ICING CONDITION to 165 Knots.

In addition to the speed alerts (emitted by the APM), the airspeed indicators of the left- and right-hand cockpit stations had BUGS for reference, particularly for minimum speed maneuvers at low bank, flaps O', and icing conditions (VMLBO ICING), The said BUGS could be adjusted manually.

 

The ICING BUG needed to be adjusted by the pilots for each flight in accordance with the aircraft's weight, in order to indicate the minimum speed for a flight in icing conditions and with flaps retracted. The VMLBO ICING.