Pilots Have Had Limited Information About Weather Conditions Over The Oceans

New Forecast System Helps Transoceanic Flights Avoid Storms

 Science Daily

Dec. 11, 2012

A new NASA-funded prototype system developed by the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) of Boulder, Colo., now is providing weather forecasts that can help flights avoid major storms as they travel over remote ocean regions. The eight-hour forecasts of potentially dangerous atmospheric conditions are designed for pilots, air traffic controllers and others involved in transoceanic flights.

Click on the link below for real time weather forecast:

http://www.rap.ucar.edu/projects/ocn/realtime_sys/global_extrap/

Tradução Humana em 12 DEZ 2012

by George Rocha

 Novo Sistema de Previsão Ajuda Voos Transoceânicos a Evitar Tempestades

11 DEZ 2012

Um novo sistema protótipo baseado na NASA desenvolvido pelo Centro Nacional para Pesquisa Atmosférica (CNPA) de Bloulder, Colorado, agora está fornecendo previsão neteorológica que pode ajudar voos a evitar tempestades quando eles viajam sobre regiões remotas de oceanos. A previsão de oito horas de condições atmosféricas potencialmente perigosas são planejadas para pilotos, controladores de tráfego aéreo e outros envolvidos em voos transoceânicos.

Clicar no link abaixo para previsão meteorológica em tempo real:

http://www.rap.ucar.edu/projects/ocn/realtime_sys/global_extrap/

The NCAR-based system combines satellite data and computer weather models to produce maps of storms over much of the world's oceans. The system is based on products that NCAR has developed to alert pilots and air traffic controllers about storms and related hazards, such as turbulence and lightning, over the continental United States. Development of the forecasts was spurred in part by the 2009 crash of Air France Flight 447, which encountered a complex of thunderstorms over the Atlantic Ocean. The system was funded by NASA's Applied Sciences Program, which supports efforts to discover and demonstrate innovative and practical uses of NASA Earth science and satellite observations. NCAR worked with the Massachusetts Institute of Technology's Lincoln Laboratory, the Naval Research Laboratory, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison to create the system. "These new forecasts can help fill an important gap in our aviation system," said NCAR's Cathy Kessinger, lead researcher on the project. "Pilots have had limited information about atmospheric conditions as they fly over the ocean, where conditions can be severe. By providing them with a picture of where significant storms will be during an eight-hour period, the system can contribute to both the safety and comfort of passengers on flights."	O sistema CNPA combina dados de satélite e modelos computadorizados de meteorologia para produzir mapas de tempestades sobre muitos dos oceanos do mundo. O sistema é baseado em produtos que o CNPA desenvolveu para alertar pilotos e controladores de tráfego aéreo acerca de tempestades e riscos, tais como turbulência e raios, sobre o continente dos Estados Unidos. O desenvolvimento das previsões foi estimulado em parte pela queda do Air France Voo 447, o qual encontrou um complexo de tempestade com trovoadas sobre o Oceano Atlântico. O sistema foi fundado pelo Programa de Ciências Aplicadas da NASA, o qual apoia esforços para descobrir e demonstrar  observações inovativas e uso prático de observações de satélite e ciência da Terra pela NASA. O CNPA trabalhou com o Laboratório Lincoln do Instituto de Tecnologia de Massachusetts, o Laboratório de Pesquisa Naval e a Universidade Wisconsin-Madison para criarem o sistema. “Estas novas previsões podem ajudar preencher uma lacuna importante em nosso sistema de aviação”, disse Cathy Kessinger do CNPA, pesquisadora lider no projeto. “Pilotos têm tido informação limitada acerca de condições atmosféricas quando eles voam sobre o oceano, onde condições podem ser severas. Ao supri-los com uma imagem de onde tempestades significantes estarão durante um período de oito horas, o sistema pode contribuir para ambos, a segurança e conforto dos passageiros nos voos".
The forecasts, which continue to be tested and modified, cover most of the Atlantic and Pacific oceans, where NCAR has real-time access to geostationary satellite data. The forecasts are updated every three hours.	As previsões, as quais continuam ser testadas e modificadas, cobrem muito dos oceanos Atlântico e Pacífico, onde o CNPA tem acesso em tempo real a dados de satélites geoestacionários. As previsões são atualizadas a cada três horas.
Pilots of transoceanic flights currently get preflight briefings and, in certain cases involving especially intense storms, in-flight weather updates every four hours. They also have onboard radar, but that information is of limited value for strategic flight planning while en route. "Turbulence is the leading cause of injuries in commercial aviation," said John Haynes, Applied Sciences Program manager at NASA Headquarters in Washington. "This prototype system is of crucial importance to pilots and is another demonstration of the practical benefit of NASA's Earth observations."	Pilotos de voos transoceânicos atualmente conseguem briefings pré-voo e, em certos casos envolvendo especialmente tempestades intensas, a meteorologia em voo atualiza a cada quatro horas. Eles também têm a bordo radar, mas essa informação é de valor limitado para planejamento estratégico do voo enquanto em rota. “Turbulência é a causa lider de lesões na aviação comercial”, disse John Haynes, gerente do Programa de Ciências Aplicadas no Centro de Operações da NASA em Washington. "Este sistema protótipo é de crucial importância para pilotos e é uma outra demostração do benefício prático de observações da Terra pela NASA.
Pinpointing turbulence associated with storms over the oceans is far more challenging than it is over land because geostationary satellites, unlike ground-based radar, cannot see within the clouds. Thunderstorms may develop quickly and move rapidly, rendering the briefings and weather updates obsolete. Onboard radars lack the power to see long distances or through dense clouds. As a result, pilots often must choose between detouring hundreds of miles around potentially stormy areas or flying directly through a region that may or may not contain intense weather. Storms may be associated with hazardous windshear and icing conditions in addition to lightning, hail and potentially severe turbulence.	Apontar com precisão turbulência associada com tempestades sobre oceanos é de longe muito mais desafiante do que ela é sobre o terreno por causa de satélites geoestacionários, diferente de radar baseado no solo, eles não podem ver dentro de nuvens. Tempestades com trovoadas podem se desenvolver apressadamente e se moverem rapidamente, tornando os briefings e atualizações meteorológicas obsoletos. Os radares a bordo faltam a potência para ver em longas distâncias ou através de nuvens densas. Como um resultado, pilotos frequentemente devem escolher entre desviar centenas de milhas em volta de áreas potencialmente tempestuosas   ou voarem diretamente através de uma região que pode ou não pode conter condições meteorológicas intensas. Tempestades podem ser associadas com riscos de ‘'windshear’  22 e condições de formação de gelo em adição a raios, granizo e turbulência potencialmente severa.
To create the forecasts, Kessinger and her colleagues first turned to geostationary satellite measurements to identify regions of the atmosphere that met two conditions: particularly high cloud tops and water vapor at high altitudes. These two conditions are a sign of powerful storms and strong updrafts that can buffet an aircraft. The scientists next used fuzzy logic and data fusion techniques to home in on storms of particular concern, and applied object tracking techniques and simulations of wind fields to predict storm locations at hourly intervals out to eight hours.	Para criarem as previsões, Kessinger e colegas dela, primeiro voltaram-se para medições de satélite geoestacionário para identificarem regiões de atmosfera que encontravam duas condições: topos de nuvens particularmente altos e vapor de água em altitudes elevadas. Estas duas condições são um sinal de tempestades potenciais e correntes de ar acendentes fortes que podem esbofetear uma aeronave. Os cientistas em seguida usaram lógica indistinta e técnicas de fusão de dados para se dirigirem para tempestades de interesse particular, e aplicaram técnicas de rastreamento de objeto e simulações de campos de vento para predizerem localizações de tempestade em intervalos horários de cada oito horas.
Researchers verified the forecasts using a variety of data from NASA Earth observations, including the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) satellite.	Os pesquisadores verificaram as previsões usando uma variedade de dados de observações da Terra pela NASA, incluindo o satélite da Missão de Medição de Precipitação Tropical (MMPT).
"These advanced techniques enable us to inform pilots about the potential for violent downdrafts and turbulence, even over the middle of the ocean where we don't have land-based radar or other tools to observe storms in detail," Kessinger said.	“Estas técnicas avançadas capacitam-nos para informar pilotos acerca do potencial para correntes de ar descendentes violentas e turbulência, mesmo acima do meio do oceano onde nós não temos radar fixado em solo ou ferramentas para observar tempestades em detalhes”, disse Kessinger.
The forecasts can be viewed at: http://go.nasa.gov/W0doRu	As previsões podem ser vistas em:   http://go.nasa.gov/W0doRu

 

22 National Aeronautics and Space Administration, Langley Research Center (June 1992). "Making the Skies Safer From Windshear". http://web.archive.org/web/20100329221032/http://oea.larc.nasa.gov/PAIS/Windshear.html. Retrieved 2012-11-16.

 

 

Court Orders US To Pay Pilot's Family - $ 4.4 Million

XMAS  READING

Court Orders U.S. To Pay Pilot's Family A District Court Judge has ordered the United States to pay $4.4 million to the family of a pilot killed in a 2005 plane crash after finding that a controller (currently serving as a front line manager) "breached his duty of care." Judge Edwin G. Torres found that controller Harvey Pake failed to provide accurate, complete weather information pertinent to pilot Michael Zinn's route of flight. He also failed to provide navigational assistance when asked, according to the court. The NTSB's full narrative suggests it may not be that simple. Zinn was flying a Cessna P337H, IFR, out of Boca Raton for Myrtle Beach in the afternoon. Pake told him he was heading toward heavy precipitation and Zinn announced a heading change. Pake became involved with another aircraft as Zinn flew into a Level 5 storm. Zinn was heard on frequency by controllers and other pilots screaming for help for two minutes before his radio went silent. The court found that the controller's station displayed Level 5 to 6 weather along Zinn's new heading. It resolved that Pake "failed to provide sufficient accurate weather information to allow Zinn to make informed decisions." In real time, when asked by Zinn, "Does my heading look clear to you at this point?" Pake replied "I cannot suggest any headings because my weather radar only picks up precipitation and is not as accurate as what you see out your window." The NTSB found Pake had cleared Zinn to deviate left and right along his new route of flight and asked Zinn to advise when he was back on course. In the interim, Pake became involved with another aircraft. When Pake returned, Zinn was in trouble, announcing he was "in difficult shape." Zinn then requested that Pake give him a heading. Pake replied that he could only suggest a heading, which he did. Twenty seconds later a voice presumed to be that of Zinn was heard on frequency saying, "Help." Other pilots relayed "Somebody's yelling for help and that they're going to die." Soon after, Zinn's aircraft crashed into a house. The judge found that Zinn was 60 percent responsible for his own death, with significant contributions made by the Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center. But according to the judge, "Neither the air traffic controllers nor Michael Zinn were bad actors in this tragic accident." HISTÓRIA DO VOO On October 19, 2005, about 1457 eastern daylight time, a Cessna P337H, N5HU, registered to River Aviation, Inc., and operated by the pilot as a Title 14 CFR Part 91 personal flight, impacted a residence in an uncontrolled descent in Port St. Lucie, Florida. The private pilot, the sole occupant, received fatal injuries, and the airplane was destroyed. Instrument meteorological conditions prevailed in the area at the time, and an instrument flight rules (IFR) flight plan was filed for the cross country flight. The flight originated in Boca Raton, Florida, about 1431, and the intended destination was Myrtle Beach, South Carolina.        According to recorded radar data provided by Palm Beach (PBI) approach control, N5HU departed Boca Raton Airport under visual flight rules (VFR) at 1431 and headed northbound. The pilot contacted PBI at 1434, requesting VFR flight following. The controller acknowledged, told the pilot that PBI already had an IFR flight plan on file, and asked if the pilot wished to fly under IFR instead of VFR. The pilot responded that he wanted to go direct to Ormond Beach, and that if he could do so, he would accept an IFR clearance. The controller advised that such a route would be possible at or below 9,000 feet and instructed the pilot to squawk 3574. After radar identifying N5HU, the PBI controller cleared the pilot to Myrtle Beach (MRB) via radar vectors west of the PBI airport area, then direct to Vero Beach, Melbourne, Ormond Beach, Craig, direct MRB. The pilot acknowledged. At 1441, the pilot asked to deviate to the east to go around some buildups. The controller responded, "Deviations approved, when able direct Vero Beach. It looks like direct Vero Beach is the best shot for you. There's some weather west of Stuart - that track should keep you out of it." The pilot then said that if he could get a higher altitude, he might be able to go direct instead of deviating. The controller issued clearance to 9,000 feet, and the pilot acknowledged. At 1450, the PBI controller instructed the pilot to contact Miami Air Route Traffic Control Center (ZMA) on 135.3. N5HU contacted ZMA sector 3 at 1450 and reported level at 9,000 feet. The controller acknowledged and issued the Vero Beach altimeter setting. The pilot then asked for a higher altitude, and the controller replied, "...I'll have higher for you in about two minutes if that works for you." N5HU responded that he might have to deviate left or right but was not sure yet, and then stated that he wished to deviate to the east. The controller approved the deviation and instructed the pilot to go direct to Vero Beach when able. At 1451, N5HU was handed off to ZMA sector 22 and told, "...contact Miami Center 133.47 for climb clearance." The pilot contacted sector 22 at 1452 and immediately requested to climb. The R22 controller issued clearance to 11,000. The controller further advised of, "...a weather area twelve o'clock five miles moderate to heavy precipitation. I do show a break about five miles wide and then picks back up to heavy extreme and uh correction moderate to heavy and extreme precipitation. Advise of your deviations, please." The pilot responded, "5HU deviations to the west around that weather, looks clear behind that." The R22 controller asked, "all right uh understand you want to go west?" The pilot replied, "Yes sir, I'm heading three hundred right now to get by that weather." At 1453, the pilot of N5HU asked, "...does my heading look clear to you at this point?" The R22 controller responded, "...I cannot suggest any headings because my weather radar only picks up precipitation and is not as accurate as what you see out the window. You are cleared to deviate left and right of course, when able direct to Melbourne - just advise when you can go back." The pilot replied, "Wilco." At 1455:23, the R22 controller became involved in a coordination call regarding an unrelated flight. At 1455:25, an unidentified pilot sounding similar to N5HU transmitted, "I'd like to have a block altitude." At 1455:33, the pilot of N5HU asked, "Do you have any weather ahead of me right now?" At 1455:41, the pilot transmitted, "5HU request assistance." None of these transmissions were acknowledged because the controller was engaged in coordination. At 1455:49, the controller transmitted, "5HU go ahead." The pilot responded, "..…are you showing what the weather is in front of me? I'm a little uh in difficult shape here." The controller advised, "OK - November 5HU I'm showing you encountering weather at this time moderate to heavy precipitation slight uh actually uh extreme precipitation, do you need uh say intentions." The pilot replied, "...give me a heading please." The controller responded, "OK - 5HU this is a suggestion only a suggestion only I cannot issue assigned headings. 20 degrees right please." At 1456:20, the pilot stated, "5HU roger that turning." Shortly afterward, the airplane entered a rapid descent. At 1456:40, an unknown pilot sounding similar to N5HU transmitted, "Help." At 1457:34, the R22 controller made two unsuccessful attempts to contact the pilot of N5HU. The pilot of AAL1968 transmitted, "...somebody's yelling for help that they're going to die." The R22 controller transmitted, "Say again?", and the pilot of AAL1968 repeated the message. The controller again tried to contact N5HU with no response. At 1458:06, AAL1968 advised that they heard a pilot yelling, "Help help help." There were no further contacts with N5HU. According to witnesses "bad weather" was present in the area at the time of the accident, with heavy rain and lightning being observed. Several witnesses stated that they saw the accident airplane emerge from the clouds at an altitude of about 300 feet, on its side, and descending. The witnesses further said the airplane appeared to roll inverted, and again rolled onto a side. They said that it became level as it climbed to an altitude of about 600 to 800 feet, and proceeded in a northeasterly direction, descended again, and started to head to the south. It then made a turn to the east, and was at a low altitude which permitted them to clearly observe the pilot and the airplane. They said the airplane then headed east, turned north, and descended below the tree line. According to witnesses, the engines sounded as if they were operating, and there were no noticeable problems with the airplane. One witness remarked that it appeared as if the airplane was "performing maneuvers." Witnesses further stated that the airplane impacted a house at a steep angle, with the sound of a loud "pop," followed by a loud explosion. A fire ensued, engulfing the house and the airplane. PERSONNEL INFORMATION The pilot held a private pilot certificate with ratings for airplane single engine land, airplane multi-engine land limited to center thrust, and instrument airplane. His most recent medical certificate was a third class medical issued on April 27, 2005, with the limitation, must have glasses available for near vision. Review of the pilot's logbook indicated he had accumulated about 1,488 hours total flight time. According to the logbook, the pilot had logged 346 hours of actual instrument time and 71 hours of simulated instrument flight time. His most recent instrument competency check was completed on April 7, 2005. Since that check, the pilot had not logged any hours of actual or simulated instrument flight time. AIRCRAFT INFORMATION Review of the airplane's maintenance records indicated that the 1978 model Cessna Skymaster received its most recent annual inspection on December 23, 2004, at a total time of 1,639.7 hours. As of that date, the front and rear engines, both Continental TSIO-360CB models, S/N 236251-R and 236252-R, respectively, had each accumulated 574 hours since installation in the airplane on February 3, 1999, following zero time overhauls by Continental. The most recent maintenance actions recorded were engine oil and filter changes performed on October 14, 2005. As of that date, the airplane had accumulated 1,740.7 hours, and the engines had accumulated 675 hours since overhaul.     The records indicated the airplane's most recent 14 CFR Part 91.411 IFR certification of the altimeter, encoder and static system took place on June 24, 2003. Examination of the maintenance records revealed no evidence of any uncorrected maintenance discrepancies. METEOROLOGICAL INFORMATION A regional radar mosaic chart for 1454 was obtained from the National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR). The chart depicted two bands of echoes extending across Florida, with the primary band of echoes extending from the Fort Myers area on the west coast of Florida, to Lake Okeechobee, northeastward into the Vero Beach area, and extending off shore to the northern Bahamas. Several defined areas of rain showers and thunderstorms were identified in the vicinity of the accident site.     The closest official weather reporting facility was from Witham Field Airport (KSUA), Stuart, Florida, located approximately 10 miles southeast of the accident site at an elevation of 18 feet msl. The airport was equipped with an Automated Weather Observation System (AWOS-3) and issued the following Meteorological Aerodrome Reports (METARs) surrounding the period of the accident. The following observations are taken from standard code provided in plain language, with cloud heights reported above ground level (agl). KSUA weather observation at 1347, wind from 160 degrees at 11 knots gusting to 17 knots, visibility unrestricted 10 miles with showers in the vicinity, scattered clouds at 2,000 feet, ceiling broken at 10,000 feet, temperature 31 degrees Celsius (C), dew point temperature 24 degrees C, altimeter 29.95 inches of Mercury (Hg). KSUA weather observation at 1447, wind from 120 degrees at 10 knots, visibility 7 miles with showers in the vicinity, scattered clouds at 3,000 feet, ceiling broken at 5,000 feet, temperature 28 degrees C, dew point temperature 24 degrees C, altimeter 29.95 inches of Hg.     KSUA weather observation at 1547, wind from 320 degrees at 10 knots gusting to 15 knots, visibility 6 miles in thunderstorms and moderate rain, ceiling broken at 2,000 feet, broken at 4,000 feet, temperature 26 degrees C, dew point 22 degrees C, altimeter 29.96 inches of Hg. Remarks: occasional lightning in-cloud and cloud-to-ground, thunderstorm southwest moving north.     The closest National Weather Service (NWS) Weather Surveillance Radar-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D) was located at Melbourne (KMLB), approximately 50 miles north-northeast of the accident site. The radar produces three basic types of products, reflectivity, radial velocity, and spectral width. Reflectivity is normally displayed in decibels (dBZ) and is a general measure of echo intensity. The FAA Advisory Circular AC 00-24B titled "Thunderstorms" dated January 2, 1983, defines the echo intensity levels and potential weather phenomena associated with those levels. If the maximum VIP Level is 1 "weak" and 2 "moderate", then light to moderate turbulence is possible with lightning. VIP Level 1 corresponds to 15 to 29 dBZ and Level 2 corresponds to 30 to 39 dBZ. VIP Level 3 is "strong" and severe turbulence is possible with lightning. VIP Level 3 corresponds to 40 to 44 dBZ. VIP Level 4 is "very heavy" and severe turbulence is likely with lightning. VIP Level 4 corresponds to 45 to 49 dBZ. VIP Level 5 is "intense" with severe turbulence, lightning, hail likely, and organized surface wind gusts. VIP level 5 corresponds to 50 to 54 dBZ. VIP Level 6 is "extreme" with severe turbulence, lightning, large hail, extensive surface wind gusts and turbulence. VIP Level 6 corresponds to 55 dBZ or greater. The KMLB WSR-88D base reflectivity image for the 1.45 degree elevation scan completed at 1456 depicts the flight track of N5HU approaching an area with reflectivities in the range of 55 dBZ echoes (border line VIP Level 6), and entering into reflectivities of 35 to 40 dBZ (VIP Level 2 to 3). The KMLB 1.45 and 0.5 degree base reflectivity images ending at 1501 and 1500, respectively, depict reflectivities ranging to over 50 dBZ along the flight track. The images confirm that N5HU penetrated an intense to extreme VIP Level 5 to 6 echo.

Tribunal Ordena Estados Unidos Pagar Família de Piloto Um Juiz da Corte Distrital ordenou os Estados Unidos a pagar US$ 4.4 Milhões para a família de um piloto morto numa queda de avião em 2005 após o veredicto que um controlador (atualmente servindo como um gerenciador de linha de frente) "quebrou a tarefa de cuidados dele ". O Juiz Edwin G. Torres decidiu que o controlador Harvey Pake falhou para fornecer informação completa e acurada pertinente à rota de voo do piloto Michael Zinn. Ele também falhou para fornecer assistência navegacional quando solicitada, de acordo com a corte. A narrativa completa da NTSB sugere que isso pode não ser tão simples. Zinn estava voando um Cessna P337H, IFR, saindo de Boca Raton para Myrtle Beach à tarde. Pake falou para ele que ele estava aproando em direção a precipitação [chuva] pesada e Zinn anunciou uma mudança de proa. Pake ficou envolvido com um outra aeronave enquanto Zinn voava para dentro de uma tempestade Nível 5. Zinn foi ouvido na [rádio] frequência pelos controladores e outros pilotos gritando por socorro por dois minutos antes do rádio dele silenciar. A Corte sentenciou que a estação do controlador apresentava condições meteorológicas Nível 5 para 6 ao longo da nova proa de Zinn. Isso esclareceu que Pake "falhou para fornecer informação meteorológica acurada suficiente para permitir Zinn tomar decisões [baseadas] no informado”. Em tempo real, quando perguntado por Zinn, "Minha proa parece livre para você neste ponto?" Pake respondeu "Eu não posso sugerir quaisquer proas porque meu radar meteorológico somente pega precipitação [chuva] e não está tão preciso quanto o que você vê fora de sua janela". A NTSB descobriu que Pake tinha liberado Zinn para desviar à esquerda e à direita ao longo da nova rota de voo e pediu a Zinn para avisar quando ele estivesse de volta ao curso. Neste ínterim, Pake ficou envolvido com uma outra aeronave. Quando Pake retornou, Zinn estava em apuros, anunciando que ele estava "em condição dificil".  Zinn depois solicitou que Pake desse a ele uma proa. Pake respondeu que ele somente poderia sugerir uma proa, a qual ele sugeriu. Vinte segundos depois uma voz presumida ser aquela de Zinn foi ouvida na rádio-frequência dizendo, "socorro". Outros pilotos retransmitiram,  "Alguém está berrando por socorro e que eles vão morrer". Logo após, a aeronave de Zinn caiu dentro de uma casa. O juiz achou que Zinn era 60 por cento responsável pela própria morte dele, com significantes contribuições feitas pelo Centro de Controle de Tráfego Aéreo em Rota em Miami. Mas de acordo com o juiz, "Nem os controladores de tráfego nem Michael Zinn foram maus atores neste trágico acidente". HISTÓRIA       DO        VOO Em 19 OUT 2005, cerca de 14:57 horas EDT, um Cessna P337H, [matrícula] N5HU, registrado para River Aviation, Inc., e operado pelo piloto como um voo pessoal de acordo com o Título 14 CFR Part 91, colidiu com uma residência numa descida descontrolada em Port St. Lucie, Flórida. O piloto privado, o único ocupante, recebeu ferimentos fatais, e o avião foi destruído. Condições meteorológicas por instrumento prevaleciam na área na hora, e um plano de voo IFR (Regras de Voo por Instrumentos) foi apresentado para o voo de longa distância. O voo originou em Boca Raton, Flórida, cerca de 14:31 horas, e o destino intencionado era Myrtle Beach, South Carolina. De acordo com os dados registrados do radar fornecidos pelo Controle de Aproximação de Palm Beach (PBI) o [avião] N5HU partiu do aeroporto de Boca Raton sob regras de voo visual (VFR) às 14:31 horas e aproou a área norte. O piloto contactou o Controle às 14:34 horas solicitando prosseguir o voo em condições visuais (VFR). O controlador confirmou o recebimento da mensagem, falou para o piloto que o Controle PBI já tinha um plano de voo IFR [voo por instrumentos] arquivado. [Apresentado] e perguntou se o piloto desejava voar sob Regras de Voo por Instrumentos (IFR) em vez de VFR. O piloto respondeu que ele queria ir direto para Ormond Beach, e que se ele pudesse fazer assim, ele aceitaria uma AUTORIZAÇÃO IFR. O controlador avisou que tal rota seria possível em ou acima de 9000 pés e instruiu o piloto para inserir o [código no TRANSPONDER] 3574. Após a identificação radar do [avião] N5HU, o Controlador de PBI liberou o piloto para Myrthle Beach (KMRB) via vetores de radar a Oeste da área do aeroporto de PBI, depois [voar] direto para Vero Beach, Melbourne, Ormond Beach, Craig, direto MRB. O piloto acusou o recebimento da mensagem. Às 14:41 horas, o piloto pediu para desviar para Este  para contornar algumas formações meteorológicas. O controlador respondeu: "Desvios aprovados, quando capaz direto Vero Beach. Parece que direto Vero Beach é a melhor jogada para você. Há algumas formações meteorológicas a Oeste de Stuart - essa rota deve manter você fora dela". O piloto depois disse que se ele pudesse conseguir uma altitude mais alta, ele podia ser capaz de ir direto em vez de desviar. O controlador emitiu a AUTORIZAÇÃO para 9000 pés, e o piloto acusou o recebimento da mesnagem. Às 14:50 horas, o controlador de PBI instruiu o piloto para contactar o Centro de Controle de Tráfego Aéreo de Rota em Miami (ZMA) na [rádio frequência] 135.3. O [avião] N5HU contactou o Setor 3 do Cetro ZMA às 14:50 horas e reportou no nível [de voo] 9000 pés. O controlador acusou o recebimento da mensagem e informou o ajuste do altímetro em Vero Beach. O piloto então pediu uma altitude mais elevada, e o controlador respondeu, "... Eu terei mais alta, para você, em cerca de dois minutos se isso funcionar para você". O N5HU respondeu que ele podia ter que desviar à esquerda  ou direita, mas não estava seguro ainda, e depois declarou que ele desejava desviar para Este. O controlador aprovou o desvio e instruiu o piloto para ir direto para Vero Beach quando capaz. Às 14:51 horas, o N5HU foi transferido para o Setor 22 de ZMA e comunicado, ".. contacte o Centro Miami [na frequência] 133.47 para autorização de subida". O piloto contactou o Setor 22 às 14:52 horas e imediatamente solicitou subir. O Controlador R22 emitiu a AUTORIZAÇÃO para 11000 pés. O controlador adicionalmente avisou de "... uma área de formação meteorológica [na posição ] doze horas, cinco milhas, precipitação moderada para severa. Eu exibo uma quebra [na apresentação radar] cerca de cinco milhas de largura e depois pega de volta até  extrema pesada e uh... correção, moderada para pesada e precipitação extrema. Avise de seus desvios, por favor". O piloto respondeu, "5HU desvios para Oeste em volta da formação meteorológica, parece limpo atrás disso". O controlador R22 perguntou, "tudo bem, uh... você entende que você quer ir para Oeste?" O piloto respondeu, "Sim, senhor, eu estou aproando 300 agora mesmo para passar por essa formação". Às 14:53 horas, o piloto do N5HU perguntou "... minha proa parece livre para você neste ponto?" O controlador R22 respondeu, "... Eu não posso sugerir qualquer proa porque meu radar meteorológico somente pega precipitação e não está acurado como você vê fora da janela. Você está livre para  desviar à esquerda e à direita do curso, quando capaz [voe] direto para Melbourne – no mesmo momento avise quando você puder voltar". O piloto respondeu, "Cumprirei". Às 14:55:23 horas, o controlador R22 ficou envolvido numa chamada de coordenação com respeito a um voo não relacionado. Às 14:55:25, um piloto não identificado soando similar ao [piloto] do N5HU transmitiu, "Eu gostaria de ter um bloco de altitude". Às 14:55:33, o piloto do N5HU perguntou, "você tem alguma formação meteorológica à minha frente agora mesmo?" Às 14:55:41 horas, o piloto transmitiu, "5HU solicita assitência". Nenhuma destas transmissões foi acusado recebimento porque o controlador estava engajado em coordenação. Às 14:55:49 horas, o controlador tramsmitiu, "5HU prossiga". O piloto respondeu, "... você está esclarecendo que a formação meteorológica está na minha frente?  Eu estou um pouco uh ... em séria dificuldade aqui". O controlador informou, "OK - November Cinco Hotel Uniform, eu estou informando a você  que encontrando condições meteorológicas neste momento ligeira precipitação moderada para pesada uh ... precipitação severa, você precisa uh ... dizer [suas] intenções". O piloto respondeu, "... dê-me uma proa, por favor". O controlador respondeu, "OK - 5HU esta é uma sugestão somente, eu não posso emitir proas especificadas. 20 graus  à direita, por favor". Às 14:56:20, o piloto declarou, "5HU ciente que [está] curvando". Logo posteriormente, o avião entrou numa descida rápida. Às 14:56:40 horas, um piloto desconhecido soando similar ao do N5HU transmitiu, "Socorro". Às 14:57:34 horas, o controlador R22 fez duas tentativas sem sucesso para contactar o piloto do N5HU. O piloto do [voo American Airlines] AAL1968 transmitiu, "...o berro de alguém por socorro que eles vão morrer". O controlador R22 transmitiu, "Diga novamente?", e o piloto do voo AAL1968 repetiu a mensagem. O controlador novamente tentou contactar o N5HU, com nenhuma resposta. Às 14:58:06 horas, o AAL1968 avisou que eles ouviram um piloto berrando, "Socorro, socorro, socorro". Não existiram contatos adicionais com o N5HU. De acordo com testemunhas "o mau tempo" estava presente na área na hora do acidente, com chuva pesada e relâmpagos sendo observados. Várias testemunhas declararam que elas viram o avião acidentado emergir das nuvens numa altitude de cerca de 300 pés, sobre sua lateral, e descendo. As testemunhas adicionais disseram que o avião pareceu rolar invertido [voo de dorso], e novamente rolou sobre uma lateral. Elas disseram que ele ficou nivelado quando ele subiu  para uma altitude de cerca de 600 a 800 pés, e prosseguiu numa direção nordeste, descendo novamente, e começou aproar para o Sul. Ele então fez uma curva para Este, e foi numa baixa altitude, a qual os permitia claramente observar o piloto e o avião. Elas disseram que o avião depois aproou o Este, curvou para Norte, e desceu abaixo da linha das árvores. De acordo com testemunhas, os motores soaram como se eles estivessem operando, e não houvesse problemas notáveis com o avião. Uma testemunha observou que ele pareceu como se o avião estivesse "efetuando manobras". Testemunhas adicionais declararam que o avião colidiu com uma casa num ângulo abrupto, como o som de um alto "pop" [estampido], seguido por uma sonora explosão. Um fogo resultou, engolfando a casa e o avião. INFORMAÇÃO PESSOAL O piloto tinha um certificado de Piloto Privado com habilitações técnicas para avião monomotor terrestre, avião multi-motores terrestre limitado à potência central, e avião [homologado] para voo por instrumentos. O mais recente certificado médico dele era de terceira classe emitido em 27 ABR 2005, com a limitação, 'deve haver óculos disponíveis para visão de perto'. Vistoria do livro de registro de horas de voo do piloto indicaram que ele tinha acumulado cerca de 1488 horas totais de tempo de voo. De acordo com o livro de horas de voo, o piloto tinha registradas 346 horas de instrumento real e 71 horas de voo simuladas. O mais recente exame de competência dele foi completado em 07 ABR 2005. Desde aquele check, o piloto não tinha registrado qualquer hora de tempo de voo por instrumento simulado ou real. INFORMAÇÃO DA AERONAVE Revisão dos registros de manutenção do avião indicaram que o 1978 [o ano de fabricação] modelo Cessna Skymaster recebeu sua mais recente Inspeção Anual em 23 DEZ 2004, num total de 1639.7 horas. Quando daquela data, os motores, da frente e de trás, ambos Continental modelos TSIO-360CB, Serial Number 236251-R e 236252-L,repectivamente, tinham cada um acumulado 574 horas desde a instalação no avião em 03 FEV 1999, seguindo vistorias zero hora pela Continental. As ações mais recentes de manutenção registradas foram troca de óleo e filtro do motor efetuadas em 14 OUT 2005. Quando daquela data, o avião tinha acumulado 1740.7 horas, e os motores tinham acumulado 675 horas desde a vistoria. Os registros indicaram que a mais recente certificação no avião  sob título 14 CFR Part 91.411 IFR foi do altímetro, sistemas codificador e estático que tomou lugar em 24 JUN 2003. Exames dos registros de manutenção não revelaram evidência de quaisquer discripâncias de manutenção incorreta. INFORMAÇÃO METEOROLÓGICA A carta mosaico do radar regional para às 14:54 horas foi obtida do Centro Nacional para Pesuisa Atmosférica (NCAR). A carta retratava duas faixas de ecos estendendo através da Flórida, com a faixa principal de ecos estendendo da área de Fort Myers na costa Oeste da Flórida, para o Lake Okeechobee, direção Nordeste para dentro da área de Vero Beach, e estendendo além-mar para o extremo norte das Bahamas. Várias áreas definidas de pancadas de chuva e trovoadas foram identificadas nas proximidades do local do acidente. A mais próxima estação oficial de informação de formação meteorológica era a do aeroporto Witham Field (KSUA, Stuart, Flórida, localizada aproximadamente 10 milhas a Sudeste do local do acidente numa elevação de 18 pés MSL [Acima do Nível do Mar]. O aeroporto estava equipado com um Sistema Automático de Observação Meteorológica (AWOS-3) e emitiu o seguinte METAR [Informações Meteorológicas de Aeródromo] por volta  do horário do acidente. As seguintes observações meteorológicas são tomadas do código padrão em linguagem comum, com alturas de nuvem reportadas Acima do Nível do Solo (AGL). KSUA observação meteorológica às 13:47 horas, vento de 160 graus com 11 Knots, rajadas até 17 Knots, visibilidade irrestrita acima de 10 milhas com pancadas de chuva nas proximidades, nuvens esparsas a 2000 pés, teto parcialmente nublado a 10.000 pés, temperatura 31 graus Celsius , temperatura do Ponto de Orvalho 24 graus Celsius, Altímetro 29.95 polegadas de Mercúrio. KSUA observação meteorológica às 14:47, vento de 120° com 10 Knots, visibilidade 7 milhas com pancadas de chuva nas proximidades, nuvens esparsas a 3000 pés, teto parcialmente nublado a 5000 pés, temperatura 28°C, Ponto de Orvalho 24°C, altímetro 29.95 polegadas de Mercúrio. KSUA observação meteorológica às 15:47, vento de 320° com 10 Knots, rajadas até 15 Knots, visibilidade 6 milhas dentro de trovoadas e chuva moderada, teto parcialmente encoberto a 2000 pés, parcialmente encoberto a 4000 pés, temperatura 26°C, ponto de orvalho 22°C, altímetro 29.96 polegadas de Mercúrio. Observações: raios ocasionais dentro de nuvem e de nuvem para o solo, trovoada a Sudoeste movendo para Norte. O mais próximo Serviço Nacional Meteorológico (NWS) Radar Meteorológico de Vigilância-1988, Doppler (WSR-88D) estava localizado em Melbourne (KMLB), aproximadamente 50 milhas Norte-Nordeste do local do acidente. O  radar produz três tipos básicos de produtos, reflectividade, velocidade radial, e largura espectral. Reflectividade é normalmente apresentada em decibéis (dBZ) e é uma medida geral de intensidade do eco. A Circular de Aviso AC 00-24B da FAA entitulada "Thunderstorms" datada de 02 JAN 1983, define os níveis de intensidades de eco e fenômenos meteorológicos potenciais associados  àqueles níveis. Se o Nível VIP máximo, é 1 "fraco" e 2 "moderado", então turbulência leve para moderada é possível com relâmpagos. Nível VIP 1 corresponde de 15 a 29 dBZ e Nível 2 corresponde de 30 a 39 dBZ. VIP Nível 3 é "forte" e turbulência severa é possível com raios, Nível VIP 3 corresponde de 40 a 44 dBZ. Nível VIP 4 é "muito pesado" e turbulêcia severa é provavelmente com raios. Nível VIP 4 corresponde de 45 a 49 dBZ. Nível VIP 5 é "intenso" com turbulência severa, raios, granizo provavelmente, e rajadas de vento na superfície. Nível VIP 5 corresponde de 50 a 54 dBZ. Nível VIP 6 é "extremo" com turbulência severa, raios, granizos grandes, extensas rajadas de vento de superfície e turbulência. Nível VIP 6 corresponde de 55 dBZ ou maior. A imagem de reflitividade do radar base WSR-88D de KMLB para varredura de elevação de 1.45 graus completada às 14:56 horas retrata a trajetória do voo de N5HU aproximando de uma área com refletividades num alcance de ecos com 55 dBZ (linha de borda Nível VIP 6), e entrando na refletividade de 35 para 40 dBZ (Nível VIP 2 para 3).  As imagens de refletividade  base com 1.45 e 0.5 graus de KMLB terminando às 15:01 horas e 15:00 horas, respectivamente, retratam refletividades alcançando de mais de 50 dBZ ao longo da trajetória de voo. As imagens confirmam que o N5HU penetrou um intenso e extremo eco Nível  VIP 5  para 6.

Bloco de Altitudes

Às vezes um piloto pode ter dificuldade em manter a altitude do voo devido às condições meteorológicas ou alguma outra razão. Talvez uma turbulência forte esteja se tornando um problema, e você está cavalgando os topos de nuvens, entrando e saindo de formação de gelo, seja qual for, uma opção para os pilotos  é um 'bloco de altitude'.

O Controle de Tráfego Aéreo não fornece AUTORIZAÇÕES para aeronave em 'blocos de altitudes' sem uma solicitação do piloto. A solicitação para o bloco normalmente deve ser acompanhada pela razão da solicitação.
Controladores têm um número de condições que eles precisam encontrar antes de aprovarem um 'bloco de altitude'.

Eles têm que saber qual a razão e quando você pode retornar para uma "altitude dificil". Esta última condição é difícil em algumas cincunstâncias, uma vez que um piloto ou um controlador provavelmente não saberá quando condições de turbulência ou formação de gelo terminarão.
Os controladores também têm que ver se o piloto satisfaz certas exigências que ele pode nem mesmo estar consciente delas.
O piloto pode solicitar "bloco de altitude" por razões de conbustível, turbulência ou formaçao de gelo.
A fraseologia que o Controlador de Tráfego Aéreo usará para designar um "bloco de altitude" poderá ser como esta:

"GOLF CHARLIE ROMEO, mantenha o bloco de seis mil até oito mil pés".

Quando um "bloco de altitude" não é mais exigido, o piloto deve se esforçar pata manter uma altitude apropriada para o rumo do voo dentro do bloco designado ou solicitar uma altitude diferente e avisar o ATC que o "bloco de altitude" não é mais necessário.

Air France 447 - New Findings - Recommendations - Pilots' Talkings

AIRBUS 330 - Controles de Voo

Principio Básico

As superfícies de controle de voo do A330 são:

 - Eletricamente controladas
 - Hidraulicamente ativadas

O estabilizador e o leme/direção podem ser mecanicamente controlados.

Os sidesticks são usados para pilotar a aeronave com leme e direção.
Os comandos dos pilotos, são interpretados pelos computadores, os quais enviam sinais para mover os controles de voo necessários para realizar o curso de voo desejado.
Apesar do comando dos pilotos, os computadores previnem:
 - manobras excessivas
 - que os limites da segurança de voo sejam excedidos

In a schematic manner, the threshold is stable below a Mach of the order of 0.3, then reduces in a quasi-linear manner to a Mach of the order 0.75, after which it falls more rapidly when the Mach increases up to Mach 0.82.

Onboard weather radar

The Air France Airbus A330’s are fitted with Collins WXR 700X-623 type weather radar with a flat antenna (P/N : 622-5132-623). The opening angle of the radar beam is 3.6° in elevation and 3.7° in azimuth.

Adjustments to the tilt and the gain are made manually.

Each airplane is equipped with two systems, only one antenna and only one control box.

Only one system is active at a time.

The radar image is presented on the ND overlaid with navigation and TCAS information. It is presented when the radar is operating, when the ND is not in PLAN2 mode and when the TERR3 mode is not selected. Range adjustment is done manually

.

Note: Adjusting the luminosity of the terrain and weather information is done independently of that of other information on each ND.

No malfunctions of the weather radar were reported on the other ATL of F-GZCP in the last 6 months prior to the accident.

Instructions for use of weather radar

In cruise mode above 20,000 feet, a slight downwards adjustment of tilt, depending on the scale selected, is recommended so that the ground echoes only appear on the ND at the edge of the furthest distance circles. This method enables the simple and practical application of the height/tilt rule of equivalence providing the optimum tilt adjustment.
When pilots monitor the weather situation, gain can remain in CAL position. In the confirmed
presence of storms and during their avoidance, a manual adjustment can be used for comparison with the CAL image.
A scale of 160 NM enables the change in the weather situation to be assessed and anticipate route changes. A scale of 80 NM is used for avoidance. Short scales must be periodically discontinued in order to observe distant weather conditions and to avoid an impasse amid the disturbances.
The shape of the echoes may alert the crew to the possible presence of hail. Zones of turbulence may be presented above a detected zone of precipitation.
Red or magenta zones as well as fringe-shape echoes must in this way be by-passed from windward by regularly adjusting the tilt and the range. The avoidance decision must be taken before the echoes are at 40 NM.

The operator recommends avoiding flying less than 5,000 ft above or below a storm cell. It provides a formula for pilots to estimate the separation height between the top of a detected cell and the airplane. This formula uses the distance and the tilt points from which the zone echo disappears. Above 23,000 ft, it is recommended to fly more than 20 NM from these zones11.

Time (UTC)	Captain & PNF	1st Officer (PF)
22:10	Cleared to Start Up
22:29		Take Off  (TOW = 232.8) TakeOff Weight Max. TOW = 233 Ton. Including Fuel = 70.4 Ton
01:35:15		Crew Informed ATLANTICO controller the aircraft passed INTOL Fix point and they estimated SALPU at 01:48 then ORARO at 02:00 UTC.
01:35:46		Controller asked them to maintain Flight Level 350 and the estimated time at TASIL Fix point.
01:35:53 to 01:36:14		Controller asked again three times for the estimated at TASIL Fix with no answer.
01:55:00	He woke the second copilot and said:	“…he’s going to take my place”
01:59:32 to 02:01:46	He attended the briefing between the two copilots	“the little bit of turbulence that you just saw we should find the same ahead we`re in the cloud layer unfortunately we can’t climb much for the moment because the temperature is falling more slowly than forecast” “the logon with DAKAR failed”
	The airplane approached the ORARO point maintaining Flight Level 350, MAC 0.82, Pitch Altitude 2.5°, Weight & Balance 205 Ton and 29%. Autopilot 2 and Auto-Thrust engaged.
02:06:04		Called cabin crew: “in two minutes we should enter an area where it’ll move about a bit more than at the moment, you should watch out” He added: “I’ll call you back as soon as we’re out of it”
02:08:07	“you can maybe go a little to the left …”	The airplane changed the heading 12 degrees to the left. Turbulence level increased slightly and the speed was reduced to MACH 0.80.
02:10:05	The AUTOPILOT and   AUTO-THURST disengaged
		Pilot Flying said: “I have the controls”
	The airplane began to roll to the RIGHT and the Pilot Flying made a nose-up and LEFT input. The STALL WARNING sounded 2 times in a row. The recorded parameters show a sharp FALL from about 275 Knots to 60 Knots in the speed displayed on the LEFT PFD, and then a few moments later in the speed displayed on the Integrated Standby Instrument System [ISIS]. There is no record on the Flight Data Recorder about speed displayed on the RIGHT side.
02:10:16		“we`ve lost the speeds then” He added: “alternate law protections”
	The airplane’s pitch attitude increased progressively beyond 10 degrees and the plane start climb.
		PF made nose-down control inputs and alternately LEFT and  RIGHT  roll inputs.
	The vertical speed reached 7000 feet/min, dropped to 700 feet/min and roll varied between 12° RIGHT and 10° LEFT. The speed displayed on the LEFT side increased sharply to 215 Knots (MACH 0.68). The airplane was at 37500 feet and the recorded AOA was around 4°.
02:10:50	PNF tried several times to call the Captain back
02:10:51	The STALL WARNING triggered again. The TRUST levers were positioned in the TO/GA detent
		The Pilot Flying maintained nose-up inputs
	AOA [Angle Of Attack] was around 6° continued to increase. The Trimmable Horizontal Stabilizer [THS] began a movement and passed from 3° to 13° pitch-up in about 1 minute and remained in the latter position until the end of flight.
50 seconds later	The speed displayed on the ISIS increased sharply towards 185 Knots.
		The Pilot Flying continued to make nose-up inputs
	The airplane’s altitude reached its maximum of about 38000 feet.  AOA and pitch attitude reached 16°.
02:11:45	The Captain re-entered the cockpit
	During the following seconds all of the recorded speeds became invalid and the STALL WARNING stopped.
	The altitude was then about 35000 feet, the AOA exceeded 40° and the Vertical Speed was about  minus 10000 feet/minute. The airplane’s pitch attitude did not exceed 15° and the engines’ N¹ were close to 100%. The airplane was subjected to roll oscillations that reached 40°.
		The Pilot Flying made input on the Side-stick to the LEFT and nose-up stops, wich lasted about 30 seconds.
02:12:02		PF said: “I have no more displays”
	PNF said: “we have no valid indications”
	The Thrust levers were on IDLE detent, at that moment, and the engines’ N¹ were at 55%.
50 seconds later	PF made pitch inputs.
	The AOA decreased, the speeds became VALID again and the STALL WARNING triggered again
02:13:32	PF said: “we’re going to arrive at level one hundred”
15 seconds later	Simultaneous inputs by both pilots on the side-sticks were recorded
		PF said: “go ahead you have the controls”
	AOA, while it was valid, always remained above 35°
02:14:28	The last recorded values were a Vertical Speed of minus 10912 feet/minute, a Gorund Speed of 170 Knots, Pitch Attitude of 16,2° nose-up, Roll Angle of 5.3° LEFT and a Magnetic Heading of 270°
	No EMERGENCY message was issued by the crew
	The wreckage was found at a depth of 3980 meters on 03 APR 2011 at about 6.5 Nautical Miles and to the North of the last position transmitted by the aircraft

The following tracks were recorded:

 track 1: radio communications and the signal from the microphones for the pilot seated on the left
 track 2: radio communications and the signal from the microphones for the pilot seated on the right
 track 3: radio communications, the signal from the second copilot’s microphone (rear seat), and the FSK signal
 a track made up from the first 3 tracks mixed together
 CAM track: the signal from the cabin area microphone

Analysis of the 5 audio files downloaded revealed that the event did not occur at the end of the sequence of data recorded on the 5 tracks, and that the tracks lasted for less than a few dozen seconds at the expected values.

Synchronisation of the various channels showed that some of the data was missing.
Moreover, analysis of the binary contents of the EEPROM memory confirmed the inconsistency of the pointers5 used by the manufacturer’s reader to start and end the downloading of the data.

Analysis of the flight recorder data

 Synchronisation of the recorders
The recorders were synchronised using the various alarms triggered during the flight, particularly the stall warning. The number of alarms made it possible to synchronise the recorders with an accuracy of approximately 100 ms.

The CVR recording started at about 0 h 09 UTC on 1 June.

 CVR analysis
The CVR audio recording starts at 00 h 09 min 15. The cockpit door was opened once at 0 h 26 min 19. It was later closed and opened again several times. It stayed opened for some time on several occasions. The door security system (electrical opening command by the pilots) was not heard on the overall recording.
At 0 h 36 min 26, an electrical phenomenon (audio discharge) linked to atmospheric conditions appeared on the CAM track and could be heard until the end of the recording. The following figure shows the distribution of those audio discharges as a function of time:

CONCLUSIONS

New Findings
 the composition of the crew was in accordance with the operator’s procedures,
 the airplane’s weight and balance were within operational limits,
 at the time of the autopilot disconnection, the Captain was taking a rest,
 the departure of the Captain was done without leaving any clear operational instructions, in particular on the role of each of the copilots,
 the crew had identified some echoes on the weather radar,
 the crew made a heading change of 12° to the left of its route,
 the AP disconnected while the airplane was flying at the upper limit of a slightly turbulent cloud layer,
 the copilots had not received any training, at high altitude, in the “Unreliable IAS” procedure and manual aircraft handling,
 there was an inconsistency between the speeds measured, likely following the blockage of the Pitot probes in an ice crystal environment,
 although having identified and called out the loss of the speed indications, neither of the two copilots called the procedure “Unreliable IAS”,
 the invalidity of the speed displayed on the left PFD lasted for 29 seconds, that of the speed on the ISIS for 54 seconds,
 in less than one minute after the autopilot disconnection, the airplane exited its flight envelope following inputs that were mainly pitch-up,
 the Captain came back into the cockpit about 1 min 30 after the autopilot disconnection,
 throughout the flight, the movements of the elevators and the THS were consistent with the pilot’s inputs,
 up to the exit from the flight envelope, the airplane’s longitudinal movements were consistent with the position of the flight control surfaces,
 there was no explicit task-sharing between the two copilots,
 there is no CRM training for a crew made up of two copilots in a situation with a relief Captain,
 no standard callouts were made on the disparities in pitch attitude and vertical speed,
 the airplane’s angle of attack is not directly displayed to the pilots,
 the approach to stall was characterised by the triggering of the warning then the appearance of buffet,
 neither of the pilots made any reference to the stall warning,
 neither of the pilots formally identified the stall situation,
 the stall warning was triggered continuously for 54 seconds,
 a short time after the triggering of the stall warning, the PF selected TO/GA thrust and made a nose-up input,
 the angle of attack is the parameter that allows the stall warning to triggered; if the angle of attack values become invalid, the warning stops,
 by design, when the measured speed values are lower than 60 kt, the 3 angle of attack values become invalid,
 each time that the stall warning triggered, the angle of attack exceeded the value of its theoretical trigger threshold,
 the engines functioned normally and always responded to the crew’s inputs,
 no announcement was made to the passengers.

Recommendations on Operations

Training for Manual Aircraft Handling

The investigation brought to light weaknesses in the two copilots: the inappropriate inputs by the PF on the flight controls at high altitude were not noted by the PNF through an absence of effective surveillance of the flight path. The stall warning and the buffeting were not identified either. This was probably due to a lack of specific training, although in accordance with regulatory requirements. Manual airplane handling cannot be improvised and requires precision and measured inputs on the flight controls. There are other possible situations leading to autopilot disconnection for which only specific and regular training can provide the skills necessary to ensure the safety of the flight. Examination of their last training records and check rides made it clear that the copilots had not been trained for manual airplane handling of approach to stall and stall recovery at high altitude.

Consequently, the BEA recommends:

 that EASA review the content of check and training programmes and make mandatory, in particular, the setting up of specific and regular exercises dedicated to manual aircraft handling of approach to stall and stall recovery, including at high altitude.

Relief Captain

The investigation showed that an absence of training and practice for a crew consisting of two copilots does not guarantee a level of performance equivalent to a crew consisting of a Captain and a copilot when faced with a degraded situation. The absence of a hierarchy and of effective task-sharing in the cockpit strongly contributed to the low level of synergy. The anxiety generated by the absence of the Captain from the cockpit shows that the two copilots were not capable of resolving this emergency situation. This can be explained both by the absence of any appropriate training and a lack of decision-making practice on the part of the two copilots. Numerous events turned out favourably due to the presence of the Captain whose training and experience made possible a more solid analysis and more serenereactions to the situation.

Recommendations relating to Certification

Angle of Attack Measurement

The crew never formally identified the stall situation. Information on angle of attack is not directly accessible to pilots. The angle of attack in cruise is close to the stall warning trigger angle of attack in a law other than normal law. Under these conditions, manual handling can bring the airplane to high angles of attack such as those encountered during the event. It is essential in order to ensure flight safety to reduce the angle of attack when a stall is imminent. Only a direct readout of the angle of attack could enable crews to rapidly identify the aerodynamic situation of the airplane and take the actions that may be required.

Consequently, the BEA recommends:

 that EASA and the FAA evaluate the relevance of requiring the presence of an angle of attack indicator directly accessible to pilots on board airplanes.

Recommendations relating to Flight Recorders

Analysis of the FDR parameters and audition of the CVR provide information that is essential to an understanding of the event. However, it is difficult to reconstruct the indications that were available to the crew on their instrument panel, especially the instructions given by the Flight Director crossbars when they reappear. It is also impossible to see whether there have been any attempts to re-engage the autopilot. A view of the instrument panel would complete the information provided by the FDR and the CVR and would make it possible to confirm the indications that were available to the crew and the actions that they made. Numerous recommendations have already been made on this subject over the past ten years without any real progress having been made.