LaMia LMI-2933 Crash in Medellin - TRIP FUEL WAS NOT CONSIDERED

INTERPRETATION FOR LAYMAN

If your plane is flying on right side of Localizer course you need to turn to the left for intercepting the Localizer course (it is the runway centerline extension); Otherwise, as you are flying on heading NORTH (360°) and, the ATC controller gives you heading 010° you should turn to the right (less time), so the plane will turn away from localizer course.

Whether the pilot under absolute emergency pressure has immediately turn to 010°  and, the ATC controller has only perceived her mistake after 30 seconds because she saw the target on radar screen moving on opposite direction as desired, the pilot will need to make the plane to turn 30° to the left for correction. This turn in emergency at night with engines flame out will withdraw the pilot attention (focus) and a loss of control could come because of unavailable engine thrust.

LMI2933

LMI2933, FL210 inbound and we request priority for approaching.
Right now we have a fuel problem.

Medellin Approach Control

LMI2933, understand you request priority to land with fuel problems, correct?

LMI2933             

Affirmative.

Medellin Approach Control

OK, be advised I'll give you vectors to proceed to localizer
and for approaching. It'll be approximately 7 minutes.

LMI2933

...FOR VECTORS, LMI2933.

Medellin Approach Control

LMI2933, say your heading.

LMI2933

179 outbound leg.

 Medellin Approach Control

Maintain present heading and wait to start, to continue your descent.

LMI2933

Mantain present heading and we're visual with the ground.

LMI2933

LMI2933, requesting vectors for inbound leg, ma'ma.

Medellin Approach Control

Stand by, I have a traffic just below doing the approach.
And additionally, they are performing a runway inspection.
How much time do you have for landing, LMI?

LMI2933

We are with emergency fuel, ma'ma.
We're established  on final course.

LMI2933

Request immediately descent, LMI2033.

Medellin Approach Control

LMI2933, you can turn to the right just now to start your descent.
You have traffic one mile and below you.

LMI2933

Traffic in sight, no factor and we request to intercept the localizer at once.
(Captain asked for Gear Down).

Medellin Approach Control

Captain, you are at Flight Level 210. I need you climb down flight level.
You'd have to turn right to star your descent.

LMI2933

Negative, ma'ma, we've already started the descent.
and we're going to localizer.

Medellin Approach Control

LMI2933, you have a traffic ahead, at 18000 feet, an Airbus 320.

LMI2933

We have it on TCAS and just above, ma'ma, we're on final course.

Medellin Approach Control

The aircraft is at 18000 feet, captain.
The traffic is turning left now.
Additionally, there is another traffic, ...OK, it has already cleared 18500 feet.

LMI2933

Traffic in sight and we're at 18000 feet, 2933.

Medellin Approach Control

Stand by (for Colombia 3020).
LMI2933, 17700 feet, continue the approach, wet runway.
Let us know if you request any ground assistance.

LMI2933

We will confirm for ground assistance and we're crossing 16000 feet to localizer.

Medellin Approach Control

Set QNH to 30.27

LMI2933

30.27

LMI2933

Ma'ma, LMI2933 is with total failure, total electric and fuel.

Medellin Approach Control

Runway is clear, LMI2933 and fire services are rolled.

LMI2933

Copied, LMI2933... Vectors, vectors, ma'ma. Vectors to runway.

Medellin Approach Control

The radar signal has lost, I can't see you, say your heading now.

LMI2933

We're heading 360, 360.

Medellin Approach Control [in Spanish]

Con rumbo, vire por la izquerda 010, proceder'ia al localizador
del VOR de Rionegro - una milla delante del VOR. Al momento usted se encuentra ... - correto, le confirmo - por la izquerda rumbo 350.

Medellin Approach Control [Air Traffic Controller misled pilots]

With heading, turn left 010 to localizer, Rionegro VOR - a mile ahead the VOR. Right now, you are ... - correct, I confirm - left turn 350. [She finally corrected to right heading to be taken]

NOTE: Who is heading North never turn left to 010. This ATC mistake withdrew pilot focus on keep flying without turns. Maybe here is the key to the pilot has lost FLIGHT CONTROL.

LMI2933

Left 350...

Medellin Approach Control

Yes, correct. You're 0.1 miles from Rionegro VOR.
I can't see your altitude, LMI.

LMI2933

9000 feet, ma'ma.
Vectors, Vectors.

Medellin Approach Control

You're 8.2 miles from the runway.
What's your altitude now?
LMI2933, say your position?

NO ANSWER!

ENGLISH
Just in case of any aircraft is very short on fuel  the pilot MUST declare 'proceeding for landing' even though he/she hasn't got the ATC CLEARANCE.

The ATC will immediately instruct all the other aircrafts in vicinity to  keep their tracks from approach sector and runway centerline. Go-Around for all planes on log.

The ATC will devote full attention to the aircraft with "run of fuel" declaratory (It is Law Declaratory). All other aircraft lose their priorities, even if other aircraft has declared "supposed fuel leak".

Justification
The aircraft declaring "run of fuel" and "proceeding to land" takes over the highest priority even though it hasn’t got proper authorization from ATC. It is in the same priority of GLIDERS because it has lost its own propulsion system.

Priorities for landing:

1° Gliders
2° Aircraft in Aero-medical service (wounded or seriously injured)
3° Aircraft operational SAR (search and rescue)
4° Aircraft in Military Operation (War mission)
5° Aircraft carrying the President of the Nation
6° Aircraft in Military (Military Maneuver)
7° Other Aircraft

PORTUGUÊS

Exatamente no caso em que qualquer aeronave estiver com pouquíssimo combustível, o piloto DEVE declarar 'prosseguindo para pousar' mesmo sem ter AUTORIZAÇÃO do Controle de Tráfego Aéreo.

O ATC instruirá imediatamente todas as outras aeronaves nas proximidades para se afastarem de suas trajetórias do setor de aproximação e do eixo da pista. ‘Arremetida’ para todas as aeronaves no enfileiramento.

O ATC dedicará atenção total à aeronave com declaratória "sem combustível".

Todas as outras aeronaves perdem suas prioridades, mesmo a aeronave que tiver declarado "suposto vazamento de combustível".

Justificativa

A aeronave que declara "sem combustível" e "prosseguindo para pousar" sem a devida autorização do ATC, está na mesma prioridade de PLANADORES, portanto tem prioridade de pouso.

Prioridades para o Pouso:

1° Planadores
2° Aeronaves em serviço aeromedico (Enfermo ou Ferido grave)
3° Aeronaves em operação SAR (Busca e Salvamento)
4° Aeronaves em Operação Militar (Missão de Guerra)
5° Aeronave transportando o Presidente da República
6° Aeronaves em Operação Militar (Manobra Militar)
7° Demais Aeronaves

Thrust Reverser Technique

Thrust Reversers

From FlightSafety Fundation

Thrust reversal, also called reverse thrust, is the temporary diversion of an aircraft engine's exhaust so that the thrust produced is directed forward this acts against the forward travel of the aircraft, providing deceleration. Thrust reversers are used by many jet aircraft to help slow down just after touch-down, reducing wear on the brakes and enabling shorter landing distances. Reverse thrust is typically applied immediately after touchdown, often along with spoilers, to improve deceleration early in the landing roll when residual aerodynamic lift and high speed limit the effectiveness of the friction brakes located on the gear. When thrust is reversed, passengers will hear a sudden increase in engine noise, particularly seated just forward of the engines.

A potência reversa, também chamada de empuxo reverso, é o desvio temporário do ar de exaustão do motor de uma aeronave tal que o impulso produzido é direcionado para frente; isto age contra o deslocamento da aeronave, proporcionando desaceleração. As potências dos reversores são  usadas por muitos aviões à jato para ajudar a desacelerar exatamente após o toque no solo, reduzindo o desgaste nos freios e permitindo encurtar distâncias de pouso. O empuxo reverso é tipicamente aplicado imediatamente após o toque da roda do nariz no solo, frequentemente acompanhado de [abertura] dos spoilers, para melhorar a desaceleração no início da rolagem do pouso quando a força residual de sustentação aerodinâmica [para cima] e a alta velocidade limitam a eficácia de fricção dos freios localizados no trem de pouso. Quando o impulso é invertido, passageiros ouvirão um súbito aumento no ruído do motor, particularmente aqueles sentados à frente dos motores.

Thrust reverser provide a deceleration force that is independent of runway condition.

Thrust-reverser efficiency is higher at high airspeed.

Therefore, thrust reversers must be selected as early as possible after touchdown.

Thrust reverser should be returned to reverse idle at low airspeed to prevent engine stall or foreign object damage and stowed at taxi speed.

Nevertheless, maximum reverse thrust can be maintained to a complete stop in an emergency.

Potência  reversora fornece uma força de desaceleração que é independente da condição de pista.

A eficiência da potência reversora é maior em velocidade alta.

Portanto, [os gatilhos] dos reversores devem ser selecionados tão cedo quanto possível após o toque da roda do nariz no solo.  Os [gatilhos] de potência dos reversores devem ser retornados para marcha-lenta (idle) em velocidade baixa para evitar que o motor “afogue”  ou seja danificado por [ingestão] de objetos estranhos e parado [o funcionamento] em velocidade de táxi. 

Não obstante, a potência máxima reversa pode ser mantida até uma parada completa em uma emergência.

Factos Affecting Braking

The following factors have affected braking in runway excursions or runway overruns:

 - Failure to arm ground spoilers, with thrust reversers deactivated (e. g., reliance on a thrust-reverser signal for ground-spoilers extension, as applicable).

- Failure to use any braking devices (i. e., reliance on the incorrect technique of maintaining a nose-high attitude after touchdown to achieve aerodynamic braking.

The nose-whell should be lowered onto the runway as soon as possible to increase weight-on-wheels and activate aircraft systems associated with the nose-landing-gear squat switches.

- Asymmetric thrust (i. e., one engine above idle in forward thrust or one engine failing to go into reverse thrust.

- Brake unit inoperative (e. g., reported as a "cold brake", i.e., a brake whose temperature is lower, by a specified amount, than the other brakes on the same landing gear.

- Spongy pedals (air in the hydraulic wheel-braking system.

- Anti-skid tachometer malfunction.

- Failure to adequately recover from loss of the normal braking system.

- Late selection of thrust reversers.

- No takeover or late takeover from autobrakes, when required.

- No switching or late switching from normal braking to alternate braking or to emergency braking in response to abnormal braking.

- Crosswind landing and incorrect braking technique.

DO NOT TURN ON GALAXY NOTE 7 WHILE ON BOARD

 F. A. A Statement

FAA Statement on Samsung Galaxy Note 7 Devices

For Immediate Release

September 8, 2016

Contact: Laura Brown

Phone: 202-267-3883

---

In light of recent incidents and concerns raised by Samsung about its Galaxy Note 7 devices, the Federal Aviation Administration strongly advises passengers not to turn on or charge these devices on board aircraft and not to stow them in any checked baggage.

Replace Current Note7 with New One

on September 02, 2016

Samsung is committed to producing the highest quality products and we take every incident report from our valued customers very seriously. In response to recently reported cases of the new Galaxy Note7, we conducted a thorough investigation and found a battery cell issue.

To date (as of September 1) there have been 35 cases that have been reported globally and we are currently conducting a thorough inspection with our suppliers to identify possible affected batteries in the market. However, because our customers’ safety is an absolute priority at Samsung, we have stopped sales of the Galaxy Note7.

For customers who already have Galaxy Note7 devices, we will voluntarily replace their current device with a new one over the coming weeks.

We acknowledge the inconvenience this may cause in the market but this is to ensure that Samsung continues to deliver the highest quality products to our customers. We are working closely with our partners to ensure the replacement experience is as convenient and efficient as possible.

Emirates B777-300 Flight EK521 Tailwind Shared in Accident

PRELIMINARY REPORT

As the flight neared Dubai, the crew received the automatic terminal information service (ATIS) Information Zulu, which included a windshear warning for all runways.

The Aircraft was configured for landing with the flaps set to 30, and approach speed selected of 152 knots (VREF + 5) indicated airspeed (IAS) The Aircraft was vectored for an area navigation (RNAV/GNSS) approach to runway 12L. Air traffic control cleared the flight to land, with the wind reported to be from 340 degrees at 11 knots, and to vacate the runway via taxiway Mike 9.
During the approach, at 0836:00, with the autothrottle system in SPEED mode, as the Aircraft descended through a radio altitude (RA) of 1,100 feet, at 152 knots IAS, the wind direction started to change from a headwind component of 8 knots to a tailwind component. The autopilot was disengaged at approximately 920 feet RA and the approach continued with the autothrottle connected. As the Aircraft descended through 700 feet RA at 0836:22, and at 154 knots IAS, it was subjected to a tailwind component which gradually increased to a maximum of 16 knots.
At 0837:07, 159 knots IAS, 35 feet RA, the PF started to flare the Aircraft. The autothrottle mode transitioned to IDLE and both thrust levers were moving towards the idle position. At 0837:12, 160 knots IAS, and 5 feet RA, five seconds before touchdown, the wind direction again started to change to a headwind.
As recorded by the Aircraft flight data recorder, the weight-on-wheels sensors indicated that the right main landing gear touched down at 0837:17, approximately 1,100 meters from the runway 12L threshold at 162 knots IAS, followed three seconds later by the left main landing gear. The nose landing gear remained in the air.
At 0837:19, the Aircraft runway awareness advisory system (RAAS) aural message “LONG LANDING, LONG LANDING” was annunciated.

At 0837:23, the Aircraft became airborne in an attempt to go-around and was subjected to a headwind component until impact. At 0837:27, the flap lever was moved to the 20 position. Two seconds later the landing gear lever was selected to the UP position. Subsequently, the landing gear unlocked and began to retract.
At 0837:28, the air traffic control tower issued a clearance to continue straight ahead and climb to 4,000 feet. The clearance was read back correctly.
The Aircraft reached a maximum height of approximately 85 feet RA at 134 knots IAS, with the landing gear in transit to the retracted position. The Aircraft then began to sink back onto the runway. Both crewmembers recalled seeing the IAS decreasing and the Copilot called out “Check speed.” At 0837:35, three seconds before impact with the runway, both thrust levers were moved from the idle position to full forward. The autothrottle transition from IDLE to THRUST mode. Approximately one second later, a ground proximity warning system (GPWS) aural warning of “DON’T SINK, DON’T SINK” was annunciated.
One second before impact, both engines started to respond to the thrust lever movement showing an increase in related parameters.
At 0837:38, the Aircraft aft fuselage impacted the runway abeam the November 7 intersection at 125 knots, with a nose-up pitch angle of 9.5 degrees, and at a rate of descent of 900 feet per minute. This was followed by the impact of the engines on the runway. The three landing gears were still in transit to the retracted position. As the Aircraft slid along the runway, the No.2 engine-pylon assembly separated from the right hand (RH) wing. From a runway camera recording, an intense fuel fed fire was observed to start in the area of the damaged No.2 engine-pylon wing attachment area. The Aircraft continued to slide along the runway on the lower fuselage, the outboard RH wing, and the No.1 engine. An incipient fire started on the underside of the No.1 engine.
The Aircraft came to rest adjacent to the Mike 13 taxiway at a magnetic heading of approximately 240 degrees. After the Aircraft came to rest, fire was emanating from the No. 2 engine, the damaged RH engine-pylon wing attachment area and from under the Aircraft fuselage. Approximately one minute after, the Commander transmitted a “MAYDAY” call and informed air traffic control that the Aircraft was being evacuated.

More Gadgets on Flight Deck for Pilots Being Prepared to the Future

Rockwell Collins está planejando entregar o software final para Boeing para instalá-lo nas telas de cockpit do  737 MAX em meados de Setembro, seguida por entregas iniciais dos componentes finais de hardware no final do ano.

A entrega encerrará os quatro anos de trabalho de design, desenvolvimento e trabalho de testes já feitos, sendo os mais desafiantes pelo objetivo da Boeing de manter a máxima semelhança entre o 737NG e o 737 MAX, em parte para manter o tipo comum classificações entre os dois, e as mínimas “diferenças de treinamento" para os pilotos. A Boeing está planejando para  2017 as primeiras entregas do replanejado e de outra forma modernizado 737, para o qual ela reuniu mais de 3200 pedidos.

"Uma das coisas que tem sido um desafio para nós e para a Boeing é que estamos pegando um sistema de telas de 2015 e o aplicando em um avião que foi projetado em 1964 e que não mudou tanto assim em termos de sistema hidráulico, elétrico e de ar condicionado", diz Keith Stover, engenheiro-chefe do programa MAX da Rockwell Collins. "Nós estávamos tentando encaixar este novo sistema nele e fornecer recursos que não existem na aeronave atual."

O que resultou é indiscutivelmente o melhor dos dois mundos, com o cockpit imitando os 737NGs, enquanto permitindo que para certos recursos avançados, tais como a capacidade de tela dividida, mas com a flexibilidade e poder de processamento para introduzir mais recursos avançados no futuro, incluindo Transmissão de Vigilância Dependente Automática - ADSB "DENTRO" das aplicações de vigilância.

O cockpit do Boeing  MAX apresenta quatro grandes telas nos formatos 15,1 polegadas dispostas lado a lado em todo o painel, substituindo seis telas construídas pela Honeywell de 8 X 8 polegadas exibidas em uma disposição de "T" nos modelos de Boeing NG. O hardware Rockwell Collins inclui as quatro telas, dois computadores de processamento localizados no alojamento de eletrônicos e novos painéis de interruptores no console central.

As telas são as versões de terceira geração das telas de grande formato que Rockwell Collins desenvolveu para o Boeing 787. A fabricante está usando a tela de segunda geração no cockpit do avião-tanque aéreo KC-46 Pegasus da Força Aérea. As diferenças entre a primeira e a terceira geração incluem a introdução de novos LEDs e LCDs, uma redução na profundidade do monitor para 8,9 centímetros nos monitores de 20 centímetros e uma diminuição no peso para 4,8 Kg nos de 7.1 Kg. Uma vez certificados, Stover diz, a tela de monitor dos Boeings MAX será adaptável para o Boeing 787.

In-Flight Fire - Batteries Travelling in Passenger Baggage

Halon replacement deadlines

In 2010, the European Commission adopted cutoff and end dates for essential-use exemptions for halon on airplanes operating in the European Union. The International Civil Aviation Organization adopted halon replacement deadlines in 2011, and Underwriters Laboratories will withdraw its standard for halon in handheld fire extinguishers in 2014.

Aggressively Pursue 

Aggressively pursuing a fire means taking immediate action to determine the source of hot spots, smoke, and/or flames. The crew should quickly evaluate the situation, gain access to the fire, and attack the fire using all available resources, which may include deadheading crewmembers or able-bodied persons (ABP).

Cheek Area

This term describes the area just below the floor, outboard of the cargo compartment areas. In narrow and widebody aircraft, this area houses wire bundles, hydraulic lines, and other electrical components. (See Appendix 2, Typical Widebody Cross-Section.) c. Circuit Breaker. Circuit breakers are designed to open an electrical circuit automatically at a predetermined overload of current. d. 

Halon 

Halon is a liquefied gas that extinguishes fires by chemically interrupting a fire’s combustion chain reaction, rather than physically smothering it. This characteristic is one of the main reasons that halon extinguishers are effective when the exact source of the fire cannot be positively determined. Halon fire extinguishing agents that have been approved for use in aircraft include Halon 1211, Halon 1301, and a combination of the two (Halon 1211/1301). Both are typified as “clean agents,” leaving no agent residue after discharge. Approved halon-type extinguishers are three times as effective as carbon dioxide (CO2) extinguishers with the same weight of extinguishing agent.

Insulation blanket burn-through protection

Fire-protective insulation blankets are designed to resist burn-through from a fuel fire next to the bottom half of the fuselage

Photoelectric-area type. These detectors are designed to detect the presence of smoke particles in the air by reflection of scattered light. They also rely on particles in the air being convectively carried into a sensing chamber where light from a pilot lamp is transmitted through a sensing chamber. If smoke is present, it will reflect light onto a photocell and trigger an alarm. Newer production airplanes use photoelectric detectors based on an advanced smoke sensor utilizing two discrete wavelengths to determine the presence of smoke and to distinguish between smoke and nonsmoke aerosols. These are also mounted in the ceiling or upper sidewalls of the protected space.

Photoelectric-ducted type. These detectors are similar to photoelectric-area type detectors, but they are typically mounted behind the walls of the protected space. They differ from the area detectors in that fans draw air samples from the protected space into a series of air sampling ports in the monument walls and ceiling, and then through an aluminum tube manifold to the detectors. Current production airplanes use the more advanced area detectors mentioned above, rather than ducted photoelectric detectors.

Each smoke detection system has a built-in electronic test capability switch. This allows for the system’s electrical and detector sensor integrity to be checked at any time.

Detection of smoke is affected by compartment volume and contour, air distribution, and the amount and buoyancy of the combustion particles. Boeing conducts extensive laboratory and flight testing to determine the best location for the detector sensors to enable them to most effectively detect smoke under all conditions.

One of the largest trends in the growth of in-flight fire is due to the transportation of lithium batteries. From March 1991 to October 2012, the FAA office of Security and Hazardous Materials Safety recorded 132 cases of aviation incidents involving smoke, fire, extreme heat or explosion involving batteries and battery powered devices (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012). Lithium batteries were the majority of battery types in the incidents. (Levin, 2011)

Lithium ion batteries (Li-ion) are used to power portable electronic devices such as cellular phones, portable tablets, EFBs and digital cameras; Li-ion batteries are rechargeable. Non-rechargeable lithium batteries (Li-metal) are similar to Li-ion, but use a different electrode material – metallic lithium.

All lithium batteries present a potential fire hazard. These batteries are carried on aeroplanes as cargo, within passenger baggage, and by passengers directly. Like some other batteries lithium batteries are capable of delivering sufficient energy to start an in-flight fire (Kolly). Lithium batteries present a greater risk of an in-flight fire than some other battery types because they are also unable to contain their own energy in the event of a catastrophic failure (Kolly).

Only a small fire source is needed to start a lithium battery fire. The material around lithium battery powered devices (often plastic) melts easily and ignites adjacent cells or batteries, contributing to higher fire intensity (Webster, 2004). When shipped as cargo, batteries are packed on pallets.

Aviation accidents and incidents, believed to be caused by Li-ion battery initiated fire, have occurred when battery shipments were placed next to other cargo on the aeroplane. On 3 September 2010, UPS Flight 006, a cargo flight from Dubai, United Arab Emirates, to Cologne, Germany, crashed off airport near Dubai resulting in the deaths of the two crewmembers. The Boeing 747-400F departed Dubai but returned due to smoke in the cockpit and the indication of major fire on the main deck.

The investigation revealed that a large quantity of lithium batteries were on the flight.

Following the accident the FAA issued a SAFO stating that Halon was inefficient in fighting fires involving a large quantity of lithium batteries. A restriction was also put in place to restrict the carriage of lithium batteries carried in bulk as cargo on passenger flights. (Federal Aviation Administration, 2010)

Additionally, IATA modified the Dangerous Goods Regulations to improve risk reduction for the shipment of lithium batteries. (International Air Transport Association IATA, 2012).

Batteries travelling in passenger baggage can also start an in-flight fire. The FAA recommends that lithium batteries should not be packed in checked luggage, but kept in hand luggage and stowed in overhead aeroplane’s compartments during flight. On 17 April 2012, an in-flight battery fire incident occurred on Pinnacle Flight 4290 from Toronto, Canada to Minneapolis/Saint Paul, Minnesota (LitBat Fire TransCanada October 2011). While at 28,000ft, a passenger’s personal electronic device (an air purifier) caught fire.

During the in-flight service, the flight attendant noted that the device was on fire on the floor; its battery was burning several feet from the device. Using water from the  service cart, the flight attendant put out the fire using wet paper towels. She then submerged the battery in a cup of water because the battery was still smouldering.

On the flight deck, the Captain sensed very strong burning electrical odour coming from the cabin. An emergency was declared and the flight diverted and landed safety at Traverse City, Michigan (Avherald). Li-Ion batteries such as the one described in the incident above do not need to be operating in an active circuit to catch fire and do not require a short to overheat. Incidents like this one are becoming more common as the number of personal electronic devices increase as shown in the FAA office of Security and Hazardous Materials Safety data. It is not uncommon for a passenger to carry several devices with lithium batteries.

Devices include, but are not limited to, laptop computers, tablet computers, mobile phones, electronic watches, flashlights, EFBs, and e-readers.

On a typical flight, a single aisle jet carrying 100 passengers could have over 500 lithium batteries on board. These devices are not tested or certified nor are they necessarily maintained to manufacture’s recommendations. Replacement batteries from questionable sources (‘grey’ market) can be contained within devices.

‘Grey’ market batteries may not be manufactured in accordance with international standards. It is possible that they have a greater probability than original equipment to overheat and cause a fire. Aircraft crew have no means to determine the presence of ‘grey’ market batteries or the physical condition of batteries on board.

The FAA Fire Safety Branch through cooperation with the International Aircraft Systems Fire Protection Working Group conducted several tests using standard Lithium-Ion batteries.

The tests used a standard air exchange rate of one cabin air exchange every 60 seconds using one air conditioning pack (system) with the gasper fans operating; the flight deck door was closed for all tests. The results for the first test showed that there was no visible smoke or audible warning prior to the battery event. After the battery went into thermal runaway the smoke percentage was greater than 10% light obscuration per foot for a period of approximately 90 seconds (Summer, 2012). The second test performed outlined similar results. In conclusion, the outcome of the tests prove that even in a high ventilation rate a typical COTS Li-Ion battery could pose a “significant hazard within the flight deck environment and could potentially present a catastrophic risk” (Summer, 2012).

 Lavatory fire protection

Lavatories include systems to both detect and extinguish fires

One type of electronic device that is rapidly gaining use in all forms of aviation is the EFB. These devices are used by pilots to replace paper materials found inside the flight deck. EFBs can be divided into groups by Classes:

·         Class I: Portable electronic devices (PEDs), Commercial off the shelfequipment (COTS), used as loose equipment and stowed during portions of flight.

·         Class II: PED can be COTS equipment, mounted and connected via aeroplane power supply for use in flight and for charging.

·         Class III: Not PEDs or COTS. Class 3 is considered installed aeroplane equipment. These are built and tested specifically for aeroplane EFB use (Summer, 2012) Class I and II are not subject to FAA airworthiness standards. However, Class II mounting and charging connections are. Class III is subject to airworthiness standards for all aspects of their operation. Because Class I and II are not subject to FAA airworthiness standards, they bring potential hazards when used as EFBs. All classes of EFBs utilize lithium-ion batteries as their primary power source.

As the number of Class I and II devices increase in their use inside the flight deck, the number of potential hazards also increases.

The FAA Technical Center conducted research on all classes of EFBs. They cited the primary concern as thermal runway of lithium batteries.

“The primary concern is the resulting fire/smoke hazards should one of the lithium-ion (Li-ion) batteries installed in these units fail and experience thermal runaway, a failure causing rapid increases in temperature, significant smoke production and at times, explosion and/or rocketing of the battery cell.”

Furthermore, the FAA tests found that:

The testing showed that even with a very high ventilation rate of one air exchange per minute within the cockpit, a typical COTS Li-ion battery could pose a significant smoke hazard within the flight deck environment. . The initial battery event occurred, at times, without warning (i.e. no visible smoke or audible event prior to failure). The battery cells failed in a very vigorous manner, at one point with enough pressure to forcefully push open the unlatched cockpit door. The most striking safety hazard however, was the volume and density of smoke that emanated from the failed battery cells.

During one test in which only four of the nine battery cells went into thermal runaway, the installed smoke meter recorded greater than 10% light obscuration/ft for a period of greater than 5 minutes and a peak value of greater than 50% light obscuration/ft, resulting in severe lack of visibility within the flight deck. (Federal Aviation Administration, 2012)

As portable electronic devices become more powerful, so will their batteries. The increasing energy densities of the batteries will also increase the likelihood of producing an uncontrollable in-flight fire. The proliferation of portable electronic devices will also increase the risk of battery failure incidents (Keegan, 2001).

Technologies are available to lessen the spread of lithium battery-fuelled fires. The FAA has requested that ISO develop a standard for Fire Containment Covers. They have also conducted testing of intumescent paint, which acts as a thermal barrier, when used in the packaging of lithium batteries. (Pennetta, 2012).

Ceiling-mounted smoke detectors

Typical faceplate of a ceiling-mounted ionization smoke detector (left) and a photoelectric smoke detector (right)

Why no PTLU on Airbus 340-500/600 or Reason for a PTLU on Airbus 330/340

Yaw Maneuver Criteria

• “Sudden Pedal Input till pedal stop” (one way) must be structurally possible from VMCA to VD

• “Sudden pedal release from full pedal input” once in steady side slip state, must be structurally possible from VMCA to VD.

Yaw Maneuver Criteria

• In case of an engine failure, the pedal deflection required for the corrective action from the pilot after 2 sec recognition time must be possible.

Loads and Rudder Travel Limitation Unit

• In other words, the structure and the load limits are dimensioned so as to match the yaw maneuver criteria with adequate rudder deflection limited by a judicious RTLU.

• However, the RTLU is not designed to protect the Rudder Structure for any “unrealistic” action of the pilot on the rudder pedals.

• Finally, the Certification Criteria do not address “all” possible asymmetry cases for load considerations (typically 2 same side engine out configuration on a quad, sharp roll maneuvers with rudder deflected …)

Typical Cases including high loads

• Engine failure case:

If, once the pilot has centered the ß target, he then commands a sharp turn unto the live engine, the side slip increases rapidly.

Thus the Yaw Damper abruptly reacts, which induces high loads.

Typical Cases including high loads

• Engine failure case

– Be aware that there is no restriction to roll the aircraft with an engine failure (no additional rudder input required)

– Furthermore with an engine failed, the maximum roll rate is limited to 7.5 o / sec (on FBW A/C at low speed, typically 160 knots).

– At VMCA and V2 min, the certification requires to demonstrate adequate roll capability, with full roll input; the maximum ß reached is around 10 o and loads are Ok.

Reason for a PTLU on A330/A340

• The “Yaw Damper” has a great authority in terms of rudder deflection and rudder deflection rate, on A330/A340 as compared to A310/A320.

• Thus, in case of a steady state side slip maneuver, the Yaw Damper decreases the initial rudder deflection so as to minimize the Side Slip.

• The PTLU is the Pedal Travel Limit Unit which limits the pedal deflection as a function of the A/C CAS.

Reason for a PTLU on A330/A340

When the pilot releases the rudder pedals suddenly to neutral, as requested by certification criteria, a peak of high loads can be reached (since the rudder pedal release is equivalent to a mechanical rudder movement of same amplitude) leading to a rudder deflection on opposite side.

Why no PTLU on A340-500/600

• The rudder channel is fully electric on the A3456

• Thus the rudder pedal directly commands the amount of rudder as a function of the IAS and pedal deflection

• At a given IAS, the rudder pedals are able to command a maximum rudder deflection, as per TLU. Any additional pedal input has no effect on the rudder (PTLU and RTLU built in the lateral law).