Personal Electronic Devices During Takeoff and Landing

 

We are reviewing the policies, guidance, and procedures that establish the methods and criteria aircraft operators use to determine if they can allow PED usage during flight. The FAA has long recognized that PEDs have the potential for causing interference with aircraft navigation or communication systems. Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR) §§ 91.21, 121.306, 125.204, and 135.144 establish the requirements prohibiting the use of PEDs without the authorization of the aircraft operator.

The potential for aircraft interference depends on the aircraft and its electrical and electronic systems, as well as the type of PED being used. Prior to fly-by-wire flight controls, the primary concern was the susceptibility of sensitive aircraft communication and navigation radio receivers to spurious radio frequency emissions from PEDs. Many of these aircraft using this older technology are still in service and are as susceptible today to interference as they were when they first entered service. When aircraft included fly-by-wire controls and electronic displays, the susceptibility of these aircraft systems also became a concern. The FAA defined requirements for high-intensity radiated fields (HIRF) that provide assurance that newer aircraft with such systems have sufficient protection to continue to operate safely when exposed to spurious emissions of PEDs and intentional transmissions3 from transmitting PEDs. While the highly critical fly-by-wire controls and electronic displays were designed and certified to withstand the fields from transmitting PEDs, all aircraft electrical and electronic systems were not designed to withstand these fields. These newer aircraft still have sensitive navigation, communication, and surveillance radio receivers that may be susceptible at certain frequencies to spurious radio frequency emissions from PEDs.

Under FAA regulation, the aircraft operator is responsible for determining which PEDs may be used by the passengers and during which phase of flight this utilization may occur. The aircraft operator is best suited to make the determination of which PEDs would not cause interference with the navigation or communication system on its aircraft. The operators’ PED policy determines what types of devices may be used on board their aircraft and during which phase(s) of flight. The responsibility for enforcing an aircraft operator’s PED policy typically falls on the cabin crew. On occasion, enforcement of a commercial airline’s PED policy results in a conflict between a flight attendant and a passenger. Noncompliance with crewmember safety instructions on the use of PEDs has resulted in passengers being removed from an aircraft and, in some cases, has caused in-flight diversions. The FAA provides oversight of aircraft operators to ensure that they have established and are currently following robust PED-allowance procedures.

Technical Challenges

What are the technical, operation, and regulatory challenges commercial aircraft operators face in expanding their PED usage policy?

• What are the technical challenges the aircraft manufacturers, modifiers, and avionics equipment manufacturers see with further PED usage allowance?
• Data and support can they provide to commercial aircraft operators to address these technical challenges?

 

PED - Dispositivo Eletrônico Pessoal a Bordo

Nós estamos revisando as políticas, orientações e procedimentos que estabelecem os métodos e critérios que operadores de aeronave usam para determinar se eles podem permitir o uso de PED durante o voo. A FAA a tempo tem reconhecido o potencial para causar interferência com sistemas de navegação e comunicação de aeronave. O Título 14, do Código de Regulamentação Federal (14 (CFR)   §§ 91.21, 121.306, 0020125.204, e 135.144 estabelece as exigências proiindo o uso de PEDs sem a autorização do operador da aeronave.

A interferência potencial para aeronave depende da aeronave e seus sitemas elétrico e eletrônico, tanto quanto o tipo de PED sendo usado. Antes dos controles de voo ‘fly-by-wire’ a principal preocupação  era a suscetibilidade de sensibilidade de rádio-receptores de comunicação e navegação da aeronave para emissões espúrias de rádio frequências de PEDs. Muitas destas aeronaves usando esta tecnologia antiga estão ainda em serviço e são tão suscetíveis hoje à interferência  quanto elas eram quando elas entraram em serviço no início. Quando aeronaves incluíram controles ‘fly-by-wire’ e telas eletrônicas, a suscetibilidade destes sistemas de aeronave também se tornaram uma preocupação.

A FAA definiu exigências para Campos Irradiado de Alta Intensidade (HIRF) que fornecem garatia que aeronave mais nova com tais sistemas tenham proteção o suficiente para continuarem a operar seguramente quando exposta a emissão de PEDs e transmissões³  intencionais de PEDs transmitindo. Enquanto os controles ‘fly-by-wire’ altamente críticos e telas eletrônicas foram planejados e certificados para suportarem os campos de PEDs transmitindo, todos sistemas elétro-eletrônico de aeronave não foram projetados para suportar estes campos. Estas aeronaves mais novas ainda têm rádio-receptores de navegação, comunicação e vigilância sensíveis que podem ser suscetíveis  em certas frequências a emissões espúrias de rádio frequência de PEDs.

Sob a regulamentação da FAA, o operador da aeronave é responsável pela determinação, a qual PEDs podem ser usados pelos passageiros e durante quais fases de voo esta utilização pode ocorrer. O operador da aeronave é melhor adequado para fazer a determinação da qual PEDs não causariam interferênia com sistema de navegação ou comunicação na sua aeronave. A diretriz PED de operadores determina  quais tipos de dispositivos podem ser usados a bordo de aeronave delas e durante quais fase(s) de voo. A responsabilidade para executar uma diretriz PED do operador da aeronave tipicamente cai sobre a tripulação de cabine [comissárias de voo].  Na ocasião, execução de diretriz PED de uma empresa de linha aérea comercial resulta num conflito entre uma comissária de voo e um passageiro.  A não obediência às instruções de segurança de membro da tripulação no uso de PEDs tem resultado em passageiros sendo removidos de uma aeronave e, em alguns casos, tem causado desvio [pouso noutra cidade diferente do destino] em voo. A FAA estipula  inadvertência de operadores de aeronave para assegurar que elas tenham estabelecido e estejam atualmente seguindo procedimentos fortes de permissão de PED.

 

Desafios Técnicos

Quais são os desafios técnico, de operação e regulatório que operadores de aeronave comercial encaram em expandirem suas diretrizes de uso PED?

Quais são os desafios técnicos que os fabricantes, modificadores de aeronaves, e   fabricantes de equipamentos avionics veem com adicional permissão de uso de PED?

Da dos e apoio podem eles fornecer para operadores de aeronave comercial para direcionar estes desafios técnicos?

 

 

 

Double Collision Risks

ATC Audio-Video

Approach Collision Risks http://youtu.be/sSZq3p18d1o

UPDATED

AUG 7, 2012

FAA
MEMORANDUM

Date: AUG 07, 2012

This incident should not have happened.
Investigation reconfirmed that at no point were the aircraft on a head-to-head course and the aircraft remained at different altitudes.
Initial information indicated that the miscommunication occurred when the TRACON and Tower were turning the flow of traffic at the airport due to bad weather developing south of the airport.
As the investigation has continued, it has concluded that management's intention at the TRACON was initially only to turn the direction of a series of arrivals.
Only after the loss of separation events, was the flow of traffic at the airport turned completely.

Separately, the FAA interviewed the pilot of inbound Republic 3329  who had reported LOW FUEL to the Tower and found that the aircraft did have adequate fuel, and, in fact, upon landing had more fuel than the FAA regulations require as a reserve.
The procedure used for this series of arrival involved opposite direction operations.

These operations occur when an arrival or a departure is cleared to use a runway end that is opposite from the established flow of the airport. These procedures are used at DCA and at airports around the country in a variety of situations including noise mitigation and cargo operations.

While this procedure encompasses many of the same elements as turning the flow of an airport, there is no standard protocol in place, and FAA believe this contributed to the miscommunication.

FAA has initiated a temporary suspension on opposite direction operations at commercial airports until detailed procedures can be developed, trained and implemented. Although most air traffic facilities have detailed procedures for runway changeoperations, procedures for opposite direction arrivals and departures are not standard.

Air traffic controllers cleared two planes to take off on one runway while a third plane was on approach toward them and had been cleared to land on the same runway, according to the Federal Aviation Administration. The reason apparently was a “miscommunication” with air traffic controllers, the F.A.A. said.

Controladores de tráfego aéreo autorizaram dois aviões decolarem numa pista enquanto um terceiro avião estava em aproximação em direção a eles e tinha sido liberado para pouso na mesma pista, de acordo com a FAA. A razão aparentemente foi uma  “comunicação errônea”  com controladores de tráfego aéreo, disse o FAA.

The episode happened at about 2 p.m. Tuesday, and involved three US Airways regional jets carrying a total of 192 passengers and crew members. No one was hurt.
O episódio aconteceu por volta das 2 horas da tarde. Terça-feira, e envolveu três jatos regionais da US Airways carregando um total de 192 passageiros e membros de trupulação. Ninguém foi ferido.

The first plane taking off came within 0.82 miles of the arriving plane and the second one came within 2.7 miles, according to Michael Huerta, the F.A.A.’s acting administrator. The two departing planes and the incoming jet were 800 feet above or below one another, he said.

O primeiro avião decolando aproximou-se dentro de 1,5 Km do avião chegando e o segundo avião aproximou-se dentro de 5 Km, de acordo com Michael Huerta, o administrador da FAA. Os dois aviões partindo e o jato chegando estiveram 800 pés acima ou abaixo um dos outros, ele disse.

The episode occurred after an F.A.A. regional center changed runway flows because of bad weather developing south of the airport, which is in Arlington, Va., across the Potomac from Washington. Planes were directed to land to the north of the runway instead of to the south.

O episódio ocorreu após um Centro [de Controle de Tráfego Aéreo] regional da FAA ter mudado o fluxo de pista por causa de mau tempo em desenvolvimento ao Sul do aeroporto, o qual está em Alington, Virginia, em frente ao [rio] Potomac em Washington. Os aviões estavam direcionados para pouso na pista 01 em vez da pista 19.