VOEPASS 2283 [PASSAREDO CALLSIGN] PRELIMINARY REPORT - LOSS OF CONTROL IN-FLIGHT (LOC-I)

 

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SOURCE: CENIPA

LOC-I LOSS OF CONTROL IN-FLIGHT

Date: 9 August 2024

(UTC): 9 August 2024

Time: 16:22

City: VINHEDO - SÄO PAULO - BRASIL

Aerodrome: OUTSIDE THE AERODROME

Local: RESIDENTIAL AREA OF THE CITY

Damage to third

parties: YES

Injuries Function on Board Quantity

FATAL CREW 4

FATAL PASSENGERS 58

 

History

 

At 14:58 UTC, the aircraft took off from SBCA (Coronel Adalberto Mendes da Silva Airport, Cascavel, State of Paraná), bound for SBGR (Guarulhos - Governador André Franco Montoro - Airport, Guarulhos, State Of SOO Paulo) on a public regular passenger transport flight with 04 crew and 58 passengers on board. With the aircraft flying along the route, and after encountering icing conditions, control Of the aircraft was lost and it crashed into the ground.

 

Aircraft Involved

Registration marks: PSVPB

Location of latest takeoff: SBCA - ADALBERTO MENDES DA SILVA

Location of intended landing: SBGR - GOVERNADOR ANDRÉ FRANCO MONTORO

Type of operation: REGULAR

Phase of flight: CRUISE

Aircraft damage: DESTROYED

 

Sequence of events

Based on the information collected at the initial field Investigation, as well as recordings from the Flight Data Recorder (FDR) and Cockpit Voice Recorder (CVR), the Investigation Committee identified the sequence of events preceding the aircraft's collision with the ground. The time reference utilized is UTC (Universal Time Coordinated).

• 14:58:05 - the aircraft initiated takeoff from the runway 15 of SBCA, with 58 passengers and 04 crew on board;

• - the PROPELLER ANTI-ICING 1 and 2 were turned on;

• 15:14:56 - the Electronic Ice Detector connected to the Centralized Crew Alert System (CCAS) emitted an alert signal upon passing FL130;

• - the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on;

• 15:15:42 - a single chime was heard in the cockpit. Subsequently, the crew commented on the occurrence of an AIRFRAME DE-ICING Fault, and that they would turn it Off;

• 151549 - the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned off,

- the Electronic Ice Detector ceased emitting the alert signal.

• 1516125

• 1517:08

- the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal.

- the Electronic Ice Detector stopped emitting the alert signal;

- the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal;

- the Electronic Ice Detector stopped emitting the alert signal.

- the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal;

- the Electronic Ice Detector stopped emitting the alert signal;

- the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal;

- the SIC (pilot Second in Command) made radio contact with the airline's operational dispatcher at

Guarulhos airport, for coordination of the aircraft arrival;

• - At the same time of the SIC's coordination with the operational dispatcher, a flight attendant called

over the intercom. The SIC asked her to hold on moment and continued speaking with the dispatcher,

• - the Electronic Ice Detector stopped emitting the alert signal. At this time, the SIC was asking the

flight attendant for information that would be passed to the operational dispatcher;

• 16:17:32 - the Electronic Ice Detector emitted an alert signal; at this time, the PIC was informing the passengers about the SBGR local conditions and estimated time of landing,

• 16:17:41- the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on;

• 16:18:41 - at a speed of 191 kt., the CRUISE SPEED LOW alert was triggered. Concomitantly, the SIC was about to finish relaying some information to the operational dispatcher;

• 16:18:47 - the PIC started the briefing relative to the approach for landing in SBGR. Concomitantly, APP-SP made a radio call, and instructed him to change to frequency 123.25MHz;

• 16:18:55 — a single chime was heard in the cockpit. At this time, the communication with APP-SP was taking place;

• - the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned off;

• 16:19:16 - the crew made a call to APP-SP (Sao Paulo Approach Control) on the frequency 123.25 MHz;

• 16:19:19 - APP-SP requested the PS-VPB aircraft to maintain FL170 due to traffic;

• 16:19:23 - the crew replied to APP-SP that they would maintain flight level and that they were at the ideal point of descent, waiting for clearance;

• 16:19:28 - at a speed of 184 kt., the DEGRADED PERFORMANCE alert was triggered, together with a single chime. The alert was triggered concomitantly with the exchange of messages between APP-SP and the Crew;

• - APP-SP acknowledged the message and requested the aircraft to wait for clearance;

• 16:19:31 - Passaredo 2283 aircraft reported receipt of the message and thanked ATC;

• - the PIC resumed delivering the approach briefing;

• - the Second in Command (SIC) commented, "a lot of icing";

• - the AIRFRAME DE-ICING was turned on for the third time;

• - APP-SP cleared the aircraft to fly direct to SANPA position, maintaining FL170, and informed that the descent would be authorized in two minutes;

• 16:20:39 - the crew acknowledged the flight instruction received (last communication performed by the flight crew);

• - the aircraft started a right turn in order to fly to SANPA position.

• 16:20:57 — during the turn, at a speed of 169 the INCREASE SPEED alert was triggered, in conjunction with a single chime. Immediately afterwards, vibration noise was heard in the aircraft, simultaneously with the activation of the stall alert;

• 16:21:09 - control of the aircraft was lost, and it entered an abnormal flight attitude until colliding with the ground. The aircraft rolled to the left to a bank-angle of 52 degrees, and then rolled to the right to a bank- angle of 94 degrees, performing a 180-degree turn in a clockwise direction. Subsequently, the turn was reversed to an anticlockwise direction, with the aircraft completing five full rotations in a flat spin before crashing into the ground.

Click on image to see it isolated

The ICING light would blink with the detection of an Icing condition and the Anti-Icing and/or De-lcing  (AIFRAME) were not selected to ON, followed by single chime. The light would remain illuminated in a continuous fashion with the systems turned on.

 

Anti-Icing and De-Icing Systems

 

The Anti-lcing functions were energized electrically, whereas the De-icing ones were provided by means of pneumatic pressure.

 

The APM system needed to be checked by the crew on a daily basis, and in case of a failure, an amber-colored FAULT message would illuminate on the APM panel.

If the aircraft's drag increased due to ice accumulation and performance was degraded, resulting in loss of cruise speed, alerts in three levels were triggered and presented to the pilots on both alert panels Of the APM, as follows:

• 1st Level - CRUISE SPEED LOW

The blue-colored message would indicate performance degradation Of around 10%, with reduction Of the Indicated Air Speed (IAS) during the cruise phase by at least 10 kt. below the speed computed by the APM.

This alert would be triggered only during the cruise phase.

• 2nd Level - DEGRADED PERFORMANCE

The amber-colored message would be followed by a single chime and a master caution alert, indicating a significant performance degradation in the range between 22% and 28%, induced by a significant increase in aerodynamic drag, causing a drop in cruise IAS of around 15 to 20 knots below the speed computed by the APM. This alert could be triggered during climb, cruise, Or descent.

• 3rd Level - INCREASE SPEED.

The amber-colored message would appear flashing, followed by a single chime and a master caution alert, indicating that the degraded performance condition had worsened , reaching an IAS value below the ICING BUG + 10 kt. This alert could be triggered during climb, cruise, or descent.

 

The pilot has set the ICING BUG SPEED for SEVERE ICING CONDITION to 165 Knots.

In addition to the speed alerts (emitted by the APM), the airspeed indicators of the left- and right-hand cockpit stations had BUGS for reference, particularly for minimum speed maneuvers at low bank, flaps O', and icing conditions (VMLBO ICING), The said BUGS could be adjusted manually.

 

The ICING BUG needed to be adjusted by the pilots for each flight in accordance with the aircraft's weight, in order to indicate the minimum speed for a flight in icing conditions and with flaps retracted. The VMLBO ICING.

Airbus 380 - The Perfect Flight Crew Resource Management - In An Emergency? Avoid It Distracting You

Maximum take-off weight	Peso Máximo de Decolagem	569,000 kg
Actual take-off weight	Peso Real de Decolagem	464,040 kg
Maximum landing weight	Peso Máximo de Pouso	391,000 kg
Actual landing weight	Peso Real de Pouso	431,712 kg

 

 

 

Human Translation
by George Rocha

What happened On 4 November 2010, while climbing through 7,000 ft after departing from Changi Airport, Singapore, the Airbus A380 registered VH-OQA, sustained an uncontained engine rotor failure (UERF) of the No. 2 engine, a Rolls-Royce Trent 900. Debris from the UERF impacted the aircraft, resulting in significant structural and systems damage. The flight crew managed the situation and, after completing the required actions for the multitude of system failures, safely returned to and landed at Changi Airport.	O que aconteceu Em 04 NOV 2010, enquanto subindo cruzando 7000 pés após decolar do aeroporto Changi, em Cingapura, o Airbus A380, matrícula VH-OQA, suportou uma Falha Incontida do Rotor do Motor  n° 2, um Rolls-Royce Trent 900. Destroços da UERF colidiu com a aeronave, resultando em significante avaria estrutural e de sistemas. A tripulação de voo gerenciou a situação e, após completar as ações exigidas para a multiplas de falhas de sistmas, seguramente retornou e pousou no aeroporto Changi.
What the ATSB found The Australian Transport Safety Bureau (ATSB) found that a number of oil feed stub pipes within the High Pressure / Intermediate pressure (HP/IP) hub assembly were manufactured with thin wall sections that did not conform to the design specifications. These non-conforming pipes were fitted to Trent 900 engines, including the No. 2 engine on VH-OQA. The thin wall section significantly reduced the life of the oil feed stub pipe on the No. 2 engine so that a fatigue crack developed, ultimately releasing oil during the flight that resulted in an internal oil fire. That fire led to the separation of the intermediate pressure turbine disc from the drive shaft. The disc accelerated and burst with sufficient force that the engine structure could not contain it, releasing high-energy debris.	O que a Agência Australiana de Segurança de Transporte encontrou A Agência Australiana de Segurança de Transporte (ATSB) descobriu que um número de tubos curtos de alimentação de óleo dentro da montagem do eixo de Alta Pressão/Pressão Intermediária (HP/IP) foram frabricados com seções de parede finas que não que não estavam de acordo com as especificações do projeto. Estes tubos com não conformidade foram preparados para motores Trent 900, incluindo o motor n° 2 no VH-OAQ. A seção da parede fina significantemente reduziu a vida do tubo curto de alimentação de óleo no motor n° 2 tal que uma desenvolvida rachadura por fadiga, no final das contas liberou óleo durante o voo que resultou num incêndio interno do óleo. Esse incêndio conduziu para a separação do disco da turbina de pressão intermediária do eixo de propulsão. O disco acelerou e rebentou-se com suficiente força que a estrutura do motor não pôde contê-lo, liberando destroços com alta energia.

The occurrence flight The aircraft departed Changi Airport, Singapore on a scheduled passenger flight to Sydney, Australia. About 4 minutes after take-off, while the aircraft was climbing through about 7,000 ft, the flight crew heard two ‘bangs’ and a number of warnings and cautions were displayed on the electronic centralised aircraft monitor (ECAM).	O voo da ocorrência A aeronave partiu do aeroporto Changi, Cingapura num voo programado de passageiro para Sydney, Austrália. Cerca de 4 minutos após a decolagem, enquanto a aeronave estava cruzando cerca de 7000 pés, a tripulaçao de voo ouviu dois ‘estouros’ e um número de avisos e advertências foram mostrados no Monitor Eletrônico Centralizado da Aeronave (ECAM).
Initially, the ECAM displayed a message warning of turbine overheat in the No. 2 (inner left) engine. That warning was followed soon after by a multitude of other messages relating to a number of aircraft system problems. After assessing the situation and completing a number of initial response actions, the flight crew were cleared by ATC to conduct a holding pattern to the east of Changi Airport. While in the holding pattern, the flight crew worked through the procedures relevant to the messages displayed by the ECAM. During that time the flight crew were assisted by additional crew that were on the flight deck as part of a check and training exercise.	Inicialmente, o ECAM mostrou uma mensagem avisando do sobreaquecimento da turbine no motor n° 2 (interno [da asa] esquerda). Aquele aviso foi seguido logo após por um grande número de outras mensagens as relacionando a um n’umero de problemas dos sistemas da aeronave. Ap’os avaliar a situação e completer um número de ações iniciais de resposta, a tripulação de voo foi liberada pelo ATC [Controle de Tráfego Aéreo] para conduzir uma [espera] em órbita padrão à Este do aeroporto Changi. Enquanto na órbita padrão, a tripulação de voo trabalhou sem interrupção os procedimentos relevantes às mensagens mostradas pelo ECAM. Durante esse tempo a tripulação de voo foi assistida pela tripulação adicional que estava no cockpit como parte de um cheque e exercício de treinamento.
The aircraft sustained significant impact damage to the left wing by fragments and debris from the UERF, and fuel was leaking from the damaged left wing fuel tanks. However, after completing the ECAM procedures and performing some aircraft controllability checks, the flight crew landed the aircraft safely at Changi Airport.	A aeronave sofreu significante avaria de impacto na asa esquerda po fragmentos e destroços da UERF, e combustível estava vazando dos tanques de combustível da asa esquerda avariada. Todavia, após completar os procedimentos do ECAM e efetuar algumas verificações de controlabilidade da aeronave, a tripulação de voo pousou a aeronave no aeroporto Changi.
After landing, fuel continued to leak from the left wing tank. The risk associated with this leak was minimised by the airport emergency services by applying large quantities of water and foam below the left wing while the aircraft’s engines were shut down.	Após o pouso, combustível continuous a vazar do tanque da asa esquerda. O risco associado com este vazamento foi minimisado pelos serviços de emergência do aeroporto ao aplicar quantidades grandes de água e espuma embaixo da asa esaquerda enquanto os motores da aeronave eram cortados.
The No. 1 (outer left) engine continued to run following the normal shut-down procedure. Because of the still-running engine and leaking fuel on the left side, the passengers were disembarked via a set of stairs on the right side of the aircraft. The disembarkation was completed about 2 hours after the aircraft landed. Numerous unsuccessful attempts to shut down the No. 1 engine were made by the flight crew, maintenance engineers and the airport emergency services using different methods . The engine was finally shut down about 3 hours after the aircraft landed by pumping firefighting foam directly into the engine inlet.	O motor n° 1 (externo [da asa] esquerda) continuou funcionando em seguida ao procedimento de corte normal. Por causa do motor  ainda funcionando e vazamento de combustível no lado esquerdo, os passageiros foram desembarcados via um arranjo de escadas no lado direito da aeronave. O desembarque foi completado em cerca de 2 horas após a aeronave ter pousado. Numerosas tentativas sem sucesso para cortar [desligar] o motor n° 1 foram feitas pela tripulação de voo, engenheiros de manutenção e serviços de emergência do aeroporto usando métodos diferentes. O motor foi finalmente cortado [desligado] cerca de 3 horas depois da aeronave ter pousado pelo bombeamento de espuma contra incêndio diretamente na tomada de entrada de ar do motor.
The operator’s Flight Crew Emergency Procedures Manual (FCEPM) categorised the emergency egress of an aircraft’s occupants into three basic classes: unprepared emergencies, prepared emergencies and precautionary disembarkation.   O Manual de Procedimentos de Emergência da Tripulação de Voo do operador (FCEPM) categorizou a egressão de emergência de ocupantes de aeronave em três classes básicas: Emergências não preparadas, Emergências preparadas e Desembarque precautório.    The flight crew actioned the applicable evacuation checklist, assessed the information that had been provided to them by the AES and decided that a precautionary disembarkation using stairs would be the most appropriate and safest method.   A tripulação de voo acionou a lista de verificação aplicável à evacuação, avaliou a informação que tinha sido fornecida para eles pelo AES e decidiu que o desembarque Precautório usando escadas seria o método mais apropriado e o mais seguro.
The ATSB found that the flight crew and cabin crew managed the event as a competent team in accordance with standard operating procedures and practices.	A ATSB descobriu que a tripulação de voo e de cabina [comissárias] gerenciou o evento como uma equipe competente de acordo com procedimentos e práticas de operação padrão.
Managing the situation The flight crew discussed the available options to manage the situation, including an immediate return to Singapore, climbing or holding. As the aircraft remained controllable, and there was ample fuel on board, it was decided that the best option would be to hold at the present altitude while they processed the ECAM messages and associated procedures. The flight crew recalled frequently reviewing this decision and assessing the amount of fuel on board. The flight crew contacted ATC and advised that they would need about 30 minutes to process the ECAM messages and associated procedures, and requested an appropriate holding position in order for that to occur. ATC initially cleared the flight crew to conduct a holding pattern to the east of Singapore. Following further discussion amongst the flight crew, ATC was advised that a holding area within 30 NM (56 km) of Changi Airport was required. ATC acknowledged that requirement and directed the aircraft to a different area to the east of the airport and provided heading information to maintain the aircraft in an approximately 20 NM (37 km) long racetrack holding pattern at 7,400 ft (below Figure ). ATC also advised of reports that a number of aircraft components had been found by residents of Batam Island, Indonesia.	Gerenciamento da situação A tripulação de voo discutiu as opções disponíveis para gerenciar a situação, incluindo um imediato retorno para Cingapura, subindo ou esperando em órbita. Enquanto a aeronave permaneceu controlável, e havia muito combustível a bordo, foi decidido que a melhor opção seria se manter na presente altitude enquanto eles processavam as mensagens do ECAM e procedimentos associados. A tripulação de voo lembravam frequentemente de revisar esta decisão e avaliar a quantidade de combustível a bordo. A tripulação de voo contatou o ATC e avisou que eles necessitariam de cerca de 30 minutos para processar as mensagens do ECAM e procedimentos associados, e solicitou uma posição apropriada de espera em órbita [fixo de espera] para isso ocorrer. O ATC inicialmente autorizou a tripulação de voo para conduzir uma espera em órbita padrão à Este de Cingapura. Seguindo discussão adicional entre os tripulantes de voo, o ATC foi avisado que uma área de espera em órbita dentro de 30 Milhas Náuticas (56 Km) do aeroporto Changi era exigida. O ATC reconheceu essa exigência e direcionou a aeronave para uma área diferente à Este do aeroporto e forneceu informação da proa para manter a aeronave num circuito longo de órbita de espera padrão aproximadamente 27 NM (37 Km) a 7400 pés (Figura abaixo). O ATC também foi informado de relatos de que um número de componentes da aeronave tinha sido encontrado por residentes da Ilha Batan, Indonésia.

The approach and landing The flight crew progressively configured the aircraft for the approach and landing and conducted further controllability checks in each new configuration. As a result of the damage to the aircraft, extending the landing gear required use of the emergency extension procedure.  Singapore ATC radar vectored the aircraft to a position 20 NM (37 km) from the threshold of runway 20C and provided for a progressive descent to 4,000 ft. The captain set engines No. 1 and 4 to provide symmetrical thrust, and controlled the aircraft’s speed with thrust from No. 3 engine.	A aproximação e pouso A tripulação de voo pregressivamente configurou a aeronave para a aproximação e pouso e conduziu verificações adicionais de controlabilidade em cada nova configuração. Como um resultado da avaria da aeronave, a extensão do trem de pouso exigiu uso do procedimento de extensão em emergência. O Controle Radar de Tráfego Aéreo de Cingapura vetorou a aeronave para uma posição 20 NM (37 Km) da cabeceira da pista 20 Central e providenciou uma descida progressiva proveu uma descida progressiva para 4000 pés. O comandante ajustou os motores n° 1 e 4 [externo (da asa) direita]  para fornecer potência simétrica, e controlou a velocidade da aeronave com potência do motor n° 3.
Following the engine failure and subsequent system damage, the autopilot remained operational. The captain, as the handling pilot, continued to fly the aircraft using the autopilot during the time that the crew managed the ECAM procedures. The captain manually disconnected the autopilot to conduct control checks to assess the handling qualities of the aircraft, before re-engaging it. The autopilot disconnected twice during the approach - these were automatic disconnections in response to pre-set functions within the autopilot system relating to the aircraft’s angle of attack. When the autopilot disconnected for the second time (at about 800 ft) the captain elected to leave it disconnected and manually fly the aircraft for the remainder of the approach.	Seguindo a falha do motor e subsequente avaria de sistema, o Piloto Automático permaneceu operacional. O comandante, como o piloto manuseando (os controles de voo) [Pilot-Flying], continuou usando o Piloto Automático durante o tempo que a tripulação gerenciou os procedimentos do ECAM. O comandante manualmente desconectou o Piloto Automático para efetuar verificações de controle para avaliar as qualidades de manuseio da aeronave, antes de re-engajá-lo. O Piloto Automático desconectou duas vezes durante a aproximação -  estas foram desconexões automáticas em respostas às funções de pré-ajustagem dentro do sistema do Piloto Automático relacionada ao ângulo de ataque da aeronave. Quando o Piloto Automático se desconectou pela segunda vez ( a cerca de 800 pés) o comandante resolveu deixá-lo desconectado e manualmente voar a aeronave pelo restante da aproximação.
The aircraft touched down at 03:46:47 and the captain applied the brakes and selected reverse thrust on the No. 3 engine. The flight crew observed that the deceleration appeared to be ‘slow’ in the initial landing roll, but that with the braking effort being used and reverse thrust, the aircraft began to slow. The captain recalled feeling confident that, as the speed approached 60 kt, the aircraft would be able to stop in the remaining runway. The No. 3 engine was gradually moved out of maximum reverse thrust and manual braking was continued until the aircraft came to a stop about 150 m from the end of the runway. The aircraft was attended by emergency services.	A aeronave tocou o solo às 03:46:47 horas e o comandante aplicou os freios e selecionou potência reversa no motor n° 3. A tripulação de voo observou que a desaceleração pareceu estar ‘lenta’ no início da rolagem do pouso, mas que com o esforço de breacagem sendo usado e potência reversa, a aeronave começou a tornar-se mais lento. O comandante lebrou de sentir-se confiante que, quando a velocidade aproximou-se de 60 Knots, a aeronave seria capaz de parar na pista remanescente. O motor n° 3 foi gradualmente mudado para fora de potência reversa máxima e breacagem manual foi continuada até a aeronave vir para uma parada cerca de 150 metros do final da pista. A aeronave foi assistida pelos serviços de emergência.

Engine failure sequence The crack in the oil feed pipe was a result of fatigue and had developed over some time. On the occurrence flight, the crack grew to a size that allowed oil in the pipe to be released into the buffer space between the bearing chamber and the hot air surrounding the IP turbine disc. The oil was released as an atomised spray and the air within the buffer space was sufficiently hot for the oil to auto-ignite.	Sequência da falha do motor A rachadura no tupo de alimentação de óleo foi um resultado de fadiga e foi desenvolvido durante algum tempo. Na ocorrência do voo, a rachadura cresceu para um tamanho que permitiu óleo no tubo ser liberado para dentro do espaço do amortecedor entre a câmara de rolamento e o ar quente envolvendo o disco da turbina de Pressão Intermediária. O óleo foi liberado como um borrifo atomizado e o ar dentro do espaço do amortecedor estava suficientemente quente para o óleo se auto-inflamar.
The resulting fire propagated through the bearing chamber buffer space and eventually impinged upon the IP turbine disc drive arm, resulting in the separation of the disc from the drive shaft. Following the separation of the disc, the engine behaved in a manner different to that anticipated by the manufacturer during engine design and testing. The disc accelerated to a speed in excess of its structural capacity and burst into three main segments, with sufficient force to puncture the engine case at high velocity.	O fogo resultante se propagou através do espaço do amortecedor da câmara de rolamento e evantualmente invadiu sobre o braço de propulsão do disco da turbina de Pessão Intermediária, resultando na separação do disco do eixo de propulsão. Seguindo a separação do disco, o motor comportou-se numa maneira diferente àquela prevista pelo fabricantge durante o projeto e teste do motor. O disco acelerou para uma velocidade em excesso de sua capacidade estrutural e estourou em três segmentos, com suficiente força para romper a caixa do motor em velocidade alta.

Intermediate pressure turbine behaviour Disc burst During the normal operation of a gas turbine engine, the load applied by the hot airstream as it passes through a turbine is transferred through the interconnecting shaft to the compressor. That load is used to drive the compressor to increase the pressure of the air passing through the compressor. A turbine will rotate at a constant speed when there is a balance between the load applied to the turbine by the hot airstream and the compressor load as it compresses the air.	Comportamento de turbine de pressão intermediária Estouro do disco Durante a operação normal de um motor [movido] a gas de turbina, a carga aplicada pela corrente de ar quente quando ela passa atrav;es de uma turbina é transferida através do eixo de internonexão para o compressor. Uma turbina girará a uma velocidade constante quando há um balanceamento entre a carga aplicada à turbina pela corrente de ar quente e a carga do compressor quando ele comprime o ar.
When a drive shaft (or drive arm) fails, the compressor load is removed from the turbine and the system is no longer balanced. This condition, known as a ‘loss of load’ on the turbine, results in a decrease in compressor speed and an increase in turbine speed, as the hot gas stream is still applying a load on the now unloaded turbine.	Quando um eixo de propulsão (ou braço de propulsão) falha, a carga do compressor é removida da turbina e o sitema não mais fica balanceado. Esta condição, conhecida como uma ‘perda de carga’ na turbina, resulta num decréscimo na velocidade do compressor e um aumento na velocidade da turbina, enquanto a corrente d gas quente está ainda aplicando uma carga na turbina agora sem carga [força].
When a disc is rotating, there is a radial expansion of the disc as a result of centrifugal forces generated by the rotation. The greater the rotational speed, the greater the forces that are generated. These centrifugal forces are resisted by the stiffness of the disc  and result in stresses within the disc. When the speed is such that those stresses exceed the yield strength of the disc, permanent deformation results and the disc ‘grows’ larger than its original size. When the stresses exceed the ultimate strength of the disc, the disc fails. That failure is typically in tension, and results in radial (that is, from the centre of the disc outward to the rim) overstress factures. Thus, a disc that failed in overspeed (disc burst) will exhibit permanent growth and radial overstress fractures.	Quando um disco esta girando, há uma expansão radial do disco como um resultado de forças centrífugas geradas pela rotação. Quanto maior a velocidade de rotação, maior as forças que são geradas. Estas forças centrífugas  são resistidas pela rigidez do disco e resultam em estresses dentro do disco. Quando a velocidade é tal que esses estresses excedem o efetivo rendimento do disco, deformação permanente resulta e o disco ‘cresce’ mais do que seu tamanho original. Quando os estresses excedem a eficiência máxima do disco, o disco falha. A falha é tipicamente em tensão, e resulta em fraturas radiais superestressadas (isso é, do centro do exterior do disco para a borda). Assim, um disco que falhou em sobrevelocidade (estouro de disco) exibirá crescimento permanente e fraturas radiais superstressadas.
Because a disc burst generally occurs at a high rotational speed, the released debris has sufficient energy to pass through the engine case at great speed and can impact the aircraft structure. The non-containment of significant high-energy debris is defined as a ‘hazardous effect’  and the prevention of a disc burst is paramount for designers and manufacturers. It is therefore critical that the speed of a turbine disc under any condition does not exceed its burst speed.	Porque um estouro de disco geralmente ocorre em uma velocidade rotacional alta, os destroços liverados têm suficiente energia para atravessar a caixa do motor em grande velocidade e pode colidir com a estrutura da aeronave. A não contenção de significante destroço com alta energia é definido como uma ‘efeito perigoso’ e a prevenção de um estouro de disco é muito importante para projetistas e fabricantes.  ‘E por essa razão crítica que a velocidade de um disco de turbina sob qualquer condição não excede sua velocidade de estouro.

Effect of the damage to the aircraft on power supply The AC power generation feed lines from generators No. 1 and No. 2 were severed by engine debris, removing the power supply to AC busbar 1 (AC BUS 1) and AC BUS 2 (see below figure). The system automatically reconfigured AC BUS 1 to obtain its supply from AC BUS 4. When the crew started the APU, AC BUS 1 was reconfigured to be supplied with AC power from APU generator A. In the event of a loss of power to AC BUS 2, the system would normally reconfigure to receive supply from AC BUS 3. Due to residual current being sensed from the No. 2 engine generator, the Generator and Ground Power Control Unit (GGPCU) considered the No. 2 generator was still online and isolated AC BUS 2. This resulted in AC BUS 2 being unable to be reconfigured and it was not powered.	Efeito da avaria ao suprimento de eletricidade da aeronave As linhas de alimentação de geração de corrente elétrica AC dos geradores n° 1 e n° 2 foram rompidas pelos destroços do motor, removendo o suprimento de eletricidade para as barras de corrente AC 1 (AC BUS 1) e AC BUS 2 (veja figura abaixo). O sistema automaticamente reconfigurou a AC BUS 1 para obter seu suprimento da AC BUS 4. Quando a tripulação deu partida na APU [Unidade de Força Auxiliar] , a AC BUS 1  foi reconfigurada para ser suprida com força AC do gerador A da APU. No evento da perda de força para o barramento AC BUS 2, o sistema normalmente reconfiguraria para receber suprimento do barramento AC BUS 3. Devido à corrente residual sendo sentida do gerador do motor n° 2, a Unidade de Controle de Força do Gerador e Força no Solo (GGPCU) considerou que o gerador do motor n° 2 estava ainda online e isolou a AC BUS 2. Isto resultou na AC BUS 2 ser incapaz de ser reconfigurada e não foi alimentada.
The loss of AC BUS 2 resulted in the loss of Air Data Inertial Reference Unit (ADIRU) 3. One of ADIRU 3’s functions is to provide a speed signal to the electrical power system. This speed signal is used by the electrical power system to determine which APU generators are available to supply power. When power was lost to ADIRU 3, its speed signal output was frozen in the ‘speed higher than 50 knots’ configuration (that is, in the air mode).	A perda de barramento AC BUS 2 resultou na perda da Unidade de Referência Inercial de Dados Aéreos (ADIRU) 3. Uma das funções do ADIRU 3 é fornecer uma sinal de velocidade para o sistema de força elétrica. Este sinal de velocidade é usado pelo sistema de força elétrica para determinar quais geradores da APU estão disponíveis para suprir energia elétrica. Quando a enegia foi perdida para o ADIRU 3, sua saída de sinal de velocidade ficou congelada na configuração ‘velocidade mais alta que 50 Knots’ (isso é, no modo aéreo).
As the electrical system was locked in the air mode, only APU generator A was available to supply power following the shutdown of engines No. 3 and 4. This resulted in only AC BUS 1 and the essential bus bar continuing to be supplied with AC power. This limited power source resulted in some flight deck display screens being lost and only the VHF 1 radio being available for use by the flight crew.	Quando o sistema elétrico foi travado no modo aéreo, somente o gerador A da APU estava disponível para suprir energia em seguida ao corte [desligamento] dos motores n° 3 e 4. Isto resultou em somente o barramento AC BUS 1 e o barramento Essencial continuar a ser suprido com energia AC. Esta fonte de energia limitada resultou em algumas telas de exibição do cockpit serem perdidas e somente o rádio VHF 1 estando disponível para uso pela tripulação de voo.

Flight controls Immediately after the uncontained failure, the following flight controls were inoperative: • all slats • all droop nose flaps • the left mid aileron • spoilers No. 4 and 6 on the left wing.	Controles de voo Imediatamente após a falha incontida, os seguintes controles de voo estavam inoperantes: ·        Todos slats ·        Todos flaps de inclinação do nariz ·        O aileron médio esquerdo ·        Spoilers n° 4 e 6 na asa esquerda
As a result of the inoperative slats, the flight law changed from normal law to alternate law. Approximately 10 minutes later, coincident with the depressurisation of the Green hydraulic system, the following additional flight controls were unavailable: • the left and right outboard ailerons • spoilers No. 2 and 8 on the left wing • spoilers No. 2 and 8 on the right wing • spoiler No. 4 on the right wing.	Como um resultado dos slats inoperativos, a lei do modo de voo mudou de Normal Law para Alternate Law. Aproximadamente 10 minutos mais tarde, coincidente com a despressurização do sistema hidráulico Verde, os seguintes adicionais controles de voo, estavam indisponíveis: ·        Spoilers n° 2 e 8 na asa esquerda ·        Spoilers n° 2 e 8 na asa direita ·        Spoiler n° 4 na asa direita
All trailing edge flaps, the elevators and the trimmable horizontal stabiliser and rudder control surfaces remained available for the duration of the flight. The availability of the primary and secondary flight control surfaces following the uncontained engine failure and subsequent ECAM actions by the crew are depicted in the below image.	Todos flaps de bordo de fuga, os profundores e estabilizador horizontal trimável e superfícies de controle do leme permaneceram disponíveis na duração do voo. A disponibilidade das superfícies secundárias de controle de voo seguindo à Falha Incontida do Motor e subsequentes ações de ECAM pela tripulação estão ilustradas na imagem abaixo.