On 15 January 2023, an ATR 72-212A was operating scheduled flights between Kathmandu (VNKT) and Pokhara International Airport (VNPR). The same flight crew operated two sectors between VNKT to VNPR and VNPR to VNKT earlier in the morning. The accident occurred during a visual approach for runway 12 at VNPR. This was the third flight by the crew members on that day. The flight was operated by two Captains, one Captain was in the process of obtaining aerodrome familarization for operating into Pokhara and the other Captain being the instructor pilot. The Captain being familarized, who was occupying the left hand seat, was the Pilot Flying (PF) and the instructor pilot, occupying the right hand seat, was the Pilot Monitoring (PM). 1.1.2 The take-off, climb, cruise and descent to Pokhara was normal. During the first contact with Pokhara tower the Air Traffic Controller (ATC) assigned the runway 30 to land. But during the later phases of flight crew requested and received clearance from ATC to land on Runway 12.
At 10:51:36, the aircraft descended (from 6,500 feet at five miles away from
VNPR and joined the downwind track for Runway 12 to the north of the runway.
The aircraft was visually identified by ATC during the approach. At 10:56:12,
the pilots extended the flaps to the 15 degrees position and selected the landing
gears lever to the down position. The take-off (TO) setting was selected on
power management panel.
At 10:56:27, the PF disengaged the Autopilot System (AP) at an altitude of 721
feet Above Ground Level (AGL). The PF then called for “FLAPS 30” at
10:56:32, and the PM replied, “Flaps 30 and descending”. The flight data
recorder (FDR) data did not record any flap surface movement at that time.
Instead, the propeller rotation speed (Np) of both engines decreased
simultaneously to less than 25%1 and the torque (Tq) started decreasing to 0%,
which is consistent with both propellers going into the feathered condition2.
On the cockpit voice recorder (CVR) area microphone recording, a single Master
Caution chime was recorded at 10:56:36. The flight crew then carried out the
“Before Landing Checklist” before starting the left turn onto the base leg. During
that time, the power lever angle increased from 41% to 44%. At the point, Np
of both propellers were recorded as Non-Computed Data (NCD) in the FDR
and the torque (Tq) of both engines were at 0%. When propellers are in feather,
they are not producing thrust.
When both propellers were feathered, the investigation team observed that
both engines of 9N-ANC were running flight idle condition during the event flight
to prevent over torque. As per the FDR data, all the recorded parameters
related to engines did not show any anomaly. At 10:56:50 when the radio
altitude callout for five hundred feet3 was annunciated, another “click” sound
was heard4. The aircraft reached a maximum bank angle of 30 degrees at this
altitude. The recorded Np and Tq data remained invalid. The yaw damper
disconnected four seconds later. The PF consulted the PM on whether to
continue the left turn and the PM replied to continue the turn. Subsequently,
the PF asked the PM on whether to continue descend and the PM responded
it was not necessary and instructed to apply a little power. At 10:56:54, another
click was heard, followed by the flaps surface movement to the 30 degrees
position.
When ATC gave the clearance for landing at 10:57:07, the PF mentioned twice
that there was no power coming from the engines. At 10:57:11, the power
levers were advanced first to 62 degrees then to the maximum power position.
It was followed by a “click” sound at 10:57:16. One second after the “click”
sound, the aircraft was at the initiation of its last turn at 368 feet AGL, the high
pressure turbine speed (Nh) of both engines increased from 73% to 77%.
It is noted that the PF handed over control of the aircraft to the PM at 10:57:18.
At 10:57:20, the PM (who was previously the PF) repeated again that there was
no power from the engines. At 10:57:24 when the aircraft was at 311 feet AGL,
the stick shaker was activated warning the crew that the aircraft Angle of Attack
(AoA) increased up to the stick shaker threshold.
At 10:57:26, a second sequence of stick shaker warning was activated when the aircraft banked towards the left abruptly. Thereafter, the radio altitude alert for two hundred feet was annunciated, and the cricket sound and stick shaker ceased. At 10:57:32, sound of impact was heard in the CVR. The FDR and CVR stopped recording at 10:57:33 and 10:57:35 respectively.
