ALERT - Solar Wind Can Reach Brazil and Affect Aviation Communication

                   UPDATED 22 SEP 2010
AVIATION ALERT!
From now till Sep 20, 2010 by Brazilian Aeronautics
http://www.swpc.noaa.gov/alerts/index.html

Space Weather Alerts

Click on this link to watch a video for supplementary understanding in 3D
Clique neste link para ver um video para entendimento suplementar em 3 dimensões.

http://www.nature.com/ncomms/journal/v1/n6/extref/ncomms1077-s2.avi  UPDATING Atualização

Reference: Byrne, J.P. et al. Propagation of an Earth-directed coronal mass ejection in three dimensions. Nat. Commun. 1:74 doi: 10.1038/ncomms1077 (2010).

Cracks in Earth's Magnetic Shield

Rachaduras no Escudo Megnético da Terra

A solar wind stream is buffeting Earth's magnetic field.

Um fluxo de vento solar está esbofeteando o campo magnético da Terra.

Earth is surrounded by a magnetic force field - a bubble in space called "the magnetosphere" tens of thousands of miles wide. Although many people don't know it exists, the magnetosphere is familiar. It's a far flung part of the same planetary magnetic field that deflects compass needles here on Earth's surface. And it's important. The magnetosphere acts as a shield that protects us from solar storms.

A Terra é envolta por um campo de força magnética - uma bolha no espaço chamada "a magnetosfera" com largura de dezenas de milhares de milhas. Embora muitas pessoas não conheçam que ela existe, a magnetosfera é familiar. Ela é uma parte lançada do mesmo campo magnético planetário que desvia a agulha da bússola aqui na superfície da Terra. E ela é importante. A magnetosfera age como um escudo que nos protege de tempestade solares.

According to new observations, however, from NASA's IMAGE spacecraft and the joint NASA/European Space Agency Cluster satellites, immense cracks sometimes develop in Earth's magnetosphere and remain open for hours. This allows the solar wind to gush through and power stormy space weather.

De acordo com novas observações, de qualquer modo, da nave espacial IMAGE da NASA e do conjunto de satélites do Agrupamento da Agência Espacial NASA/Europeia, imensas rupturas algumas vezes desenvolvem-se na magnetosfera da Terra e permanecem abertas por horas. Isto permite o vento solar jorrar e potencializar condições meteorológicas de tempestade no espaço.

The solar wind is a stream of electrically charged particles (electrons and ions) blown constantly from the Sun.  (The solar wind transfers energy from the Sun to the Earth through the magnetic fields it carries and its high speed (hundreds of miles/kilometers per second). It can get gusty during violent solar events, like Coronal Mass Ejections (CMEs), which can shoot a billion tons of electrified gas into space at millions of miles per hour.

O Vento solar é um fluxo de partículas carregadas eletricamente (elétrons e íons) sopradas constantemente do Sol. O vento solar transfere energia do Sol para a Terra, através de campos magnéticos que ele [vento] carrega e da sua alta velocidade (centenas de quilômetros por segundo). Ele pode alcançar rajadas durante eventos solares, como Ejeções de Massa Coronal - CMEs, as quais podem disparar bilhões de toneladas de gas eletrificado no espaço a milhões de milhas por hora.

EVENTOS ANTERIORES ESTUDADOS
No dia 12 DEC 2008, uma proeminente erupção foi observada pelas duas sondas espaciais STEREO enquanto a nave estava em quadratura próxima de 86.7º de separação (Fig. 1a). As erupções foram visíveis nas coordenadas 50 a 55º Norte, às 03:00 horas UT. A proeminência é considerada pelo material interno da CME, o qual foi primeiro observada às 05:35 UT (Fig. 1b).
 

Observe que frente do vento solar (protons) é iniciada aproximadamente 4 horas após a erupção dependendo da magnitude da erupção

A chegada da frente da CME ao Polo da Terra foi entre 08:09 e 13:20 UT do dia 16 DEZ 2008 de acordo com os dados executados em simulação. Após 4 dias da erupção (4 dias + 5 a 10 horas).

Em distâncias grandes do Sol, os efeitos de arrasto tornam-se importantes quando a velocidade da CME aproxima-se daquela do Vento Solar.

Neste evento passado, foi encontrado que a força de arrasto é de fato suficiente para acelerar a CME para a velocidade do Vento Solar e quantificar que as forças cinemáticas estão consistentes com o sistema de arrasto aerodinâmico (turbulento, quando confrontado à viscosidade, dominantes efeitos)

Veja video da explosão solar detectada por sondas espaciais em 01 AGO 2010 e está se dirigindo para Terra
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UQA2iww7HSI
http://spaceweather.com/

NASA artistic conception

Ministério da Aeronáutica

Brasil

Nota Oficial

O Comando da Aeronáutica informa que estarão em vigor, até o dia 20 de setembro, medidas adicionais de segurança para o tráfego aéreo brasileiro como prevenção a possíveis interferências nas comunicações satelitais na área de controle do espaço aéreo de Brasília. Tais interferências são naturais e ocorrem por conta do alinhamento entre o sol e o satélite de comunicação, com duração de três a dezesseis minutos, geralmente entre 14h45min e 15h00min (horário de Brasília).


As medidas adicionais de segurança são:


- Suspender todas as decolagens de Brasília cinco minutos antes do início das interferências;


- Autorizar novas decolagens imediatamente após cessar tal fenômeno;


- Indicar frequências alternativas para todas as aeronaves em voo na região de Brasília dez minutos antes do início do fenômeno.


Essas medidas já foram comunicadas às companhias aéreas e suas tripulações já têm pleno conhecimento dos procedimentos a serem realizados.


Ressaltamos que o conjunto de medidas tem caráter preventivo de forma a manter os padrões de segurança da atividade aérea no País.


Atenciosamente,


Centro de Comunicação Social da Aeronáutica

FAA says current regulations do not adequately address the risk of fatigue

14 CFR Part 117

Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Safety.
14 CFR Part 121
Air carriers, Aircraft, Airmen, Aviation safety, Reporting and recordkeeping requirements, Safety.

The Proposed Amendment

In consideration of the foregoing, the Federal Aviation Administration proposes to amend Chapter I of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, as follows:

1. Part 117 is added to read as follows:

PART 117 - FLIGHT AND DUTY LIMITATIONS AND REST

REQUIREMENTS: FLIGHTCREW MEMBERS

Sec.

117.1 Applicability.
117.3 Definitions.
117.5 Fitness for duty.
117.7 Fatigue risk management system.
117.9 Schedule reliability.
117.11 Fatigue education and training program.
117.13 Flight time limitation.
117.15 Flight duty period: Un-augmented operations.
117.17 Flight duty period: Split duty.
117.19 Flight duty period: Augmented flightcrew.
117.21 Reserve status.
117.23 Cumulative duty limitations.
117.25 Rest period.
117.27 Consecutive nighttime operations.
117.29 Deadhead transportation.
117.31 Operations into unsafe areas.

Table A to Part 117 – Maximum Flight Time Limits for Un-augmented Operations
Table B to Part 117 – Flight Duty Period: Un-augmented Operations
Table C to Part 117 – Flight Duty Period: Augmented Operations

§ 117.1 Applicability.

This part prescribes flight and duty limitations and rest requirements for all flightcrew members and certificate holders conducting operations under part 121 of this chapter. This part also applies to all flightcrew members and part 121 certificate holders when conducting flights under part 91 of this chapter.

§ 117.3 Definitions.

In addition to the definitions in §§ 1.1 and 119.3 of this chapter, the following definitions apply to this part. In the event there is a conflict in definitions, the definitions in this part control.

Acclimated means a condition in which a crewmember has been in a theater for 72 hours or has been given at least 36 consecutive hours free from duty.

Airport/standby reserve means a defined duty period during which a crewmember is required by a certificate holder to be at, or in close proximity to, an airport for a possible assignment.

Augmented flightcrew means a flightcrew that has more than the minimum number of flightcrew members required by the airplane type certificate to operate the aircraft to allow a flightcrew member to be replaced by another qualified flightcrew member for in-flight rest.

Calendar day means a 24-hour period from 0000 through 2359.

Certificate holder means a person who holds or is required to hold an air carrier certificate or operating certificate issued under part 119 of this chapter.

Crew pairing means a flight duty period or series of flight duty periods assigned to a flightcrew member which originate or terminate at the flightcrew member’s home base.

Deadhead transportation means transportation of a crewmember as a passenger, by air or surface transportation, as required by a certificate holder, excluding transportation to or from a suitable accommodation.

Duty means any task, other than long-call reserve, that a crewmember performs  on behalf of the certificate holder, including but not limited to airport/standby reserve, short-call reserve, flight duty, pre- and post-flight duties, administrative work, training, deadhead transportation, aircraft positioning on the ground, aircraft loading, and aircraft servicing.

Duty period means a period that begins when a certificate holder requires a crewmember to report for duty and ends when that crew member is free from all duties.

Fatigue means a physiological state of reduced mental or physical performance capability resulting from lack of sleep or increased physical activity that can reduce a crewmember’s alertness and ability to safely operate an aircraft or perform safety-related duties.

Fatigue risk management system (FRMS) means a management system for an operator to use to mitigate the effects of fatigue in its particular operations. It is a datadriven process and a systematic method used to continuously monitor and manage safety risks associated with fatigue-related error.

Fit for duty means physiologically and mentally prepared and capable of performing assigned duties in flight with the highest degree of safety.

Flight duty period (FDP) means a period that begins when a flightcrew member is required to report for duty with the intention of conducting a flight, a series of flights, or positioning or ferrying flights, and ends when the aircraft is parked after the last flight and there is no intention for further aircraft movement by the same flightcrew member.

A flight duty period includes deadhead transportation before a flight segment without an intervening required rest period, training conducted in an aircraft, flight simulator or flight training device, and airport/standby reserve.

Home base means the location designated by a certificate holder where a crew member normally begins and ends his or her duty periods.

Lineholder means a flightcrew member who has a flight schedule and is not acting as a reserve flightcrew member.

Long-call reserve means a reserve period in which a crewmember receives a required rest period following notification by the certificate holder to report for duty.

Physiological night’s rest means the rest that encompasses the hours of 0100 and 0700 at the crewmember’s home base, unless the individual has acclimated to a different theater. If the crewmember has acclimated, the rest must encompass the hours of 0100 and 0700 at the acclimated location.

Report time means the time that the certificate holder requires a crewmember to report for a duty period.

Reserve availability period means a duty period during which a certificate holder requires a reserve crewmember on short call reserve to be available to receive an assignment for a flight duty period.

Reserve duty period means the time from the beginning of the reserve availability period to the end of an assigned flight duty period, and is applicable only to short call reserve.

Reserve flightcrew member means a flightcrew member who a certificate holder requires to be available to receive an assignment for duty.

Rest facility means a bunk, seat, room, or other accommodation that provides a crewmember with a sleep opportunity.

(1) Class 1 rest facility means a bunk or other surface that allows for a flat sleeping position and is located separate from both the flight deck and passenger cabin in an area that is temperature-controlled, allows the crewmember to control light, and provides isolation from noise and disturbance.

(2) Class 2 rest facility means a seat in an aircraft cabin that allows for a flat or near flat sleeping position; is separated from passengers by a minimum of a curtain to provide darkness and some sound mitigation; and is reasonably free from disturbance by passengers or crewmembers.

(3) Class 3 rest facility means a seat in an aircraft cabin or flight deck that reclines at least 40 degrees and provides leg and foot support.

Rest period means a continuous period determined prospectively during which the crewmember is free from all restraint by the certificate holder, including freedom from present responsibility for work should the occasion arise.

Scheduled means times assigned by a certificate holder when a crewmember is required to report for duty.

Schedule reliability means the accuracy of the length of a scheduled flight duty period as compared to the actual flight duty period.

Short-call reserve means a period of time in which a crewmember does not receive a required rest period following notification by the certificate holder to report for a flight duty period.

Split duty means a flight duty period that has a scheduled break in duty that is less than a required rest period.

Suitable accommodation means a temperature-controlled facility with sound mitigation that provides a crewmember with the ability to sleep in a bed and to control light.

Theater means a geographical area where local time at the crewmember’s flight duty period departure point and arrival point differ by no more than 4 hours.

Unforeseen operational circumstance means an unplanned event beyond the control of a certificate holder of insufficient duration to allow for adjustments to schedules, including unforecast weather, equipment malfunction, or air traffic delay.

Window of circadian low means a period of maximum sleepiness that occurs between 0200 and 0559 during a physiological night.

§ 117.5 Fitness for duty.

(a) Each flightcrew member must report for any flight duty period rested and prepared to perform his or her assigned duties.

(b) No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may accept assignment to a flight duty period if the flightcrew member has reported for a flight duty period too fatigued to safely perform his or her assigned duties or if the certificate holder believes that the flightcrew member is too fatigued to safely perform his or her assigned duties.

(c) No certificate holder may permit a flightcrew member to continue a flight duty period if the flightcrew member has reported himself too fatigued to continue the assigned flight duty period.

(d) Any person who suspects a flightcrew member of being too fatigued to perform his or her duties during flight must immediately report that information to the certificate holder.

(e) Once notified of possible flightcrew member fatigue, the certificate holder must evaluate the flightcrew member for fitness for duty. The evaluation must be conducted by a person trained in accordance with § 117.11 and must be completed before the flightcrew member begins or continues an FDP.

(f) As part of the dispatch or flight release, as applicable, each flightcrew member must affirmatively state he or she is fit for duty prior to commencing flight.

g) Each certificate holder must develop and implement an internal evaluation and audit program approved by the Administrator that will monitor whether flightcrew members are reporting for FDPs fit for duty and correct any deficiencies.

§ 117.7 Fatigue risk management system.

(a) No certificate holder may exceed any provision of this part unless approved by the FAA under a Fatigue Risk Management System that provides at least an equivalent level of protection against fatigue-related accidents or incidents as the other provisions of this part.

(b) The Fatigue Risk Management System must include:

(1) A fatigue risk management policy.

(2) An education and awareness training program.

(3) A fatigue reporting system.

(4) A system for monitoring flightcrew fatigue.

(5) An incident reporting process.

(6) A performance evaluation.

(c) Whenever the Administrator finds that revisions are necessary for the continued adequacy of an FRMS that has been granted final approval, the certificate holder must, after notification, make any changes in the program deemed necessary by the Administrator.

§ 117.9 Schedule reliability.

(a) Each certificate holder must adjust within 60 days —

(1) Its system-wide flight duty periods if the total actual flight duty periods exceed the scheduled flight duty periods more than 5 percent of the time, and

(2) Any scheduled flight duty period that is shown to actually exceed the schedule 20 percent of the time.

(b) Each certificate holder must submit a report detailing the scheduling reliability adjustments required in paragraph (a) of this section to the FAA every two months detailing both overall schedule reliability and pairing-specific reliability.

Submissions must consist of:

(1) The carrier’s entire crew pairing schedule for the previous 2-month period, including the total anticipated length of each set of crew pairings and the regulatory limit on such pairings;

(2) The actual length of each set of crew pairings, and

(3) The percentage of discrepancy between the two data sets on both a cumulative, and a pairing-specific basis.

§ 117.11 Fatigue education and training program.

(a) Each certificate holder must develop and implement an education and training program, approved by the Administrator, applicable to all employees of the certificate holder responsible for administering the provisions of this rule including flightcrew members, dispatchers, individuals involved in the scheduling of flightcrew members, individuals involved in operational control, and any employee providing management oversight of those areas.

(b)(1) Initial training for all individuals listed in paragraph (a) of this section must consist of at least 5 programmed hours of instruction in the subjects listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.

(2) Recurrent training for all individuals listed in paragraph (a) of this section must be given on an annual basis and must consist of 2 programmed hours of instruction in the subjects listed in paragraph (b)(3) of this section.

(3) The fatigue education and training program must include information on—

(i) FAA regulatory requirements for flight, duty and rest and NTSB recommendations on fatigue management.

(ii) Basics of fatigue, including sleep fundamentals and circadian rhythms.

(iii) Causes of fatigue, including possible medical conditions.

(iv) Effect of fatigue on performance.

(v) Fatigue countermeasures.

(vi) Fatigue prevention and mitigation.

(vii) Influence of lifestyle, including nutrition, exercise, and family life, on fatigue.

(viii) Familiarity with sleep disorders and their possible treatments.

(ix) Responsible commuting.

(x) Flightcrew member responsibility for ensuring adequate rest and fitness for duty.

(xi) Operating through and within multiple time zones.

(c) Whenever the Administrator finds that revisions are necessary for the continued adequacy of a fatigue education and training program that has been granted final approval, the certificate holder must, after notification, make any changes in the program that are deemed necessary by the Administrator.

§ 117.13 Flight time limitation.

No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment or continue an assigned flight duty period if the total flight time:

(a) Will exceed the limits specified in Table A of this part if the operation is conducted with the minimum required flightcrew.

(b) Will exceed 16 hours if the operation is conducted with an augmented flightcrew.

§ 117.15 Flight duty period: Un-augmented operations.

(a) Except as provided for in § 117.17, no certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment for an unaugmented flight operation if the scheduled flight duty period will exceed the limits in Table B of this part.

(b) If the flightcrew member is not acclimated:

(1) The maximum flight duty period in Table B of this part is reduced by 30 minutes.

(2) The applicable flight duty period is based on the local time at the flightcrew member’s home base.

(c) In the event unforeseen circumstances arise:

(1) The pilot in command and certificate holder may extend a flight duty period up to 2 hours.

(2) An extension in the flight duty period exceeding 30 minutes may occur only once in any 168 consecutive hour period, and never on consecutive days.

§ 117.17 Flight duty period: Split duty.

For a split duty period, a certificate holder may extend and a flightcrew member may accept a flight duty period up to 50 percent of time that the flightcrew member spent in a suitable accommodation up to a maximum flight duty period of 12 hours provided the flightcrew member is given a minimum opportunity to rest in a suitable accommodation of 4 hours, measured from the time the flightcrew member reaches the rest facility.

§ 117.19 Flight duty period: Augmented flightcrew.

The flight duty period limits in § 117.15 may be extended by augmenting the flightcrew.

(a) For flight operations conducted with an acclimated augmented flightcrew,

no certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment if the scheduled flight duty period will exceed the limits specified in Table C of this part.

(b) If the flightcrew member is not acclimated:

(1) The maximum flight duty period in Table C of this part is reduced by 30 minutes.

(2) The applicable flight duty period is based on the local time at the flightcrew member’s home base.

(c) No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment under this section unless during the flight duty period:

(1) Two consecutive hours are available for in-flight rest for the flightcrew member manipulating the controls during landing;

(2) A ninety minute consecutive period is available for in-flight rest for each flightcrew member; and

(3) The last flight segment provides an opportunity for in-flight rest in accordance with paragraph (c)(1) of this section.

(d) No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment involving more than three flight segments under this section unless the certificate holder has an approved fatigue risk management system under § 117.7.

(e) At all times during flight, at least one flightcrew member with a PIC typerating must be alert and on the flight deck.

(f) In the event unforeseen circumstances arise:

(1) The pilot in command and certificate holder may extend a flight duty period up to 3 hours.

(2) An extension in the flight duty period exceeding 30 minutes may occur only once in any 168 consecutive hour period.

§ 117.21 Reserve status.

(a) Unless specifically designated otherwise by the certificate holder, all reserve is considered long-call reserve.

(b) For airport/standby reserve, all time spent in a reserve status is part of the flightcrew member’s flight duty period.

(c) For short call reserve,

(1) All time within the reserve availability period is duty.

(2) The reserve availability period may not exceed 14 hours.

(3) No certificate holder may schedule and no reserve flightcrew member on short call reserve may accept an assignment of a flight duty period that begins before the flightcrew member’s next reserve availability period unless the flightcrew member is given at least 14 hours rest.

(4) The maximum reserve duty period for un-augmented operations is the lesser of –

(i) 16 hours, as measured from the beginning of the reserve availability period;

(ii) The assigned flight duty period, as measured from the start of the flight duty period; or

(iii) The flight duty period in Table B of this part plus 4 hours, as measured from the beginning of the reserve availability period.

(iv) If all or a portion of a reserve flightcrew member’s reserve availability period

falls between 0000 and 0600, the certificate holder may increase the maximum reserve duty period in paragraph (c)(4)(iii) of this section by one-half of the length of the time during the reserve availability period in which the certificate holder did not contact the flightcrew member, not to exceed 3 hours.

(5) The maximum reserve duty period for augmented operations is the lesser of –

(i) The assigned flight duty period, as measured from the start of the flight duty period; or

(ii) The flight duty period in Table C of this part plus 4 hours, as measured from the beginning of the reserve availability period.

(iii) If all or a portion of a reserve flightcrew member’s reserve availability

period falls between 0000 and 0600, the certificate holder may increase the maximum reserve duty period in paragraph (c)(5)(ii) of this section by one-half of the length of the time during the reserve availability period in which the certificate holder did not contact the flightcrew member, not to exceed 3 hours.

(d) For long call reserve,

(1) The period of time that the flightcrew member is in a reserve status does not count as duty.

(2) If a certificate holder contacts a flightcrew member to assign him or her to a flight duty period or a short call reserve, the flightcrew member must receive the required rest period specified in § 117.25 prior to reporting for the flight duty period or commencing the short call reserve duty.

(3) If a certificate holder contacts a flightcrew member to assign him or her to a flight duty period that will begin before and operate into the flightcrew member’s window of circadian low, the flightcrew member must receive a 12 hour notice of report time from the air carrier.

(e) An air carrier may shift a reserve flightcrew member’s reserve availability period under the following conditions:

(1) A shift to a later reserve availability period may not exceed 12 hours.

(2) A shift to an earlier reserve availability period may not exceed 5 hours, unless the shift is into the flightcrew member’s window of circadian low, in which case the shift may not exceed 3 hours.

(3) A shift to an earlier reserve period may not occur on any consecutive calendar days.

(4) The total shifts in a reserve availability period in paragraphs (e)(1)

through (e)(3) of this section may not exceed a total of 12 hours in any 168 consecutive hours.

§ 117.23 Cumulative duty limitations.

(a) The limitations of this section on flightcrew members apply to all commercial flying by the flightcrew member during the applicable periods.

(b) No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment if the flightcrew member’s total flight time will exceed the following:

(1) 100 hours in any 28 consecutive calendar day period and

(2) 1,000 hours in any 365 consecutive calendar day period.

(c) No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment if the flightcrew member’s total Flight Duty Period will exceed:

(1) 60 flight duty period hours in any 168 consecutive hours and

(2) 190 flight duty period hours in any 672 consecutive hours.

(d) Except as provided for in paragraph (d)(3) of this section, no certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may accept an assignment if the flightcrew member’s total duty period will exceed:

(1) 65 duty hours in any 168 consecutive hours and

(2) 200 duty hours in any 672 consecutive hours.

(3) If a flightcrew member is assigned to short-call reserve or a certificate holder transports a flightcrew member in deadhead transportation in, at a minimum, a seat in aircraft cabin that allows for a flat or near flat sleeping position, the total duty period may not exceed:

(i) 75 duty hours in any 168 consecutive hours and

(ii) 215 duty hours in any 672 consecutive hours.

(4) Extension of the duty period under paragraph (d)(3) of this section is limited to the amount of time spent on short-call reserve or in deadhead transportation.

§ 117.25 Rest period.

(a) No certificate holder may assign and no flightcrew member may accept assignment to any reserve or duty with the certificate holder during any required rest period.

(b) Before beginning any reserve or flight duty period, a flightcrew member must be given at least 30 consecutive hours free from all duty in any 168 consecutive hour period, except that:

(1) If a flightcrew member crosses more than four time zones during a series of flight duty periods that exceed 168 consecutive hours, the flightcrew member must be given a minimum of three physiological nights rest upon return to home base.

(2) A flightcrew member operating in a new theater must receive 36 hours of consecutive rest in any 168 consecutive hour period.

(c) No certificate holder may reduce a rest period more than once in any 168 consecutive hour period.

(d) No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may accept

an assignment for reserve or a flight duty period unless the flightcrew member is given a rest period of at least 9 consecutive hours before beginning the reserve or flight duty period measured from the time the flightcrew member reaches the hotel or other suitable accommodation.

(e) In the event of unforeseen circumstances, the pilot in command and certificate holder may reduce the 9 consecutive hour rest period in paragraph (d) of this section to 8 consecutive hours.

§ 117.27 Consecutive nighttime operations.

No certificate holder may schedule and no flightcrew member may accept more than three consecutive nighttime flight duty periods unless the certificate holder provides an opportunity to rest during the flight duty period in accordance with § 117.17.

§ 117.29 Deadhead transportation.

(a) All time spent in deadhead transportation is considered part of a duty period.

(b) Time spent in deadhead transportation is considered part of a flight duty period if it occurs before a flight segment without an intervening required rest period.

(c) Time spent entirely in deadhead transportation during a duty period may not exceed the flight duty period in Table B of this part for the applicable time of start plus 2 hours unless the flightcrew member is given a rest period equal to the length of the deadhead transportation but not less than the required rest in § 117.25 upon completion of such transportation.

§117.31 Operations into unsafe areas.

(a) This section applies to operations that cannot otherwise be conducted under this part because of unique circumstances that could prevent flightcrew members from being relieved by another crew or safely provided with the rest required under § 117.25 at the end of the applicable flight duty period.

(b) A certificate holder may exceed the maximum applicable flight duty periods to the extent necessary to allow the flightcrew to fly to a destination where they can safely be relieved from duty by another flightcrew or can receive the requisite amount of rest prior to commencing their next flight duty period.

(c) The flightcrew shall be given a rest period immediately after reaching the destination described in paragraph (b) of this section equal to the length of the actual flight duty period or 24 hours, whichever is less.

(d) No extension of the cumulative fatigue limitations in § 117.3 is permitted.

(e) If the operation was conducted under contract with an agency or department of the United States Government, each affected air carrier must submit a report every 60 days detailing the –

(1) Number of times in the reporting period it relied on this section to conduct its operations.

(2) For each occurrence,

(i) The reasons for exceeding the applicable flight duty period;

(ii) The extent to which the applicable flight duty period was exceeded; and

(iii) The reason the operation could not be completed consistent with the requirements of this part.

(f) If the operation was not conducted under contract with an agency or

Department of the United States Government, each affected air carrier must submit a report within 14 days of each occurrence detailing –

(1) The reasons for exceeding the applicable flight duty period;

(2) The extent to which the applicable flight duty period was exceeded; and

(3) The reason the operation could not be completed consistent with the requirements of this part.

(g) Should the Administrator determine that a certificate holder is relying on the
provisions on this section, the Administrator may require the certificate holder to develop and implement a fatigue risk management system.

Computer Virus Suspiciously Influenced Spanair MD-82 Flight JK5022 Crash on AGO 20, 2008

Veja um curto video do acidente

 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=CLsXFFzHMIA&feature=player_embedded

SUSPECT AND REALITY

Suspeita e Realidade

PORTUGUÊS ENGLISH

Dois anos atrás, um avião MD-82 da Spanair acidentou-se na decolagem em Madrid, matando 154 pessoas e marcou como a pior tragédia aérea da Espanha em 25 anos.

No dia 20 AGO 2008, a aeronave McDonnell Douglas DC-9-82 (MD-82), matrícula EC-HFP, operada pela companhia Spanair, aterrisou no aeroporto de Madrid-Barajas às 10:23 horas procedente de Barcelona, completando o primeiro voo previsto para esse dia. O avião estava programado para realizar depois o trajeto entre Madrid e Las Palmas com a mesma tripulação de voo da etapa anterior. Na hora estimada de saída era 13:00 horas.Agora, um código malicioso infectando um computador do departamento de manutenção foi envolvido no acidente do avião.

Quando a aeronave se encontrava na cabeceira da pista, pronta para iniciar a decolagem, a tripulação comunicou ao Controle de Tráfego Aéreo (TWR), que tinha um problema e devia regressar à plataforma de embarque. Os pilotos haviam detectado uma indicação ALTA anormalmente da temperatura da sonda RAT (Ram Air Temperatura probe) e o avião retornou ao estacionamento para tratar de resolver o problema. Após a intervenção dos serviços de manutenção sobre o avião, a companhia se propôs e foi aceito nodespacho do voo do avião.


Às14:00 horas a aeronave foi outra vez autorizada para a taxiar. Às 14:23 horas o avião estava situado na cabeceira da pista 36L e foi autorizado a decolar novamente. Foi iniciada a corrida de deoclagem e imediatamente depois de sair do solo, o avião desceu até colidir com o terreno.


A aeronave acabou destruída em consequência dos impactos com o solo e o posterior incêndio.


A investigação tem determinado que a decolagem se realizou com uma configuração inapropriada e não aprovada, por estar os FLAPS e os SLATS totalmente retraídos.


O sistema de advertência de configuração inadequada para a a decolagem (TOWS = Take-Off warning System) com o qual estava equipada a aeronave, não se ativou.

SUPOSIÇÕES

Para ser claro, o código não foi voado nos próprios sistemas da aeronave e não causou o acidente. Este acidente especifico poderia ter sido evitado independente da existência de virus de computador, mas a descoberta do código malicioso introduzido num sistema em terra, operado pelo departamento de manutenção da empresa aérea, sugere certas possibilidades negativas.

Um possível cenário é que, o código tornou lento um programa, o qual se apropriadamente mantido, teria sinalizado a aeronave para [receber] manutenção e não permitido a decolagem por causa de uma série de problemas menores já mencionados com o avião, os quais foram uma porção de qualificadores.

Mas o fato é que o sistema estava infectado e a aeronave não foi sinalizada  para voo [AOG = aircraft on ground], neste caso fechou-se uma porta sobre uma oportunidade de salvar o voo. Também sugere a urgência de manutenção apropriada de computador em todas partes do sistema inteiro, de empresa aérea, para assegurar segurança do voo.como indisponível

O jato da Spanair, segundo rumores, tinha recebido [registrado] dois problemas de manutenção no dia antes do acidente e então abortou a decolagem exato antes da corrida de decolagem fatal devido a uma sensor defeituoso.

A tarefa deste computador [do departamento de manutenção] é supervisionar a condição técnica de fragmentos em peças da frota aérea. Tão logo que os problemas técnicos surjam de modo similar, três vezes consecutivas, o sistema causa um alerta, para os pilotos do avião em questão.

O sistema de rastreamento de manutenção usado pela empresa aérea poderia ter emitido um alerta baseado naquelas três anomalias e impedido a tentativa da próxima decolagem. Mas relatórios de midia da Espanha dizem que levou 24 horas totais para a última anomalia entrar (upload) no sistema [da aeronave]. É possível que o atraso foi causado em parte pela influência do vírus. Nenhum julgamento deve ser passado até a entidade de investigação oficial publicar seu relatório final. O que nós sabemos é que após a decolagem abortada, a tripulação taxiou a aeronave para uma outra tentativa e tentou uma segunda decolagem enquanto os SLATS [veja imagens no texto em inglês] da aeronave ficaram inapropriadamente ajustados.

A tripulação não notou o erro e parece que nenhum dos avisos de cockpit soaram para torná-los atentos.

O acidente correu às 14:24 do dia 20 AGO 2008, quando a aeronave partia para um destino de lazer nas Ilhas Canárias, Las Palmas da Grande Canárias.

Esse voo, JK5022, era um voo compartilhado com o voo 255 da Lufhansa.

O NTSB americano relatou numa investigação preliminar que o avião tinha decolado com seus FLAPS e SLATS retraidos - e que nenhum alerta sonoro tinha sido ouvido para avisar isto, porque os sistemas expedindo energia ao sistema de alertas de decolagem, falharam.

O virus no computador da [empresa] Spanair foi identificado como um tipo de "Cavalo de Tróia". Ele pode ter entrado no sistema da empresa aérea de várias maneiras.

Algumas das mais prováveis maneiras são através de dispositivos de terceiros, tais como PEN drives, os quais foram responsáveis pela infecção por virus na Estação Espacial Internacional - ISS em 2008, ou através de uma conecção VPN remota que não pode ter a mesma proteção como um computador dentro da rede da empresa. Abrindo um maliciouso arquivo num computador simples, é tudo que ele necessita para infectar um sistema inteiro.

A REALIDADE

OPERAÇÃO DOS FLAPS/SLATS

Os SLATS operam conjuntamente com os FLAPS e têm 3 posições, as quais dependem da posição selecionada na alavanca de FLAPS:

- Retraídos
- Extensão Média
- Extensão Total


Assim, com a alvanca de FLAPS/SLATS na posição UP/RET, os SLATS se encontram retraídos.


Se a alavanca de FLAPS/SLATS estiver numa posição menor que 14º, os SLATS se estendem até uma posição média e com a alavanca de FLAPS/SLATS em posições superiores a 14º, os SLATS se estendem totalmente.

O controle dos SLATS é mecânico para as posições de FLAP compreendidas entre 0º e 13º. E é eletromecânico entre 15º e 40º das posições dos FLAPS, a qual corresponde à extensão total dos SLATS.

Uma das condições do projeto, estabelecida na instalação do gravador de dados de voo - DFDR neste avião, é que a gravação se ponha em funcionamento  ao ser liberado o Freio de Estacionamento [Parking brake] e que seja interrompida a gravação ao aplicá-lo.


PRIMEIRA TENTATIVA DE DECOLAGEM
13:13:57 o gravador de registro de dados de voo (DFDR) começou a registrar os dados. A temperatura da sonda RAT é de 56ºC e sobe até 104ºC. Os FLAPS indicam uma deflexão de 11º.


13:25:23 foi recebida a autorização para decolar.


13:26:27 a tripulação informou ao ATC que tinha um problema e que devia abandonar a pista.


13:29:00 a gravação da DFDR é interrompida. [aplicação do Parking Brake]


13:33:12 a tripulação informa ao ATC que deve regressar à plataforma de embarque.


13:33:47 a gravação da DFDR é reiniciada. [Parking Brake solto]


13:42:50 a gravação volta a ser interrompida. [aplicação do Parking Brake]
O parâmetro de deflexão de FLAPS permaneceu nos 11º em todo o período de tempo. A temperatura da sonda RAT continuou em 104ºC.


AERONAVE ESTACIONADA PARA REPAROS
13:51:22 inicou a gravação no Gravador de Voz - CVR.


13:57:47 o co-piloto inicia uma conversação telefônica pelo seu telefone celular, dizendo que ainda estão em Madrid e que se atrasará e fala com sua interlocutora que, há necessidade de trocar a aeronave, na qual estão.


14:02:36 o comandante disse que ia descer do avião para reabastecimento de combustível e solicita que avisem os passageiros.

APÓS O REABASTECIMENTO
SEGUNDA TENTATIVA DE DECOLAGEM
14:07:02 o Co-piloto solicita autorização ao ATC para taxiar, mas ele utiliza o canal de frequência de Táxi em vez de usar a frequência de Autorizações. Depois de sintonizar a frequência correta, recebem a Autorização do ATC às 14:08:08 horas.


14:08:43 a tripulação inicia o primeiro "checklist" antes da partida dos motores. PRESTART "below the line".


14:08:50  realizam o segundo "Checklist" BEFORE START. O Comandante se adianta e conteja alguns dos itens do "checklist" antes que o co-piloto os leia.


14:09:01 é inicada a partida dos motores e durante esse processo a tripulação discute sobre, se realizarão ou não uma decolagem manual.


14:12:08 é iniciado o "checklist" AFTER START (lista de verificação após Partida dos Motores).


Antes de ler o último ítem, FLAPS/SLATS, o Comandante interrompe o Co-piloto e solicita que seja pedida a Autorização para Taxiar. E enquanto esperam a autorização para taxiar, eles calculam a EPR e é ouvida a taxa de potência a ser aplicada nos motores,  1.95. Voltam a falar, se vão fazer uma decolagem manual ou com AUTO THROTTLE. [Potência Automática].


AFTER START 'checklist'São 8 itens e o último trata do "TAKE OFF BRIEFING", no qual o Comandante combina com o Co-piloto como será a decolagem e caso haja pane durante a corrida de decolagem, quais as providências a serem tomadas. Neste 'briefing' são comentadas novamente as velocidades críticas da decolagem, a configuração dos FLAPS para decolagem e outros.

O último ítem deste 'checklist' é o de número 9, no qual se encontra a seleção de FLAPS/SLATS. A resposta para este ítem é "SET and CHECKED". Na descrição deste ítem é detalhada no 'checklist' expandido, no qual aparece um aviso específico informando que o acionamento dos FLAPS só deve ser feito quando for recebido o sinal com as mãos feito pelo mecânico em terra (assistente de pista), de que a área debaixo dos FLAPS está livre [de vaículos e pessoas].
É um ítem que é realizado pelo Co-piloto selecionando a deflexão dos FLAPS que se tenha obtido previamente nos cálculos de performance de decolagem. Ambos pilotos devem verificar se a sequência de luzes de indicação dos SLATS está correta.
Este ítem só é executado mediante a solicitação do Comandante, uma vez que ele é quem recebe o sinal do mecânico assistente de pista.
Esse mecânico rotineiramente manuseia trator e outros veículos debaixo do nariz da aeronave e ao término de suas funções, ele deve sair debaixo do nariz do avião e afastar-se o suficiente para trás lateralmente, de modo que o Comandante dentro da cockpit, o veja nitidamente pela janela esquerda e assim possa ver a sinalização do mecânico, informando que a área está livre abaixo dos FLAPS e em volta da aeronave para que também seja dada a partida dos motores.
Após a partida do motores, e o Comandante ter recebido o sinal de 'área livre', ele deve solicitar ao Co-piloto o ajuste de FLAPS/SLATS.

TAXI 'checklist'
14:14:23 o Comandante pergunta ao ATC a previsão da demora.


14:14:33 é reiniciada a gravação da DFDR. [Parking Brake solto]
Desde o início do Táxi, o parâmetro na DFDR da deflexão de FLAPS indicou ZERO. Este valor se mantém até o final da gravação.

O horário nos gráficos da DFDR é LOCAL, ou seja, UTC -2.

14:16:39 receberam uma comunicação do ATC informando que eles trocassem de frequência no rádio.


14:19:00 a aeronave se encontrava na taxiway R-5 e o ATC solicitou que os pilotos se comunicassem com a frequência de decolagem.

14:21:05 foram autorizados a entrar na pista e manter a posição.


14:22:06 foram ouvidos na cabine, o sinal da comissária de voo de que a cabine de passageiros se encontrava preparada para a decolagem. O Co-piloto iniciou o "checklist" de DECOLAGEM IMEDIATA (Take Off Inminent). Neste momento a aeronave estava taxiando pela taxiway Z-2 e realizando uma curva à direita. O Co-piloto leu todos os itens do "checklist" [Take Off Inminente] e o Comandante cotejou.


14:23:09 a aeronave foi autorizada a decolar e o Comandante cotejou a autorização.

LEMBRETE 1:
O último ítem do 'checklist' AFTER START, o qual é FLAPS/SLATS, foi pulado quando o Comandante interrompeu o Co-piloto.

LEMBRETE 2:

O checklist ao ser interrompido, deve ser reassumido no item da interrupção. Nas aeronaves com 'glass cockpit', o ítem NÃO VERIFICADO ou pulado, ficará na cor azul e antes de iniciar a corrida de decolagem, deverá ser certificada a ausência total de itens em azul. [alguns sistemas pode variar a cor, porém em termos oftalmológicos a cor CYAN em fundo negro chama mais a atenção dos pilotos]

14:23:10 foi iniciado o movimento das alavancas [manetes] de potência dos motores. [aceleração]

14:23:19 os freios foram soltos.

14:23:29 a EPR alcançou o valor de 1.4.

14:23:31 a tripulação comentou que não funcionava o sistema de AUTO THROTTLE (potência automática) e tinham que fazer uma decolagem manual.

14:23:40 a EPR atingiu 1.95.

Durante a corrida de decolagem foram ouvido os anúncios em voz alta [call outs]:

'sixty', 'one hundred', 'V1', 'power check' e 'rotate'. No momento que se ouve 'V1', a velocidade gravada no DFDR era de 154 Knots e ao se ouvir,  'rotate', a velocidade gravada foi de 157 Knots.

14:24:10 o gravador DFDR registrou a mudança do sinal de modo terra para o modo voo, procedente do sistema GPWS. [é quando o avião eleva-se no ar e o peso dele sobre as pernas do trem de pouso é anulado, o switch nas pernas do trem de pouso abre as lâminas do contato elétrico]

Durante toda a corrida de decolagem e até o final da gravação no gravador de voz - CVR, não foi registrado nenhum som relacionado com o sistema de alerta de configuração inadequada para a decolagem. [TOWS = Take Off Warning System].

14:24:14  a coluna de controle [manche] do sistema de aviso de perda de sustentação se ativou [Stall Warning Stick Shaker].

O Co-piloto disse: "falha de motor?" [sic] em tom interrogativo.

14:24:15 o Comandante, perguntou em tom de voz muito alto, 'como se cancela a voz?'. E nesse momento a velocidade era de 168 Knots e o Rádio altímetro indicava 25 pés positivos, o ângulo do pitch era de 15.5º e um ângulo de inglinação lateral de 4.4º à direita. A inclinação lateral aumentou até um máximo de 20º. Neste momento foi produzida uma variação da posição das manetes de potência de uns 4º(a manete esquerda) e 32º a manete(lever) direita, com a intenção de diminuir a potência, durante um segundo. Como consequência a EPR reduziu por 2 segundos, depois para um valor de 1.65 em ambos motores. Imediatamente as manetes de potência foram movidas até suas posições todas à frente, alcançando os valores em torno de 2.15. Estes valores se mantiveram constantes até o final.

14:24:19 foi alcançado o valor máximo de pitch 18.3º (ângulo) e o Rádio altímetro acusava 40 pés.

14:24:24 se ouviu o primeiro impacto contra o terreno, o qual alcançou uma aceleração de 3.17 G.

ENGLISH

Computer Virus Linked (Loosely) To Airline Crash

Two years ago, a Spanair MD-82 crashed on takeoff at Madrid, killing 154 people and marking Spain's worst air tragedy in 25 years.
Now, malicious code infecting a maintenance department computer has been implicated in the crash.
To be clear, the code was not flown on the aircraft's own systems and did not cause the crash. This specific crash could have been avoided regardless of the malware's existence.

But the discovery of malicious code introduced into an on-ground system operated by the airline's maintenance department does suggests certain negative possibilities.

One possible scenario is that the code slowed a program which, if properly maintained, would have flagged the aircraft for service and disallowed the takeoff because of a series of smaller problems already noted with the plane. That's a lot of qualifiers.

But the fact that the system was infected and didn't flag the aircraft in this case closed one door on an opportunity to save the flight. It also suggests the urgency of proper computer maintenance throughout the entire airline system to assure safety of flight.

The Spanair jet reportedly had hosted two maintenance problems on the day prior to the crash and then aborted a takeoff just prior to the fatal takeoff run due to a faulty sensor.

The task of this maintenance computer is it to supervise the technical condition of splinter airs airplane fleet. As soon as a technical of problems arises in similar way three times in succession, the system is to cause a warning for pilots of the questionable airplane.

A maintenance tracking system used by the airline could have issued an alert based on those three anomalies and prevented the next takeoff attempt. But Spanish media reports say it took a full 24 hours for the last anomaly to enter the system. It is possible that delay was caused in part by the influence of bad code. No judgment should be passed until investigative bodies publish their final report. What we do know is that after the aborted takeoff, the crew taxied the aircraft for another attempt and attempted a second takeoff while the aircraft's SLATS were improperly set.

SLATS as seen in the pictures for another aircraft type

The crew didn't notice the error and it seems no cockpit warnings sounded to make them aware.

The accident occurred at 2:24 p.m. as the aircraft departed for a leisure destination in the Canary Islands, Las Palmas de Gran Canarias.

That the flight, JK5022, was a codeshare with Lufthansa flight 255.

The U.S. National Transportation Safety Board reported in a preliminary investigation that the plane had taken off with its flaps and slats retracted - and that no audible alarm had been heard to warn of this because the systems delivering power to the take-off warning system failed. Two earlier events had not been reported by the automated system.

The malware on the Spanair computer has been identified as a type of Trojan horse. It could have entered the airline's system in a number of ways.

Some of the most likely ways are through third party devices such as USB sticks, Yaneeza said, which were responsible for the International Space Station virus infection in 2008, or through a remote VPN connection that may not have the same protection as a computer within the enterprise network. Opening just one malicious file on a single computer is all it takes to infect an entire system.