Pilots - Your MEDICAL Information - Security and Privacy - Are at Risk

A Transportation Department Inspector General (IG) report dated June 18 found "serious security lapses" in systems that the FAA uses to store pilots' personal information, including medical data. Information collected from roughly 465,000 current medical certifications is just the tip of the iceberg. The IG says the FAA's Internet-accessible Medical Support System (MSS) holds records for more than three million airmen, past and present. The IG listed names, addresses, Social Security numbers and other "personally identifiable information" as information "not properly secured." According to the report, the system's vulnerabilities allow for the "potential falsification of medical certificates," and more. "Failure to encrypt sensitive personal identifiable information and control remote access to MSS," says the report, "places airmen at unnecessary risk of identity theft, jeopardizes the integrity of the medical certification process, and increases risks of attacks on departmental networks." The FAA is responding and the IG believes the FAA's current and planned actions will positively address the IG's concerns in most cases.

FAA requires airmen to hold a medical certification of their medical and mental fitness to operate aircraft. 1

This review was requested by the Chairmen of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure and its Subcommittee on Aviation. The objectives of our audit were to (1) determine if airmen’s personally identifiable information (PII) is properly secured from unauthorized use or access, and (2) assess FAA’s progress in establishing mechanisms to identify airmen holding current medical certificates while receiving disability pay. MSS currently stores more than 18 million medical records supporting the medical assessment of over three (3) million airmen. To ensure aviation safety and protect the privacy of airmen, it is critical that this medical information be secure. Also, coordination with other Federal agencies may improve aviation safety by identifying airmen who are receiving disability benefits and may not have disclosed potentially disqualifying medical conditions.

1 A medical certificate must be held when exercising any of the following privileges: airline transport pilot, commercial pilot, private pilot, recreational pilot, flight instructor, flight engineer, flight navigator, or student pilot. Except for a person employed by FAA, a branch of the military services or the Coast Guard, a person acting as an air traffic control tower operator must also hold a medical certificate.

RESULTS IN BRIEF

The names, addresses, Social Security numbers, medical data, and other PII of airmen are not properly secured to prevent unauthorized access and use. We found serious security lapses in FAA’s management of AMEs private medical support staff access to the system. For example, medical examiners’ former staff continued to have access to MSS. At the same time, FAA has not fully implemented security controls required by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Department to protect PII, such as multi-factor user authentication, audit trail reports to detect inappropriate access, and data encryption. In addition, FAA has not ensured secure configuration of MSS computers in accordance with the Department’s baseline standards to reduce the risk of unauthorized access and corruption. Specifically, we found vulnerabilities on MSS computers, such as configuration allowing intruders to install malicious codes on FAA user computers. Inadequate contingency planning also threatens the service continuity of MSS. Combined, these weaknesses make airmen’s PII vulnerable to unauthorized access and use and potential falsification of medical certificates that could lead to unfit airmen being medically certified to fly. During the course of our review, FAA took immediate action to enhance security protection by working with doctors to remove thousands of separated medical staff's access to MSS and retracting millions of PII records from the contractor’s site. However, additional improvements are needed to adequately secure PII data from unauthorized use.

FAA has made limited progress in identifying airmen who receive disability benefits while holding medical certificates. While FAA has a draft matching agreement with the Social Security Administration (SSA) to reconcile data in MSS and SSA’s disability benefits system, it has yet to establish a target date for completing the interface. Further, FAA has yet to coordinate with other benefits providers, such as the Department of Veterans Affairs and the Department of Labor. FAA continues to rely on airmen to disclose potentially disqualifying conditions when applying for medical certificates. FAA recently announced a onetime, limited opportunity for airmen to reveal previously undisclosed depression and use of antidepressant medications without being subject to FAA.

2 This step, however, does not take the place of a comprehensive approach to undisclosed medical conditions. Accordingly, FAA needs to expedite computer matching agreements with disability benefits providers, implement the checks under those agreements, and take appropriate enforcement action where falsifications are found.

To assist FAA, we are making a series of recommendations to strengthen the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of airmen PII and to ensure unqualified airmen do not receive a medical certification enabling them to fly.

BACKGROUND

MSS contains over 18 million medical records on more than 3 million airmen, of which over 465,000 have current medical certifications.3

In 2007, the Inspector General testified before the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure that some airmen failed to disclose to FAA any medically disqualifying information on their applications for medical certificates. Further, some airmen held current medical certificates while simultaneously receiving disability benefits for medically disabling conditions. In addition to medical information, the system contains other sensitive personal information, such as name, address, date of birth, and Social Security number of airmen. MSS is accessible to about 9,000 users, 8,500 of whom are AME––private physicians who function as FAA designees—or their staff, who enter the medical data into the MSS Web site on the Internet. AMEs and their staff have access to all information (including medical data) stored in MSS on airmen examined in their offices. In addition, they can access the name, address, date of birth, and partial Social Security number on all airmen examined by other AMEs and stored in MSS. Almost 300 AMEs reside in 89 foreign countries and conduct exams on airmen seeking to fly in the United States.

2 75 Fed. Reg. 17049 (April 5, 2010). Our testimony suggested that FAA work with the SSA and other disability benefits providers to expeditiously develop and implement a strategy to check for and take appropriate certificate regulatory enforcement action where falsifications are found, and to consider revising its application for the medical certificate to require applicants to explicitly identify whether they are receiving medical disability benefits.


3 FAA’s Civil Aerospace Medical Institute in Oklahoma City processes medical certificate applications in MSS.


4 Falsification of FAA Airman Medical Certificate Applications by Disability Recipients (CC-2007-063, July 17, 2007). OIG reports and testimony can be found on our Web page: www.oig.dot.gov.

SENSITIVE AIRMAN MEDICAL RECORDS ARE NOT PROPERLY SECURED FROM UNAUTHORIZED USE

DOT policy requires FAA to implement controls for removing medical record access rights when they are no longer required, to ensure user access is derived from a role-based validation process and each user’s level of access is commensurate with a need to know, and to document all users who have access to sensitive data.5

Medical Staff and Contractor Access Continued Despite A Need To Know However, such controls have not been implemented in MSS. At the same time, FAA has not implemented OMB guidance to secure PII in an automated information system or to properly configure MSS production and development computers to reduce the risk of tampering.

In addition, FAA had been sending millions of airman medical records from the MSS database to its contractor’s facilities, a practice that has been in place over the past decade. FAA’s contractor has been using this live data in its system testing procedures, but FAA had not justified the contractor’s need for using millions of live records—or considered the security implications of storing airman

5 DOT Information Technology and Information Assurance Policy Number 2006-22 – October 11, 2006 (revision 1): Implementation of DOT’s Protection of Sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (SPII).

PII at the contractor facility. After we requested documentation of support and approval of the data transference, FAA concluded there was no business need to maintain the data at the contractor’s site. Millions of PII records were purged from the contractor’s site.

The control weaknesses we identified are largely the result of FAA’s failure to provide adequate oversight of the contract by communicating the DOT requirements regarding access controls. Upon learning of these control weaknesses, we notified FAA, which responded in June 2009 (see Appendix A), stating that it had begun implementing corrective actions, such as working with doctors to remove access for separated medical staff. In addition, FAA purged millions of PII records from the contractor’s site. However, the lack of documentation about the application security features such as definitions of users’ ability to access data and perform critical functions continues to weaken FAA’s ability to administer effective security.

Turkish Airlines Flight 1951 B737-800 Accident

Turkish Air Lines Flight TK1951

Clicar no link abaixo para ver o video da animação com audio em inglês.

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zR6YPFIeemE&feature=player_embedded

Transcrição do audio para português:
Atenção! Há inclusão de explicações detalhadas para leigos em aviação.
"Turkish Air Lines Flight TK1951, partiu de Istambul aos 25 minutos após as 8 horas da manhã do dia 25 FEV 2010. Primeiro voo para Armsterdam.


Um quarto de hora após as 10 horas, [10:15], a aeronave entra no espaço aéreo Deutch vindo de Este na aproximação para o aeroporto Schiphol. [Holanda]






Devido a uma falha, o Rádio Altímetro do lado esquerdo, um dos dois a bordo, indicava altitude incorreta de -8 pés. [menos 8 pés, embora a aeronave ainda estivesse passando na altitude de 7900 pés na descida AUTORIZADA para 4000 pés].




Neste caso enquanto a aeronave está descendo para o Nível de Voo 4000 [pés] e subsequentemente para 2000 pés, a altura incorreta no Rádio [Altímetro] causa 5 audíveis alertas completos,   serem ouvidos na cockpit.

Biiiiiiiiiip!

O piloto notou estes alarmas.

Havia 3 pilotos na cockpit: o co-piloto, o qual estava voando a aeronave, está sentado à direita. Ele está recebendo do comandante, também instrutor, treinamento em rota, sentado no assento esquerdo.


O Primeiro Oficial atuando como Safety-Pilot, está sentado no assento do observador, localizado no centro e atrás deles.


A aeronave está agora voando 2000 pés no curso 265 graus como designado pelo Controle de Tráfego Aéreo. O Controle de Tráfego Aéreo determinou uma nova proa, 210 graus, em ordem para interceptar, o que é referido como Localizador antes do pouso na pista 18 da Direita. ***Localizador = projeção eletrônica do Eixo da Pista de pouso



A proa determinada resulta na interceptação do Localizador, 5.5 milhas náuticas antes da cabeceira da pista.


Um alinhamento curto seria esperado para um procedimento normal, o qual alinharia a aeronave no mínimo de 8 milhas náuticas da cabeceira da pista e na Rampa Eletrônica de Planeio. ***Glide Slope = Rampa Eletrônica de Planeio


A consequência foi que, o segmento de aproximação final foi mais curto. Nenhuma autorização para descida adicional para a Rampa Eletrônica de Planeio foi emitida, tal que a Rampa Eletrônica de Planeio para pouso na pista, agora seria interceptada de cima. ***O correto e usual, é a interceptação ser feita por baixo da Rampa.

Ruido característico do abaixamento do Trem de pouso.

Quando a aeronave intercepta o Localizador [ voando acima da rampa], as manetes de potência devem ser fechadas[reduzidas], para permitir a aeronave descer para a Rampa Eletrônica de Planeio [Glide Slope].
Devido à medição rigorosa incorreta pelo Rádio Altímetro esquerdo, o [sistema] AutoThrottle prematuramente muda para o modo de voo RETARD. Este modo é usualmente ativado na fase final durante o voo, em ordem para reduzir a velocidade quando acima da pista de pouso. O efeito imediato, todavia, é o mesmo que quando o sistema está funcionando corretamente. As manetes de potência fecham [são reduzidas para idle].
Interceptação da Rampa Eletrônica de Planeio, [descendo] de cima [dela], mascara a falha de operação do AutoThrottle [sistema automático de aplicação de potência dos motores]. Na altitude de 5000 pés, a Rampa Eletrônica de Planeio é interceptada. Neste ponto, a velocidade da aeronave está ainda acima da velocidade de pouso, 144 Knots. Quando a altitude determinada de 1000 pés for passada, a aeronave e tripulação deve estar totalmente preparada para o pouso de acordo com os procedimentos da companhia Turkish Linhas Aéreas. Isto, todavia, não é o caso. Ruido característico de abaixamento dos Flaps.



A velocidade permanece muito alta e a potência do motor muito baixa. Na posição final dos Flaps, o Pilot-Not-Flying permanece ainda engajado na [leitura] da lista de verificação para pouso [checklist]. Isto pode ter causado a velocidade diminuir no anúncio. O Piloto Automático mantém a aeronave na Rampa Eletrônica de Planeio. Em ordem para gerar suficiente sustentação, o nariz eleva-se muito bem acima do nível normal, o piloto não se conscientiza disto.

Quando a velocidade reduziu para 109 Knots, o Stick Shaker foi ativado.[vibração severa da coluna do manche]. Ruido característico do Stick Shaker atuando. É o som parecido com uma rajada longa e rápida de metralhadora.


Um aviso que a aeronave estava voando muito lentamente, e em risco de perder toda sustentação muito rapidamente. O piloto respondeu a isto,[empurra as manetes de potência para frente], mas inadequadamente [empurrou só parcialmente], [a potência é reduzida novamente], a aeronave sofre o acidente.

Nos segundos finais do Gravador de Dados de Voo [FDR], ele pode ser visto que, logo que o Stick Shaker foi ativado, o co-piloto desliza as manetes de potência totalmente para frente, e empurra a coluna de controle [manche], para baixar o nariz da aeronave. O comandante assumiu o controle, mas o  AutoThrottle não está DESATIVADO, o que significa que ele quase imediatamente  fecha [reduziu] a potência [dos motores] novamente. O AutoThrottle e o Piloto Automático, são então DESATIVADOS. Sete segundos depois, potência total é aplicada, mas neste ponto há insuficiente altura restante para recuperar do STALL [perda total de sustentação]. A aeronave acidenta-se num terreno localizado 1 milha da pista. Devido a posição elevada do nariz, a cauda atinge o solo primeiro, e a aeronave parte-se em 3 pedaços.

Air India Express Flight 812 - Mangalore (VOML) Overran Runway 06 in Dense Fog

Minimum IFR Altitudes



The non-precision instrument approach procedure would still require the establishment of minimum IFR altitudes for each segment of the instrument procedure. These minimum IFR altitudes would provide the pilot with the DO NOT DESCEND BELOW values and would be depicted on the instrument approach procedure chart VERY DIFFERENT to the procedural altitudes. The intent of including these minimum IFR altitudes is to ensure the pilot has the OPTION to be able to utilise these altitudes should the need occur such as in icing conditions. These minimum IFR altitudes shall NOT be coded into the aircraft's navigation database as part of  the coded instrument procedure.

A indústria da aviação tem treinado seus pilotos para voarem nas altitudes PUBLICADAS sem considerarem o fato que estas altitudes "NÃO DESÇA ABAIXO" são somente MÍNIMAS e não MANDATÓRIAS.

O procedimento pode ser bem voado efetivamente em altitudes acima da altitude mínima.

Um piloto privado deve saber que para um ângulo de trajetória vertical de 3.0º(três graus), uma aeronave distante 10 Milhas Náuticas (NM) da cabeceira da pista, DEVE estar pelo menos 3200 pés acima da altitude da pista e 1600 pés acima da altitude da pista quando distante 5 NM. Todos tripulantes de voo, com ou sem um sistema de gerenciamento de voo, pode utilizar esta regra prática simples, embora ela se torne dificil sem alguns meios de informação de distância para a cabeceira da pista de pouso. Qualquer altitude mais baixa que estas altitudes, nestas distâncias, DEVEM levantar uma 'bandeira de alerta' para a tripulação questionar por que o avião está mais baixo do que ele deveria estar.

 



At MAPt. point, Pilot-Flying must turn 09 degrees to the LEFT to runway centerline descending in VISUAL condition only.

MAPt. = Missed Approach Point

 Performing this IFR procedure Pilot-Flying is induced to climb-down to 910 feet

O avião Boeing 737-800, voo IX-812, da companhia Air India Express, tocou a pista de pouso e houve um estrondo, talvez um pneu explodiu. A aeronave em seguida colidiu com uma antena do Sistema de Pouso por Instrumentos - ILS ao passar pelo final da cabeceira oposta da pista. A parte inferior da fuselagem (barriga) abriu-se devido a colisão com a antena do ILS e 8(oito) pessoas foram arremessadas para fora do avião (são os sobreviventes). Em seguida o avião caiu na floresta. Nevoeiro denso na hora do acidente.

Afriqiyah Airways Flight 8U-771 - Visual Night Approach Strategy

Airbus 330-200

STRATEGY FOR VISUAL NIGHT APPROACH

 APPROACH SPEED TECHNIQUE



In all cases, the crew should use managed speed.


The standard speed technique is to make a stabilized approach using AP/FD and A/THR : The aircraft intercepts the final descent path in landing configuration, and at VAPP. For this purpose, the flight crew should insert VAPP as a speed constraint at the FAF.


If the operator adopts a decelerated approach technique and the crew uses managed guidance, the aircraft should intercept the final descent path at S speed in CONF 1.


The objective is to be stabilized on the final descent path thrust above idle, in the landing configuration at 1000 feet.


To be stabilized, all of the following conditions must be achieved prior to, or upon, reaching this stabilization height :


The aircraft is on the correct lateral flight plan,

The aircraft is in the desired landing configuration,


The thrust is stabilized above idle, to maintain the target speed on the desired descent path,

No excessive flight parameter deviation.


If the aircraft is not stabilized on the approach and in landing configuration, at 1000 feet in instrument conditions, or at 500 feet in visual conditions, or as restricted by airline policy/regulations, a go-around must be initiated.


INTERMEDIATE/FINAL APPROACH


This Topic is relevant to the whole fleet


For RNAV approach :


-GPS 1+2 on GPS MONITOR page CHECK BOTH IN NAV


-GPS PRIMARY on PROG page CHECK AVAILABLE


If GPS PRIMARY is not available


-RNP for approach CHECK/ENTER


-HIGH accuracy CHECK


Note: RNAV approach without GPS is subject to a specific operational approval.


For approach in managed vertical guidance:


-APPR pushbutton on FCU PRESS


Once cleared for the approach, press the pushbutton when flying towards the FAF.


Check that APPR NAV is engaged, FINAL is armed, and the VDEV scale is on the PFD.


Note: For instructions for switching from a non ILS to an ILS approach, see the FMGS pilot's guide. (Refer to 4.05.70)


AT GREEN DOT SPEED


-ORDER "FLAPS 1"


-FLAPS 1 SELECT


-CONFIRM/ANNOUNCE "FLAPS 1"


-TCAS Mode Selector TA OR TA/RA


See ILS approach (Refer to 3.03.18)


-ND DISPLAY SELECT RANGE/MODE


AT S SPEED


-ORDER "FLAPS 2"


-FLAPS 2 SELECT


-CONFIRM/ANNOUNCE "FLAPS 2"


WHEN FLAPS ARE AT 2


-ORDER "GEAR DOWN"


-L/G DOWN SELECT


-GROUND SPOILERS ARM


-AUTO BRK AS RQRD


Use of the autobrake is recommended.


The use of MAX mode is not recommended at landing.


On short or contaminated runways, use MED mode.


On long and dry runways, LO mode is recommended.


Note: If, on very long runways, the pilot anticipates that braking will not be needed, autobrake use is unnecessary.


Firmly press the appropriate pushbutton, depending on the runway length and condition, and check that the related ON light comes on.


-CONFIRM/ANNOUNCE "GEAR DOWN"


WHEN LANDING GEAR IS DOWN


-ORDER "FLAPS 3"


-FLAPS 3 SELECT


Select FLAPS 3 below VFE.


-CONFIRM/ANNOUNCE "FLAPS 3"


-ECAM WHEEL page CHECK


The ECAM WHEEL page appears below 800 feet, or at landing gear extension.


Check for three landing gear green indications.


If residual pressure is indicated on the ECAM WHEEL page and/or the triple indicator :


-RESIDUAL BRAKING PROC APPLY


-ORDER "FLAPS FULL"


-FLAPS FULL SELECT


Select FLAPS FULL below VFE. VFE - 15 knots is recommended to minimize flaps wear.


Retract the speedbrakes before selecting FLAPS FULL to avoid an unexpected pitch down when the speedbrakes automatically retract.


-CONFIRM/ANNOUNCE "FLAPS FULL"


Check deceleration towards VAPP.


Check correct TO waypoint on the ND.


-A/THR CHECK IN SPEED MODE OR OFF


-WING ANTI ICE OFF


Switch WING ANTI ICE ON, only in severe icing conditions.


-EXTERIORS LIGHTS SET


Set NOSE switch to TAXI, RWY TURN OFF switch to ON, and LAND switch to ON.


-SLIDING TABLE STOW


-LDG MEMO CHECK NO BLUE LINE


-CABIN REPORT OBTAIN


-CABIN CREW ADVISE


-LANDING CHECKLIST COMPLETE


-FLIGHT PARAMETERS CHECK


PF announces any FMA modification.


PNF calls out:


"SPEED", when the speed goes below Vapp – 5 knots, or goes above the speed target
+ 10 knots.


"SINK RATE", when V/S is greater than – 1000 feet/minute.


"BANK", when the bank angle goes above 7 degrees.


"PITCH", when the pitch attitude goes below 0 degrees, or goes above + 10 degrees.


"COURSE", when greater than 1/2 dot (VOR) or 5 degrees (ADF).


"_ FT HIGH (LOW)" at altitude checkpoints.


AT ENTERED MDA/MDH + 100 FT:


-MONITOR or ANNOUNCE "ONE HUNDRED ABOVE"


AT ENTERED MDA/MDH


-MONITOR or ANNOUNCE "MINIMUM"


If ground references are visible:


-ANNOUNCE "LANDING"


-AP OFF


Continue, as with a visual approach (Refer to 3.03.20).


If ground references are not visible:


-ANNOUNCE "GO AROUND/FLAPS"


Begin a go-around.


Note :
In managed guidance (FINAL APP mode engaged), when the aircraft reaches MDA (MDH) - 50 feet or MAP (whichever occurs first), the autopilot automatically disengages.


In selected guidance, if ground references are not visible when the aircraft reaches MDA, the pilot should make an immediate go-around. However, if the distance to the runway is not properly assessed, a step descent approach may be considered, and a level-off at MDA may be performed while searching for visual references. If the pilot has no visual reference at MAP, at the latest, he must begin a go-around.

Flight into Volcanic Ash - NASA Study

Volcanic Ash Advisory for 17 MAY 2010

ENGLISH  PORTUGUÊS

 On the flight to Sweden, in a moonless and cloudless sky at 0508 GMT on February 28, 2000, scientists onboard the DC-8 monitoring sensitive research instruments reported a sudden increase in measurements that indicated the presence of a volcanic ash cloud. The onboard sensor data is presented in figures below showing measurements of sulfur dioxide (SO2) concentration in parts per trillion by volume (pptv), and figure 7(b) showing aerosol data for the seven-minute encounter. This encounter was more than 200 mi north of the predicted maximum northerly extent of the plume and approximately 800 nmi from the volcano (fig. 6). The volcanic plume was about 35 hr old at this time.

 No voo para Suécia, num céu sem Lua e sem nuvens às 05:08 GMT de 28 FEV 2000, cientistas a bordo da [aeronave] DC-8 monitorando instrumentos de pesquisa de sensibilidade relataram um súbito aumento nas medidas que indicavam a presença de uma nuvem de cinzas vulcânicas. Os dados do sensor a bordo apresentados nas imagens abaixo mostraram medições de concentração de DIÓXIDO DE ENXOFRE (SO2) em partes por trilhão por volume (pptv), e ainda os dados de aerossóis para SETE MINUTOS de encontro. Este encontro foi a mais de 200 milhas ao norte da prevista máxima extensão da contaminação e aproximadamente 800 milhas náuticas do vulcão. A plumagem vulcânica estava cerca de 35 horas envelhecida nesta hora [do encontro].

The flight crew noted no change in cockpit readings, no St. Elmo’s fire, no odor or smoke, and no change in engine instruments. They did notice that no stars were visible, but this is typical of flight through high cirrus clouds.

After seven minutes the crew noticed that the stars had reappeared, and at about this time the scientists reported that the research instrument readings had returned to normal. There was still no change in engine or airplane instrument readings. The DC-8 crew made an airborne encounter report to the appropriate oceanic control agency. This report is documented in VAAC #6 280751.

In this ash encounter, the crew verified that there was no change in engine instruments. As such, they did not reduce engine power nor attempt to exit the cloud. This was because of the complete lack of indication of a volcanic plume, other than the sensitive scientific instruments, and because the crew was not aware of the recommendation to reduce power to idle. In addition, over the polar ocean at night, using visual flight rules in a “Non-Radar Environment,” it was probably not prudent to reduce power and descend even if the crew had been aware of the recommended procedure.

A tripulação do voo não notou mudança nas leituras na cockpit, nenhum fogo-de-santelmo, nenhum cheiro ou fumaça, e nenhuma mudança nos instrumentos de motor. Eles notaram que nenhuma estrela estava visível, mas isto é típico de voo através de nuvens Cirrus altas.

Após SETE MINUTOS a tripulação notou que as estrelas tinham reaparecido, e a cerda desta hora os cientistas relataram que as leituras de instrumentos de pesquisa tinham retornado ao normal. Não houve ainda mudança nas leituras de instrumentos do avião ou de motor. A tripulação do DC-8 fez um relatório do encontro aéreo para a apropriada Agência de Controle Oceânico. Este relatório está documentado na VAAC #280751.

Neste encontro com cinza, a tripulação verificou que não houve mudança nos instrumentos de motor. De modo que, eles NÃO REDUZIRAM a potência de motor nem tentaram sair da nuvem. Isto foi por causa da completa falta de indicação de contaminação vulcânica, alternado com instrumentos científicos de sensíveis e porque a tripulação não estava ciente da recomendação para reduzir a potência para marcha-lenta. Em adição, à noite sobre o oceano polar, usando regras de voo visual [VFR] num "Ambiente Não-Radar", NÃO era provavelmente prudente reduzir a potência e descer mesmo se a tripulação tivesse estado ciente do procedimento recomendado.
 

Volcanic eruptions can eject huge quantities of solid and gaseous material into the atmosphere.

Large, solid material precipitates from the atmosphere near the volcano but small particles (< 15 microns) and gaseous material can be transported to high altitudes and distributed over large distances by atmospheric phenomena.

Volcanic ash particles in the 1–10 micron size range can be found more than 1000 mi from avolcano.

These ash particles typically have a melting point of approximately 1832 °F (1000 °C). Sulfur compounds and other aerosols can be found in ash clouds. At high altitudes, ice may form on ash particles, and electrostatic charges may also be present on ash particles.

Ash ingested by jet engines can lead to an immediate deterioration in engine performance and cause engine flameout. In the case of volcanic ash, the principal cause of engine flameout is the deposition of the ash in the hot sections of the engine. This buildup causes a very rapid increase in burner static pressure and in compressor discharge pressure, which at high altitude can lead to surge and flameout.

Volcanic ash, when heated by the engine combustor section, becomes molten glass that can coat fuel nozzles, the combustor, and turbine. This reduces the efficiency of fuel mixing and restricts air from passing through the engine. This can ultimately cause loss of thrust, surging, and possible flameout. Ash can also seriously erode moving engine parts, including the compressor and turbine blades, reducing engine efficiency. Molten ash can solidify inside cooling passages, clogging the passages and reducing or eliminating cooling airflow, increasing blade and vane operating temperatures, and shortening engine life.

Erupções vulcânicas podem efetar enorme quantidades de material sólido e gasoso na atmosfera. Material sólido grande, precipita da atmosfera perto do vulcão, mas pequenas partículas (menro que 15 micrômetros) e material gasoso podem ser transportados para altas altitudes e distrubuídos sobre distâncias grandes por fenômenos atmosféricos.

Partículas de Cinza vulcânica no alcance de tamanho de 1 a 10 micrômetros podem ser encontradas a mais de 1000 milhas de um vulcão.

Estas partículas de cinza tipicamente têm um ponto de fusão de aproximadamente 1832 ºF (1000 ºC).

Combinação de ENXÔFRE e outros aerossóis podem ser encontrados em nuvens de cinza, Em altas altitudes, gelo pode se formar numa particula de cinza e cargas eletróstáticas podem também estar presentes nas partículas de cinza.

Cinza ingerida por motores à jato pode conduzir a uma deterioração imediata na performance do motor e causar apagamento do motor. No caso de cinza vulcãnica, a principal causa do apagamento do motor é o depósito da cinza na seção quente no motor,

Esta formação causa um muito rápido aumento na PRESSÃO ESTÁTICA DO QUEIMADOR e na pressão de discarga do COMPRESSOR, o qual em ALTA ALTITUDE pode conduzir a uma depressão e apagamento.

Cinza vulcânica, quando aquecida pela seção de combustão do motor, torna-se derretida ao ponto de vidro líquido que pode encobrir os esguichos de combustível, o queimador e turbina. Isto reduz a eficiência de mistura combustível e restringe o ar de passar através do motor. Isto pode por último causar perde de potência, sangria e possivel apagamento. Cinzas podem seriamente corroer partes móveis do motor, incluindo o compressor e aletas da turbina, reduzindo ou eliminando o fluxo de ar de resfriamento, aumentando temperaturas de operação de aleta e guia, e encurtando a vida do motor.

Flight track and time line of the events for the ash encounter. The DC-8 deployment flight began on February 27, 2000, from Edwards, California, to Kiruna, Sweden for a SOLVE study of the Arctic ozone.

On February 26, 2000, at 1830 Greenwich Mean Time (GMT), the Mt. Hekla volcano in Iceland erupted, producing an ash and steam cloud to 45,000 ft and a lava flow.

Conditions noted were:

Altitude 37,000 ft
Mach 0.792
Total temperature –54 °F (– 48 °C)
True airspeed 438 knots

And engine readings:
N1 88– 88.5%
N2 90– 91%
EGT 1165–1200 °F (630– 649 °C)
Fuel flow 2950 lb/hr per engine

Estudo de Voo ao Encontro com Cinzas Vulcânicas



Aeronave: DC-8
Altitude: 37,000 ft
Speed: Mach 0.792
Total temperature: –54 °F (– 48 °C)
True airspeed: 438 knots
LEITURAS DE MOTOR
N1 88– 88.5%
N2 90– 91%
EGT 1165–1200 °F (630– 649 °C)
Fuel flow 2950 lb/hr per engine
Partida: 27 FEB 2000 from Edwards, California
Destino: Kiruna, Suécia
Estudo: Camada de Ozônio Ártico
Erupção do vulcão Monte Hekla na Islândia
Time: 18:30 GMT em 26 FEV 2000
Produziu: cinzas e nuvens até 45.000 pés de altitude e fluxo de lava.

 

MICROFOTOGRAFIAS DOS FILTROS DOS INTERCAMBIADORES DE CALOR

Engine Conditions at Ash Encounter

The engines were being operated in the “long range cruise” mode at the time of the encounter.

In the last figure below estimated temperatures through the engine. Thrust was about 4300 lb per engine, and HPC discharge air (used for HPT cooling) temperature was 779 °F (415 °C). The combustor exit and HPT inlet temperatures were estimated to be well above the 1832 °F (1000 °C) ash melting temperature. The ash would have been expected to melt and fuse to the HPT vanes and blades both outside and on the inner cooling passages. The second- and third-stage LPT temperatures were estimated to be below 900 °F (482 °C), and since those blades are uncooled, no damage would be expected.

Condições dos motores no Encontro com Cinza

Os motores estavam sendo operados no modo "cruzeiro de longo alcance" na hora do encontro.


Na imagem abaixo há os registros de temperaturas estimadas através do motor. A potência estava cerca de 4300 libras por motor e a temperatura do ar de descarga no Compressor de Pressão Alta - HPC (usado para resfriamento da Turbina de Pressão Alta - HPT) era de 779 ºF (415 ºC). A saída de queimador e temperaturas de entrada da Turbina de Pressão Alta foram estimadas estar bem acima dos 1832 ºF (1000 ºC) da temperatura de fusão de cinza.


A cinza teria sido experada derreter e fundir as aletas e lâminas guias da Turbina de Pressão Alta, ambas do lado externo e no interior das passagens de resfriamento. As temperaturas do segundo e terceiro estágios da Turbina de Pressão Alta foram estimadas estar abaixo de 900 ºF (482 ºC), e desde que essas lâminas não são resfriadas, nenhum dano seria esperado.
 

RESULTADOS DE INSPEÇÃO GERAL DO MOTOR

FOR PILOTS
RECOMMENDED PROCEDURE IF VOLCANIC ASH IS ENCOUNTERED

What to do in an Emergency

Unfortunately, it is not always possible to avoid an ash cloud and if a plane does enter one there are very specific steps that the flight crew must take in order to increase the chance of making it out of the dangerous area safely, according to Campbell, 1994:
• Immediately reduce thrust to idle. This will lower EGT, which in turn will reduce buildup on the turbine blades and hot-section components. The volcanic dust can cause rapid erosion and damage to the internal components of the engines.

• Autothrottles off (if engaged). The autothrottles should be turned off to prevent the system from increasing thrust above idle. Due to the reduced surge margins, limit changes with slow and smooth thrust-lever movements.

• Exit volcanic cloud as quickly as possible. Volcanic ash may extend for several hundred miles.
The shortest distance/time out of the dust may require an immediate, descending 180-degree turn.
Setting climb thrust and attempting to climb above the volcanic cloud is not recommended due to accelerated engine damage/flameout at high thrust settings.

• Engine and wing anti-ice on. All air conditioning packs on.

• Start the auxiliary power unit (APU), if available. The APU can be used to power the electrical system in the event of a multiple-engine power loss.

• Oxygen mask on and 100%, if required.

• Ignition on. For systems with autostart, switch to “on” position.

• Monitor EGT. If necessary, shut down and then restart engines to keep from exceeding EGT limits.

• Close the outflow valves.

• Do not pull the fire switch.

• Leave fuel boost pump switches “on” and open cross-feed valves.

• Do not use fuel heat.

• Engine restart. If an engine fails to start, try again immediately. Successful engine restart may not be possible until airspeed and altitude are within the airstart envelope. After the engine starts, land at the nearest airport.

REFERENCES
1. Miller, T.P., and T.J. Casadevall, “Volcanic Ash Hazards to Aviation,” Encyclopedia of Volcanoes, page 915, 1999.

2. Schneider, David J., David J. Delene, William I. Rose, and Shiming Wen, “Remote Sensing of Volcanic Eruption Clouds Using AVHRR,” http://www.geo.mtu.edu/volcanoes/research/avhrr/, July 2002.

3. Swanson, Samuel E., and James E. Beget, “Melting Properties of Volcanic Ash,” Volcanic Ash and Aviation Safety: Proceedings of the First International Symposium on Volcanic Ash and Aviation Safety, U.S. Geological Survey Bulletin 2047, page 87, July 1991.

4. Grindle, Thomas J., and Frank W. Burcham, Jr., “Even Minor Volcanic Ash Encounters can Cause Major Damage to Aircraft,” ICAO Journal, Volume 57, Number 2, page 12, March 2002.

5. Pieri, David C., and Robert Oeding, “Preliminary Analyses of Volcanic Ash on an Aircraft Windscreen: the December 15, 1989 Redoubt Encounter,” Airborne Hazards from Volcanic Ash Colloquium, Seattle, Wash., Boeing Aircraft Company, July 7, 1991.

6. Krueger, A.J., L.S. Walter, P.K. Bhartia, C.C. Schnetzler, N.A. Krotkov, I. Sprod, and G.J.S. Bluth,
“Volcanic Sulfur Dioxide Measurements from the Total Ozone Mapping Spectrometer Instruments,” Journal of Geophysical Research, Volume 100, Number C7, July 1995.

7. Schneider, David J., William I. Rose, Larry R. Coke, and Gregg J.S. Bluth, “Early Evolution of a Stratospheric Volcanic Eruption Cloud as Observed with TOMS and AVHRR,” Journal of Geophysical Research, Volume 104, Number E2, page 4037, February 1999.

8. Prata, A.J., “Observations of Volcanic Ash Clouds in the 10–12 μm Window Using AVHRR/2 Data,” International Journal of Remote Sensing, Volume 10, Numbers 4 and 5, page 751, 1989.

9. Baer-Riedhart, Jenny, NASA DC-8 Airborne Laboratory, http://www.dfrc.nasa.gov/PAO/PAIS/HTML/FS-050-DFRC.html , April 2002 .

10. SAGE III Ozone Loss and Validation Experiment, http://cloud1.arc.nasa.gov/solve/index.html, June 2001.

11. Rose, William I., Gregg Bluth, C.M. Riley, Matt Watson, Tianxu Yu, and Gerald G. Ernst, “Potential Mitigation of Volcanic Cloud Hazards Using Satellite Data — a Case Study of the February 2000 Hekla Event and an Unexpected NASA DC8 Encounter,” American Geophysical Union, 2002 Fall Meeting, Eos Trans. AGU, 81 (48), Abst. V61B-09.

12. Pieri, D., C. Ma, J. Simpson, G. Hufford, T. Grindle, and C. Grove, “Analysis of In-Situ Airborne Volcanic Ash from the February 2000 Eruption of Hekla Volcano, Iceland,” Geophysical Research Letters, Volume 29, Number 16, 10.1029/2001GL013688, 2002.